751G.00/5–654: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
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2242. Sent Geneva niact 56, Paris niact 769. I saw De Jean this morning on his return from Hanoi. He said that renewed fighting opened at Dien Bien Phu last night but that he did not have details as yet. Enemy ack-ack is proving more effective and French have been averaging losses of three planes a day during past two or three days.
De Jean said that General Navarre, in response to his point blank question whether it would be possible to send a relief column to Dien Bien Phu, had replied in the negative. Navarre said it would require between 12 and 15 battalions which he could not find and would place a logistics requirement which he could not meet. In other words Dien Bien Phu will inevitably be lost unless, in Navarre’s judgment, a ceasefire is contrived in next few days.
De Jean said that he vigorously opposed the idea of a cease-fire and had so telegraphed Bidault last night and would repeat this recommendation with even greater urgency this morning. He said Navarre was so wrought up over Dien Bien Phu, which was his own creation, that he would do almost anything to save it, but that with his monolithic concentration on the battle he could not see that a cease-fire would amount to capitulation. Furthermore De Jean had sought to [Page 1479] out to Navarre that a cease-fire without agreed conditions in the context of an armistice would be fatal not only to French Expeditionary Force in Indochina but to position of France in Europe.
Despite Navarre’s fixation on need for immediate cease-fire to save Dien Bien Phu, De Jean is hopeful that his government will heed his advice and not that of Navarre. He is telegraphing Bidault that to agree to a cease-fire at this time will mean not only loss of Southeast Asia but losses to France in Europe almost too vast to calculate.
De Jean, who is a far more rugged and courageous man than Navarre, will point out that after fall of Dien Bien Phu French still have military cards in their hands which can be played. Rain has already commenced to fall at Dien Bien Phu and with increase of monsoon downpour Viet Minh command will soon have to move if its battle force at Dien Bien Phu is not to become marooned. French military will have opportunity to strike Viet Minh while endeavoring to regroup if Cogny can be given some reinforcement and if air power can be brought to bear.
I believe that we should support De Jean’s recommendations to his government with utmost urgency. We now confront a situation in which two top French officials in Indochina are urging diametrically opposed policies and it is the irony of war that it is the General who wishes to surrender while the diplomat wishes to forge ahead.