751G.00/5–1254
Memorandum of Conversation, by Paul J. Sturm of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs
Subject:
- Situation in Indochina and Possible Defense Arrangements in Southeast Asia
Participants:
- Senator Mike Mansfield
- Mr. Francis R. Valeo, Chief, Foreign Affairs Section, Legislative Reference Service
- Mr. Paul Sturm, PSA
I lunched with Senator Mansfield today at his request. The Senator and Mr. Valeo stayed with me two days last September in Hanoi. Senator Mansfield asked what information I had regarding latest developments in Indochina. I informed him that dangerous military pressures seemed to be building up already against the Tonkin Delta and that military developments in that area were likely to have more bearing on the course of negotiations at Geneva than was generally realized.
Senator Mansfield mentioned that he had just come from a Foreign Relations Committee meeting at which the Secretary had discussed principles governing U.S. participation in the Geneva Conference.1 I asked Senator Mansfield if he was satisfied with the course of action we have followed thus far. He replied that he was reserving judgment because he had not noticed in the document read by the Secretary to the Committee any reference to a U.S. position regarding possible partition of Vietnam. I brought out that the paragraph which says that the U.S. is not prepared to give its approval, express or implied, to any settlement which would have the effect of subverting lawful governments of the Associated States or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity, should adequately cover that point. The Senator said that if such was the case, he would probably give his approval to the statement.
Senator Mansfield brought up the subject of a possible regional security pact and expressed the opinion that it would have to be based upon a voluntary association of the nations in the area, and could not be artificially stimulated by the U.S., although we would of course have to underwrite any effective action undertaken by such a grouping. Senator Mansfield went on to say that he believed the potential role of India as a de facto ally of the free world in Asia has been [Page 1539] underestimated by persons who have let themselves be affected by Nehru’s frequently annoying and uncooperative attitudes.
I mentioned to the Senator that Walter Lippmann had expressed similar thoughts regarding the present and future importance of Nehru to the free world in the Far East and had pointed out to me yesterday that Nehru’s policies are nearly identical with those pursued by this nation in its early days. Mr. Lippmann added that if these Indian policies were expressed, as they might well be, in the language of The Federalist they would be more readily understood here and would find a responsive echo.
Senator Mansfield was struck by this parallel and suggested that thought might be given to the proclamation of a “Nehru Doctrine” for South and Southeast Asia. The Senator remarked that the enforcement of our own Monroe Doctrine in the early days of the Republic depended implicitly on the support of the British Navy. We might find it advantageous similarly to underwrite, with equal discretion, any Nehru doctrine directed against an expansion of Communist “colonialism.”
Senator Mansfield asked what my personal ideas were with regard to (a) the importance to the U.S. of Indochina, (b) the importance to us of Southeast Asia, and (c) whether, in fact, the defense of Southeast Asia would be possible if Indochina were lost. I replied that it seems to me that the importance of holding the line in Indochina and Southeast Asia goes far beyond the local scene. It has been our policy both in Europe and in Northeast Asia to maintain pressures against the USSR, its allies and satellites. To accept the writing-off of Southeast Asia or even of Indochina would imply and symbolize a slackening of those pressures which might be expected to have unfortunate repercussions upon our position in all other parts of the world. Whether it proved militarily possible or not to defend Vietnam as well as Laos and Cambodia at this stage, to write them off or even to give the appearance of writing them off without a struggle would be very harmful to our moral position in the free world, and subsequently to our military position as well.
Getting down to more specific terms, Senator Mansfield asked what it might be possible for us to do, militarily, in Indochina. I offered as a purely personal idea that an initial limited intervention with ground forces, primarily in the Haiphong area, might enable us to hold the line until we could undertake serious training of a National Army and the construction of a regional defense organization, of which that National Army should be a part, and which might have a reasonable prospect of securing the area, so long as it were logistically supported by us and morally supported by its neighbors.
[Page 1540]Senator Mansfield remarked that it now is evident that our most serious mistake thus far with regard to Indochina had been to assume that a military victory was possible, in the absence of suitable political settlements between France on the one hand and the Associated States on the other.
Comment:
On each previous occasion on which I have talked with Senator Mansfield, and as recently as April 21, he has been vehemently opposed to the use of American ground forces in Indochina. Today however he did not react adversely when I mentioned this possibility.
- Secretary Dulles appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee at 3 p.m., May 11, and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at 10:30 a.m., May 12. On each occasion, he read the text of basic instructions to be sent to the U.S. Delegation at Geneva. For text of telegram Tosec 138 to Geneva, May 12, containing the instructions, see vol. xvi, p. 778.↩