Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Gullion”

Memorandum by Edmund A. Gullion¹ to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)

secret

[Washington,] May 7, 1954.

Subject:

• US Role in Current Negotiations on Indochina

1. Unless and until the United States decides to intervene in the battle in Indochina, I believe we should shun the active and central role in these negotiations. If there is real hope that the United States would choose a defense line anywhere in Indochina or adjacent to it and would participate in “united action” to man it, this would warrant our taking an active role and urging that the French and Associated States take this or that position, but this still seems questionable.

2. The terms on which Laniel is prepared to negotiate are considerably better than the French might have been expected to put forward. These are, however, only initial terms. Almost surely the French will be brought to accepting something far less; in fact, if Dien Bien Phu falls as it is bound to do, it is probable that it will not be Laniel or Bidault who negotiates. Whether they do or not, French logic will restrain them from exacting fantastic concessions from an adversary who is victorious.

3. At some stage in the game, the settlement which emerges will be most disadvantageous to the loyal inhabitants of the Associated States who have collaborated with us. The French terms contain the germ of a territorial settlement, however much the French deny that they contemplate a partition arrangement. It is bad enough that we should be signatories to the carving up of one more Asian ally without our appearing as the moving force of a capitulation which will “live in infamy” in Asia.

4. In their chagrined and rudderless condition, the French might all too easily allow us to take the initiative on proposals. Then, French opinion as well as Asian could point in the future to a US responsibility.

5. Obviously, we would do what we can to persuade the French not to fall too far below their initial bargaining position, but what we can do is obviously very little until we are willing to take responsibility and risks.

6. I think some sense of this position should inform the instructions to our Delegation. In the negotiations, it seems to me, unless unforeseen opportunities develop, we should confine ourselves to registering an opinion against extreme concessions by the French at the same time as we approve and applaud any signs of backbone on their part. If we can at the same time take some action in Europe which would demonstrate our sympathy and support, so much the better. And if a “pact” is really in the cards we could use the negotiations as a holding operation while it shapes up.

1. Member of the Policy Planning Staff.