Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–1054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

top secret
niact

Washington, May 11, 1954—4:09 p.m.

4023. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Reurtel 4287 and our 4017.²

1. We fully realize need for prompt decisions regarding internationalizing the war. Various factors combine to suggest that it may be premature to pose issue of internationalizing for decision at this moment:

(a) If raised before French realize fully that choice is between internationalizing and virtual surrender, proposal to internationalize might well be rejected, leaving no alternative but capitulation.

(b) British are more likely to support or acquiesce in intervention if Geneva has been shown to offer no prospect of solution.

(c) Australian government would almost certainly not take a position until after elections at end of May.

Even so it seems desirable for Laniel to know in general terms conditions we would require for intervention because of influence on current French decisions in military field in Indo-China and in political field in Geneva.

2. President would ask Congress for authority to use armed forces of US in area to support friendly and recognized governments against aggression or armed subversion fomented from without, provided he could then state that following conditions had been or would be met:

(a) That US military participation had been formally requested by France and three Associated States;

(b) That Thailand, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom also had received similar invitations and that we were satisfied that first two would also accept at once; that next two would probably accept following Australian elections, if US invokes ANZUS Treaty; and the U.K. would either participate or be acquiescent;

(c) That some aspect of matter would be presented to UN promptly, such as by request from Laos, Cambodia or Thailand for peace observation commission;

(d) That France guarantees to Associated States complete independence, including unqualified option to withdraw from French Union at any time;

(e) France would undertake not to withdraw its forces from Indochina during period of united action so that forces from U.S.—principally air and sea³—and others would be supplementary and not in substitution;

(f) That agreement was reached on training of native troops and on command structure for united action.

FYI Radford contemplates French Supreme Command with U.S. Air Command. End FYI

3. U.S. would require all these conditions to be accepted by French Cabinet and authorized or endorsed by French National Assembly. This would be especially important in view of uncertain tenure of any French government: U.S. would have fully committed itself once it agreed to intervene and would have to be able to rely on adherence to conditions by any successor French government.

4. You will realize that intervention might involve consequences of utmost gravity. Reactions of Communist bloc could not be predicted. Also, if it became necessary to proceed without active U.K. participation, the implications would be extremely serious and far-reaching. Removal any taint colonialism would be essential to success of operation in Indochina, to attraction of potential Asian support, and to forestalling opposition by other Asian and Middle Eastern countries. In view of these factors, you will appreciate that conditions indicated would be absolutely indispensable as basis for our action.

5. The U.S. would continue its efforts to broaden united action operation by seeking to bring in other countries whose interests are affected and to formalize the coalition as, for example, by negotiation of regional defense pact.

6. Unless you consider timing unwise in light of factors stated in para 1, you may outline foregoing orally to Laniel as your estimate of indispensable conditions in light of your knowledge of current high-level thinking in Washington in advance receipt by you of official reaction to your report of his proposal. You should leave nothing in writing with him. You should make clear to him, however, that we would not wish to proceed with any of this program unless National Assembly supports position of his government, as outlined first paragraph your cable. If that occurs and Laniel wishes to pursue matter on basis outlined above, he should formally request opening of discussions with us on procedure for fulfilling essential conditions. At that stage U.S. would expect to consult with U.K.

7. If you decide unwise to talk with Laniel now on above basis, please cable.⁴

Dulles

1. Drafted by the Secretary of State and approved by President Eisenhower. Repeated to Geneva as Tedul 54. “Eyes Only Under Secretary from Secretary.”
2. Both dated May 10, pp. 1522 and 1529, respectively.
3. According to a notation on the draft copy of this telegram in the files of the Policy Planning Staff, the words “principally air and sea” were added by the President. (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “1954 Chron”) See memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, supra.
4. In telegram 4332 from Paris, May 12, Ambassador Dillon responded as follows: “In view governmental crisis, do not intend discuss Deptel 4023 with Laniel at this time.” (751G.00/5–1254) The governmental situation was particularly uncertain in view of new discussion on Indochina in the National Assembly which began on May 11 and concluded with a vote of confidence on May 13. For information on these proceedings, see footnote 1, p. 1550.