Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–1454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

top secret
niact

Washington, May 15, 1954—12:38 p.m.

4094. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Reur 4383.²

1. Trapnell’s trip delayed as requested. However, we are inclined to question desirability of sending him next week in light of Ely’s trip. Request your recommendation.

2. We know no way to guarantee borders and independence of Laos and Cambodia. From military standpoint such guarantee would be impractical. From legal standpoint the processes requiring Senate action would be too complicated to affect present situation. Believe best course regarding Laos and Cambodia is to have them join with Thailand in seeking UN Peace Observation Commission. This would carry at least certain moral implications if the move was strongly backed by US and other powers.

3. If collective defense arranged as contemplated, this would of course embrace situation resulting from intervention by MIGs. If such intervention should occur prior to conclusion of collective defense arrangements, then the US reaction would have to be judged under circumstances of the moment, but in any case President would expect to make his action dependent upon Congressional authorization, assuming US interests not directly attacked. However, Defense advises that their intelligence does not indicate that Chinese airfield situation is such as to make such intervention seem likely.

4. Our normal processes of delivery of planes and equipment are proceeding and do not plan any interruption. We must be vigilant to prevent what in effect would be turning over equipment to the enemy. It is of course absolutely indispensable that any French cease fire or armistice negotiations should protect the right of the US to repossess itself of the planes and equipment which it has delivered for purposes of fighting Communists under agreements which give us the right to recapture if this use no longer contemplated.

5. Note acceptance Paris as place of negotiations.

6. Respecting conditions named our 4023,³ would like your suggestion regarding condition 2(d). We believe there might be some flexibility on our side regarding formulation but there cannot be any equivocation on completeness of independence if we are to get Philippines and Thailand to associate themselves. Without them, whole arrangement would collapse because we are not prepared to intervene purely as part of a white Western coalition which is shunned by all Asian states.

7. The phrase “and others” was designed to refer to other forces than those of US and France. The formula “principally air and sea” was not designed to exclude anti-aircraft artillery, and limited US ground forces for protection of bases which might be used by US naval and air forces.

8. Will do best respecting secrecy. The press report referred to almost certainly came from French Embassy. Suggest Laniel that Fr Emb Wash be instructed to exercise utmost discretion re these negotiations.

9. FYI, we believe as suggested your last sentence principal French motivation is to use US position to get better terms at Geneva. We have no objection to this, provided action is consistent with the principles which we think necessary and have reported to Under Secretary at Geneva as essential to avoid thinly disguised capitulation. We would expect if the French and ourselves are working together to create collective defense of the area, we should also work closely at Geneva and the French Delegation would not agree at Geneva to terms which we felt involved virtual abandonment of area to Communist forces. Certainly we should have full opportunity to know what was going on and have timely opportunity to express our views, and if they are ignored, publicly to disassociate ourselves.

10. Re final sentence para. 6, Tedul 54,⁴ we consider Laniel’s comments in Paris 4383 as preliminary observations and not as constituting formal request for opening discussions. Therefore we will not consult with UK and possibly others until we hear results of your further talk with Laniel over weekend. We assume that French will talk to no one but you at this juncture.

11. We are also not clear how Laniel proposes to handle this question procedurally with Cabinet and Parliament and would appreciate your own comment on this. We ourselves would have to have consultations with Congressional leadership if we reach agreement in principle with the French prior to presentation by Laniel to French Cabinet which will most certainly leak.

Dulles

1. Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated for information to Geneva as Tedul 73, eyes only for the Under Secretary. According to a memorandum by MacArthur to Bowie, May 15, this telegram was drafted as a result of a meeting at the White House that morning. (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Gullion”) The log of the President’s daily appointments indicates that Secretary Dulles, MacArthur, and Admiral Radford had an off-the-record breakfast meeting with the President at 7:45 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, “Daily Appointments”) The Dulles appointment book confirms the occurrence of the White House session and further indicates that Dulles, MacArthur, and Radford met again at 8:35 a.m., presumably at the State Department. (Princeton University, Dulles papers, “Daily Appointments”) No records of these meetings have been found.
2. Dated May 14, p. 1566.
3. Dated May 11, p. 1534.
4. Telegram 4023 to Paris, May 11, was repeated to Geneva as Tedul 54.