751G.00/5–354: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

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2181. Sent Paris 714, Geneva 32, Hanoi 401. I went up to Dalat yesterday with DeJean. We were accompanied by Offroy, who has just arrived from Geneva en route to Bangkok where he will present his letters as new French Ambassador and return to Geneva May 18. Purpose of trip was to go over political possibilities in view of abruptly worsening situation at Dien Bien Phu. DeJean is flying to Hanoi this afternoon and there will be a council of war there with Generals Navarre, Bodet, Cogny, Lauzin, Gambiez, and Colonel Crevecoeur, Commanding French Union Forces Laos, with Admiral Auboyneau [Page 1458] also present. Purpose council of war will be to examine present critical military posture and decide whether Navarre has capability of doing anything to relieve Dien Bien Phu and, secondly, what military measures can be taken to preserve delta from attack after fall of Dien Bien Phu.

DeJean’s main worry is that French Government is “hypnotized on Dien Bien Phu” but he very much fears that certain ministers of his government will advise policy of asking for immediate cease-fire in Indochina in order “to save Dien Bien Phu”. DeJean, of course, recognizes that this would be complete disaster and agreed with me that Communists would most certainly portray such action, not only throughout Asia, but elsewhere in world, as French capitulation, irrespective of whether or not remnant of Dien Bien Phu garrison is thus spared. However, DeJean evidently fears that Navarre, after examining the auspices, may telegraph Paris that militarily Dien Bien Phu cannot be saved and that, therefore, only other course is political one. I am sure, however, that DeJean is much heartened at his government’s stand against partition (cf. Embassy telegram 2180 repeated Paris 740, Geneva 31 today)1 and that he will use his utmost influence on the military commanders to continue the fight even if this means taking risks elsewhere in Indochina which Navarre is reluctant to contemplate.

If we desire to prevent French Government from proposing immediate cease-fire, urgent representations at highest level will be necessary in Paris. DeJean promises to inform me results Hanoi conference immediately upon his return tomorrow.

McClintock
  1. The telegram under reference read as follows: “Dejean has just informed me that he has received telegram from Bidault in Geneva authorizing him to give fullest publicity to refusal of French Government to contemplate any partition of Vietnam.” (751G.00/5–354)