Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers

Hagerty Diary, April 26, 19541

[Extracts]

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Indo China—The President said that the French “are weary as hell”—he said that it didn’t look as though Dien Bien Phu could hold out for more than a week and would fall possibly sooner—Reported that the British thought that the French were not putting out as much as they could, but that he did not necessarily agree with their viewpoint. “The French go up and down every day—they are very voluble. They thing [think] they are a great power one day and they feel sorry for themselves the next day.” The President said that if we were to put one combat soldier into Indo China, then our entire prestige would be at stake, not only in that area but throughout the world—The President said the British are worried about Hong Kong and hope it will be left alone. They are fearful that if they move in Indo China the Chinese Reds will move against Hong Kong and could take it easily—“My argument to the British has been that if we all went in together into Indo China at the same time, that would be fine but if they don’t go in with us, they don’t expect us to help them defend Hong Kong. We must have collective security or we’ll fall.”—The President said the situation looked very grim this morning but that he and Dulles were [Page 1411] doing everything they could to get the free countries to act in concert. In addition, he said “there are plenty of people in Asia, and we can train them to fight well. I don’t see any reason for American ground troops to be committed in Indo China, don’t think we need it, but we can train their forces and it may be necessary for us eventually to use some of our planes or aircraft carriers off the coast and some of our fighting craft we have in that area for support.”

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The discussion then came back to the international situation, and the President said that what American policy was doing was “gambling thousands to save billions.” He re-emphasized that Indo China was worse now than ever before despite the fact that the French troops were fighting magnificently—“200,000 fine French troops in Indo China.”—The President said he was not “advocating any additional troops for Indo China, not as a single partner of the French—must keep up pressure for collective security and show determination of free world to oppose chipping away of any part of the free world”—“Where in the hell can you let the Communists chip away any more. We just can’t stand it.”—Nixon and Millikin then said that we should have a real understanding with our allies and if they go back on us, then we would have to review the situation again—The President said “if allies go back on us, then we would have one terrible alternative—we would have to attack with everything we have.” He said he had more confidence in the British standing up because he believed that they had finally awakened to the fact that they cannot hold Hong Kong much longer if the Chinese want to take it—Knowland said that he thought we ought to get a thorough briefing on Russian atomic potential now and four years from now—Millikin said if our allies deserted, we would have to go back to fortress America. President angrily ended the discussion by saying “Listen, Gene, if we ever come back to fortress America, then the word ‘fortress’ will be entirely wrong in this day and age. Dien Bien Phu is a perfect example of a fortress. The Reds are surrounding it and crowding back the French into a position where they have to surrender or die. If we ever came back to the fortress idea for America, we would have, as I said before, one simple, dreadful alternative—we would have to explore an attack with everything we have. What a terrible decision that would be to make.”

Riding back with the President from Chamber of Commerce greetings, discussed with him press conference for this week2—We both agreed that it would be particularly necessary to have one in order to answer and clear up questions on Indo China and Geneva Conference. [Page 1412] Will try to emphasize that we have won a great victory at Geneva by refusing to recognize Red China and that Foster Dulles has followed American policy in refusing to yield to Russia’s seating plans—With regard to Indo China we will try to point out as strongly as possible that all is not lost if Dien Bien Phu falls, which probably it will within a week.

  1. The extracts printed here comprise Press Secretary Hagerty’s diary entry on discussion of Indochina at a White House meeting with Republican legislative leaders held on Apr. 26 at 8:30 a.m. Those present were the President; Vice President Nixon; Senators William F. Knowland of California, Homer Ferguson of Michigan, Eugene D. Millikin of Colorado, and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire; Representatives Joseph M. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts (Speaker), Charles A. Halleck of Indiana. Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, and Leo E. Allen of Illinois; and Sherman Adams, Wilton B. Persons, Robert Cutler, Arthur Minnich, Hagerty, and other members of the White House staff. With regard to this meeting, see also memorandum by Minnich, infra; editorial note, p. 1414; and telegram Tedul 16 to Geneva, Apr. 28, containing a summary by Cutler of the principal points made by the President, vol. xvi, p. 599.
  2. Regarding the President’s news conference of Apr. 29, see editorial note, p. 1430.