Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–1254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 12, 1954—2–2:30 p.m.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• Secretary Dulles
• Ambassador Bonnet
• Mr. MacArthur

At his request Ambassador Bonnet called on the Secretary this afternoon. He opened the conversation by saying he had brought copies of the two treaties which France had signed with Vietnam to show the Secretary.² In the meantime, however, he understood that the treaties had been made public today by the Vietnam representative at Geneva. The latter, he said, had made an excellent presentation at Geneva according to ticker reports. Since we would doubtless be receiving the English text from our delegation in Geneva of these two treaties (one a treaty of independence and the other a treaty of association), he would not take up more of the Secretary’s time with this question. In response to the Secretary’s request, Bonnet agreed to send copies of the French texts of these two treaties to the Secretary.

The Secretary said that in a recent conversation with Romulo,³ he had urged Philippine recognition of the Associated States. Romulo had replied that his government had never seen any of the treaties France was negotiating with the Associated States and until they had seen the treaties, it was difficult to judge whether or not the Associated States had in fact received their independence. The Secretary suggested the desirability of the French Government letting the Philippine and other friendly governments have the text of the treaties in question. Ambassador Bonnet nodded in apparent agreement and then was highly critical of Romulo saying that in speeches the latter continued to charge France with colonialism in Indochina. He said that some day he would probably get into a violent argument with Romulo if he did not refrain from making this charge.

Ambassador Bonnet then referred to the proposals put forward by the Vietminh at Geneva. He said they were cleverly devised and worded to appeal superficially to French opinion. The reference to the French Union and continuing cultural and economic ties were sugar coating with which the Vietminh coated their pill. The Secretary said he had been interested in the Vietminh indication that the Associated States, if taken over by the Communists, would remain in the French Union. Ambassador Bonnet said that it was a novel idea to have “three Bolshevik states” in the French Union.

Ambassador Bonnet then said that he wished to speak about the real purpose for his visit today. He referred to the Secretary’s talk with him last Saturday, May 8,⁴ in which the Secretary had told him that the U.S. was prepared to sit down and discuss with the French the “internationalizing” of the Indochina war. The French Government believed that the time had now come to have such conversations with the United States. It was of the greatest importance that the French Government know the attitude of the United States, the circumstance in which it would intervene in the Indochina conflict and precisely what it would do. The French Government must know the U.S. position in the event Geneva does not lead to a cessation of military hostilities in Indochina and the military situation there requires France to request outside assistance. At present the French Government recognizes that U.S. intervention in Indochina must be based on the concept of collective action. However, there are a number of “ifs” and “conditions” which are not entirely clear. For example, it is doubtful whether the Australian Government could join in collective action until after the elections of May 29. Furthermore, the British, because of their concern about the position of Hong Kong and because of Nehru, may not be willing to join in collective action. Meanwhile time is passing and if there is not some military assistance from without, the military situation in Indochina may deteriorate to the point where Indochina is lost before outside assistance is brought to bear. With respect to this problem the attitude of the U.S. is the only really important factor. The French recognize our reluctance to proceed without the U.K. but what the U.S. decides to do is the key.

Secretary Dulles replied that we were prepared to begin talks with the French virtually at once. He did not, however, believe it would be wise to begin such talks until the outcome of the French vote of confidence scheduled to take place tomorrow was known.⁵ He said that this problem had been considered in general terms by the President, the NSC and the JCS and we were in a position to discuss it with the French. Ambassador Bonnet fully agreed that talks should not start until after the outcome of the vote of confidence scheduled to take place tomorrow. While he hoped that Laniel would receive a majority, this was by no means certain. It would be a very close thing in any event. If Laniel does receive a vote of confidence, the French must then know what will happen and what assistance they can expect if they resist Communist pressure at Geneva. The Secretary said he agreed that the French should know where they stood. In particular he believed that if they had no alternative they would find it difficult to resist yielding to the Communists at Geneva, which would be a disaster of the first magnitude for France. The Secretary said that the best chance to prevent Geneva from failing was to have a sound alternative position to capitulation to the Communists.

There was then discussion as to where the discussion might be had. The Secretary said his initial reaction was that it might be best to hold them in Paris since it would make it easier to keep in touch with Laniel. Ambassador Bonnet said that it was all very difficult because Bidault was at Geneva and Laniel was in Paris. The Secretary suggested that Bidault could make a trip to Paris and Bonnet indicated that this was a possibility but depended on what was happening at Geneva. After further general exchange on this subject, Bonnet said that he would inform Paris that there seemed to be advantages in having the meeting in Paris but also other advantages in having it in Washington. He would ask the views of the French Government on this.

During the course of this conversation, the Secretary also referred to the unfortunate interpretation which had been placed on remarks he made in his press conference yesterday.⁶ Bonnet said that the press was highly irresponsible and he had worked hard with both the French and U.S. press last evening to correct the erroneous interpretation which had been placed on the Secretary’s words. Bonnet said that at the conclusion of the French cabinet meeting yesterday the Ministers had been greeted by about 100 news correspondents who informed them that the U.S. had taken the position that the U.S. had given up any hope of defending Indochina. This had created considerable confusion but he felt that the situation had now been straightened out. The Secretary made reference to the President’s press conference this morning which Bonnet said had also helped to correct the false impression created by “irresponsible journalists” yesterday. Bonnet said it might be helpful if the State Department could issue another statement correcting the misinterpretation. After further discussion he said that in view of the President’s statement⁷ he did not believe anything further was necessary.

1. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 4048 of May 12 (Tedul 60 to Geneva and 2269 to Saigon). (751G.00/5–1254) In telegram 2467 from Saigon, May 19, McClintock relayed Bonnet’s account of this meeting based on information received from Paris by High Commissioner Dejean. (751G.00/5–1954)
2. For the texts of the French-Vietnamese Treaties, actually dated June 4, 1954, see L’Année Politique, 1954, pp. 572–573; for English translations, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. I, pp. 268–271.
3. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines; Personal Representative of President Magsaysay on visit in the United States.
4. For the memorandum of that conversation, see p. 1516.
5. See footnote 1, p. 1550.
6. Remarks delivered by Secretary Dulles at his news conference of May 11 were widely interpreted as an indication that the Secretary believed that Southeast Asia as a whole might be defended by means of collective security even if Indochina or part of it were lost. For the Dulles news conference statements of May 11, see Department of State Bulletin, May 24, 1954, pp. 781–782.
7. At his news conference of May 12, President Eisenhower denied that differences existed between him and Secretary Dulles regarding Indochina and Southeast Asia. He also said: “I don’t think the free world ought to write off Indochina.” For the record of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 466–475.