751G.00/5–1554: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India1
1314. Murphy discussed Indochina with Indian Ambassador May 13.2 With reference press reports of recent meetings five powers [Page 1572] (US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand) to discuss South East Asia with special attention Indochina, said no such meetings have been held. US obviously not interested limiting its consultations re Indochina to that group; neighboring countries vitally concerned and no intention try decide destiny South East Asia without reference to area governments. A military staff group at Singapore has met from time to time and believed press had drawn incorrect inferences. Said Secretary plans to pursue idea of a grouping for united action or united attitude of countries who are concerned by situation South East Asia and by spread communism. Then turned to charges at Geneva of US support of colonialism and reviewed US record mentioning Philippines, Indonesia, and Korea. Pointed out however that US is associated with other countries in a world situation; our primary interest has been to stem flow of communism but we aware of local political over-tones. Said France had come long way rectifying situation as it concerned Indochinese independence.
Mehta then reviewed statement on Indochina issued Colombo Prime Ministers Conference.3 Said he frequently asked if India would be prepared play part in some security agreement. Said, assuming complete independence Associated States, if both sides agreed, India thought it could help, India was prepared to help. Wanted to know how we envisaged a settlement.
Murphy said that a settlement was basically for France and Associated States work out. Cited complexities making Indochina different more difficult than Korea. Thought Vietnamese did not favor partition and Eden’s idea did not appeal to Vietnamese on either side. On other hand coalition would lead to Communist domination which unacceptable. Apart from military victory no quick or happy solution.
Mehta said independence had to be translated into concrete terms. There would have to be a transition period which Asian states might supervise under UN.
Murphy said trouble with simple cease fire and then negotiations for settlement was that we did not have faith in Communists. It was desirable, as for example in Korean case, to agree in advance on machinery for safeguarding settlement or armistice. Replying question said we favored something generally along lines French proposal at Geneva.
Mehta referred colonial aspects Indochina saying Asia viewed it as predominately colonial war. Ho Chi Minh was symbol national resistance. If as enlightened as US, British or Dutch, French would have transferred power long before and avoided present dilemma. He believed Ho would win elections or come to power after them. Said he [Page 1573] knew US has been privately pressing French for settlement but this not known by public who only see US supplying money and arms for fighting nationalists. This disillusioning to Asians who recall US support for independence Asian countries. Murphy said we understood Asiatic sentiment but pointed out that three Associated States had steadily advanced toward independence.
- Drafted by Williams of SOA. Repeated for information to Geneva as Tosec 171.↩
- Deputy Under Secretary Murphy also discussed Indochina with the Ambassador of Pakistan on May 14. The conversation was summarized in telegram 989 to Karachi, May 17. (751G.00/5–1754)↩
- See footnote 2, p. 1344.↩