Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–654: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Saigon, May 6, 1954—3 p.m.

2244. Sent priority Geneva 57, priority Paris 770. During my talk this morning with DeJean we canvassed internal political situation in Vietnam. DeJean deprecated in strongest terms decree of Bao Dai handing security forces to Binh Xuyen. He said it was the most appalling action that had been taken in political field since he had been Commissioner General.

On question of Cao Daist Pope’s open letter to Ho Chi Minh,¹ DeJean was more hopeful. He agreed that Quat’s efforts to prevent knowledge of Pope’s appeal spreading to populace had on whole been successful and that by and large mass of Vietnamese people are in ignorance of Cao Daist leader’s message. Strangely, Viet Minh radio appears not yet to have picked up Pope’s communication to Ho Chi Minh.

Independently from various sources both DeJean and I agreed that Vietnamese for most part have already anticipated and discounted loss of Dien-Bien-Phu. For example, yesterday Governor Tri told me that in Tonkin final fall of fortress would not occasion any excitement since Tonkinese were long inured to battle. Even civilian French element here have already accepted fate of Dien-Bien-Phu philosophically.

Our principal concern remains deterioration of morale in Vietnamese National Army. I gave DeJean substance of my talks with Hinh and Quat. DeJean said that Navarre stressed with what he thought undue emphasis poor morale in Vietnamese Army and danger that after Dien-Bien-Phu there would be general demoralization. DeJean took a different view and thought that army would not stampede because of Dien-Bien-Phu. However, we were in agreement that something radical must be done to improve morale in army, particularly since Vietnamese mobilization scheme has thus far been total failure.

I told DeJean that this evening I was dining with Hinh and could ask him if he would sit down at my table with Quat and work out a modus vivendi to end present intolerable situation in which Minister of National Defense and Commander in Chief are at swords points. If Hinh agreed, I would then ask Quat if he would come to dine with me and Hinh alone. DeJean thought this a good idea, and I shall endeavor to execute it.

McClintock

1. In telegram 2197 from Saigon, May 5, the Embassy transmitted a rough text of the broadcast of May 1 by Pham Cong Tac, the Cao Dai Pope, to Ho Chi Minh, urging the latter to agree to a coalition in order to avoid partition. (751G.00/5–454)