751G.00/5–2254: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
4499. Repeated information Geneva 280. Department limit distribution. Geneva eyes only Under Secretary. Re Dep. tel. 4194.1 I saw Maurice Schumann late Saturday afternoon2 and conveyed to him information contained in ref. tel. He was well pleased with contents of para 1 regarding Marines which he felt answered adequately one of three serious questions which he had posed last Monday. Regarding second serious problem, that of clarifying independence of the Associated States, Schumann had nothing of interest to say except to reiterate the impossibility of publicity creating a right of secession from the French Union. The third serious problem raised by Schumann last Monday was the requirement that there be some degree of flexibility in regard to withdrawal of French forces from Indo China in the event of a substantial strengthening of the Vietnam National Army. As he then said, the French do not feel that they can make a commitment to keep their present forces, plus the reinforcements they are now sending, in Indo China for the whole period of united action. They feel that such a commitment for an indefinite period is impossible. The French are perfectly willing to agree that they will not remove their forces as additional forces from the United States and other countries come in, but they do want flexibility. Specifically, they might make some reduction in their forces as the Viet Nam National Army increased provided that the military situation allowed such a reduction. My feeling is that even if we could force the French to accept such a commitment it would certainly ensure indefinite postponement of E.D.C.3 Ref. tel. gave no answer to this question and Schumann is still awaiting our views.
As to timing, the French would like to come to full agreement with the U.S. just as soon as possible. Such an agreement would only be announced or used when it became obvious to French that it was impossible to secure an honorable armistice at Geneva.
[Page 1602]I do not understand para 2(c) of ref. tel. as French consider that negotiations are now fully under way except for military negotiations regarding training, command and operational planning, etc. The French would like to undertake such military negotiations as soon as possible and request information as to where we would like such negotiations to take place. I am sure that unless some other channel of negotiation has been set up, they would want to talk with General Trapnell along these lines. In answer to para 2(d) French would not submit agreement to cabinet or parliament until they were ready to ask for actual U.S. intervention. The time schedule, as I see it, would be (1) completion of negotiations; (2) some method, not necessarily public announcement, of letting Communists at Geneva know that agreement had been reached. If this did not produce results (3) decision that an honorable armistice was not possible at Geneva; (4) submission of agreement to cabinet and French parliament followed immediately by formal request to U.S.
After I had completed my conversation with Schumann, Bidault joined us for a few minutes and Schumann outlined status of negotiations to him. He did not have a great deal to add except to emphasize the impossibility of a public right of secession from the French Union. He remarked that the only document which contained such a right of secession was the constitution of Soviet Russia. He also enlarged upon the fact that if such a declaration were made it would cause immediate troubles in Africa which would necessitate further acts of repression on the part of the French, all of which would be most undesirable. He finished by saying the French could never agree to make such a statement and rather than make it, they would continue to fight by themselves even though the results might be disastrous. My own feeling is that if we wish to provide military assistance to France and the Associated States in Indo China we will have to abandon idea of French making any statement regarding the right of secession. My views on this subject have been motivated by my conviction that if we insist on such a statement, the result will be acceptance of surrender terms similar to those posed by Viet Minh either by this government or by a succeeding government. I will consider problem further and attempt to provide some formula as requested in ref. tel.
Bidault also made several remarks about how ill-informed he had been in Geneva on these negotiations. He said that Margerie had talked with Achilles but that he himself had never talked with the Under Secretary on this subject. I have the impression that he would very much like to have the Under Secretary talk with him about this early next week.