Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, White House Office, “Legislative Leadership Conference”

Memorandum by the Assistant Staff Secretary to the President (Minnich)¹

[Extract]

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

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At the April 26th Conference,² the President reported again on the Indo China situation. He referred vaguely to French worries and lack of fixed purpose, noted that Dienbienphu was within two or three days of its fall, then recalled our past attempt to get a collective approach by the allies to the problem. As we saw it, this approach would have to be free of any implication of colonialism as well as any implication that the United States would carry alone the burden of defense of the free world.

The President then noted repeated requests for U.S. participation, such as the use of our B–29’s. He asserted that anything to be done would have to be on the basis of the free world against the forces of enslavement, not as a simple contest for power between the United States and Russia. Because of the difficulty of getting agreed action under these terms, he feared that the situation might have a very serious outcome. Most recently, he said, there has been talk of a general cease fire, and in the last twenty-four hours both Bidault and the British have been taking a stronger stand. The latter, of course, were concerned over Hong Kong, and they realized that they could not hope for assistance in preserving Hong Kong unless they helped to save Indo China. The immediate effort of the United States was focussed on getting agreement of the several governments concerned for a plan of action which could then be discussed with the several legislative bodies of those nations involved. He concluded by saying that he did not foresee entry of American ground forces in the conflict.

The subject was revived later in the meeting following reference to a newspaper editorial which expressed alarm over the prospect of the United States getting into the Indo China war. The President undertook to explain the diplomatic situation as one where we were attempting to get what we wanted at the least cost. Again he praised the magnificent resistance put up by the French at Dienbienphu. If that fight were lost, as it soon appeared to be, there would still be the job of holding back the Communists in the rest of Indo China, and it would certainly be inadvisable to risk the loss of 200,000 French troops. One leader interrupted to recall the request for Congressional concurrence in sending 400 technicians to Indo China. The President then commented on how hard decisions were when it was a matter of doing unpleasant things that are not properly understood. Frequently it was a matter of doing small things quickly to avoid having to make larger commitments later on. He saw Indo China as constituting a dilemma for there was no end to the fighting in sight, yet the alternative of losing Indo China could be worse. He was sure that it boiled down to a matter of making fine judgments as to what seemed in the best interest of the nation. He thought one of the functions of the groups like the leadership conference was to see where “our best bet is to be had”, then go on to consult with others.

The President continued to the effect that he hated to see all action bogged down on one detail and that he thought it was a matter of finding the cheapest way out of the dilemma. He made clear that he was not advocating the commitment of U.S. ground forces. Actually, he believed, it would be a great mistake for the United States to enter the fray in partnership only with the French. United action by the free world was necessary, and in such action the U.S. role would not require use of its ground forces.

One leader then suggested that the Administration would be equally criticized if it were not calling attention to the danger of losing Indo China. The President agreed and recalled what was said about the failure of the Democrats to face up to the situation in China. Then he asserted our determination to lead the free world into a voluntary association which would make further Communist encroachment impossible.

One comment was then forthcoming from the leadership concerning criticism of Mr. Acheson for his 1950 statement about how Korea was not strategically vital to U.S. interests and another comment focussed on the undesirability of committing U.S. forces. The President noted how one step followed another in an evolving situation, increasing the need for Executive-Legislative consultation such as this. He hoped the group would not lose sight of the tremendous overall problem and potential future consequences. He felt that the group should not undertake to make final decisions, and that it should certainly not foreclose the possibility that some units might have to be sent in.

A Senator then expressed his feeling that eventually we must face a showdown as to whether we meant to resist the Chinese or not. If the United States should fail to achieve an allied effort, and if we did not mean to resist by ourselves, then the quicker we could disengage the better off we would be. The President replied only in terms of how serious would be the consequences if our allies ever went back on us, especially since it is no longer possible to fight just a defensive war and overseas bases are necessary for offensive war. Then, when the Senator referred to the “damn fool Fortress America idea”, the President ventured a prediction: should the United States ever have to fall back to that idea, the country could narrow its thinking to a single event—the explosion of the Fortress.

Once more, before this meeting concluded, the President referred to the subject. He reported from a message just received from Sec. Dulles that the latter was somewhat downcast over a rather negative response from the British in regard to (our proposal for united action?).³

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1. For information on this memorandum, see footnote 1, p. 1023.
2. The discussion on Indochina at this meeting is further documented in the extract from the Hagerty Diary, supra; editorial note, infra; and in telegram Tedul 16 to Geneva, Apr. 28, vol. xvi, p. 599.
3. Reference is presumably to telegram Dulte 5 from Geneva, Apr. 25, which summarized a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden held that day. For the memorandum by Dulles of that conversation, see vol. xvi, p. 553. For text of Dulte 5, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 388–389.