State-JCS meetings, lot 61D 417
Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, May 7, 1954, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follows a list of those present (28).]
1. Evacuation Plans for Indochina
Mr. Murphy opened the meeting by asking the JCS to inform the Department whether Defense had made plans for removing French military and civilian nationals from Tonkin and, if so, (a) whether these plans are current and (b) whether in the opinion of the JCS it is feasible to coordinate plans for evacuation of the French with plans for evacuation of Americans. Mr. Murphy added that if such coordination [Page 1499] were approved, the State Department would appreciate information as to the Defense agency which it should consult in order to effect such coordination.
Admiral Radford said that CINCPAC has the responsibility for planning, with the French, military evacuation from Indochina. That portion of evacuation plans dealing with the evacuation of French military and civilians, the Admiral continued, was under a general, enlarged plan developed at the request of French Prime Minister Pleven in the fall of 1950. As a result of this request, CINCPAC in January 1951 was ordered to discuss the question with the French in Indochina. The plan took a year to prepare, was on a large scale, and involved an amphibious operation of considerable magnitude.
Admiral Carney pointed out that the larger evacuation plan involved some 80,000 French regulars, 40,000 irregulars and some 10,000 selected civilians. Its success would depend on the French ability to undertake a reasonably orderly military retreat, since it would take from six weeks to two months to mount the requisite logistical support.
Admiral Radford again referred to his conversation with General de Lattre de Tassigny some two years ago in which the General stated that it would be impossible to evacuate because civilians would pose an insuperable difficulty. The Admiral added that if there were strong native resistance to evacuation, there would obviously be a need for U.S. protective forces to safeguard the ships lying offshore. This was another example of the magnitude of the operation.
Mr. Murphy noted that this aspect of the problem was primarily a French responsibility. He recapitulated that, as he understood it, this larger plan was as current as possible. The JCS agreed. (At this juncture, 11:55 a.m., a ticker was brought in and handed to Admiral Radford, who read aloud that Dien Bien Phu had fallen.) Summing up, Admiral Radford suggested that the larger evacuation problem was so complicated that it had to be played by ear. If the French were capable of holding a military position and falling back in some sort of order, the Admiral added, such a plan might be feasible; otherwise not.
Discussion then ensued concerning authority for the diversion of U.S. shipping to the area. It was brought out that such authority was not automatic, and that diversion could be implemented only under a proclamation of emergency by the President.
[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]
4. Request for Information on Status of Various French Requests for Aid to Indochina, and Establishments of Channels for Such Requests.
Mr. Murphy indicated that the problem of supplying U.S. aid to Indochina had been unnecessarily complicated by the receipt of French requests from civilian French officials, apparently without internal [Page 1500] French coordination. Further, many such requests are received and transmitted through U.S. diplomatic channels rather than through the military. Mr. Murphy recommended that Defense discuss with State the current status of recent French requests contained in telegrams listed in a memorandum,2 copies of which Mr. Murphy left with the JCS. He also suggested that a firm procedure be established for requests for aid to Indochina and that we inform the French of the procedure in order to avoid further confusion.
Admiral Radford expressed JCS gratitude for the memorandum and indicated that coordination obviously was necessary in a confused situation, particularly now that Dien Bien Phu had fallen.
[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]
- This State Department draft was not cleared with the participants.↩
- A memorandum on this subject was transmitted by Acting Assistant Secretary Drumright (FE) to Deputy Under Secretary Murphy on May 6, to be forwarded to the Department of Defense. A copy of that memorandum, which is presumably the document under reference here, is in file 751G.00/5–654.↩