751G.00/12–1954: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State1
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2601. Repeated information Saigon 388, London 654. Limit distribution—Saigon for Collins. Tripartite discussions on Indochina took place this afternoon2 at Matignon.
Dulles opened conversations by greeting Ely and citing appreciation of cooperation he had shown U.S. authorities in Vietnam. Ely gave report current situation at Mendes’ suggestion. He said first point to be cleared up after Collins arrived was settlement Government-national army conflict. Accomplished by means Bao Dai’s recall Hinh. Second was to try prepare program for Diem Government. This done but question now how to get Diem accept formula. Theirs was how strengthen Diem. Ely and Collins tried introduce Quat who is better politician and administrator than Diem into government but sects and Diem balked. He said only suggestion ever accepted by Diem was appointment Minh as Minister Defense.
Mendes interrupted to make two points. First that Collins and Ely thought that Ministries of Interior and National Defense should be combined. Both offices are concerned with internal affairs and it is unnecessary separate them at this time. Diem had refused this suggestion too. Second point was that working groups had been established in Saigon to suggest reforms to government both administrative and agrarian. Not a single reform suggested accepted by Diem. Mendes described Diem’s approach as wholly negative. French Government now considered that as a result of today’s talks strong approach would have to be made to Diem. Suggestions should be precise and energetic. There was no time left to allow for anything less. Mendes wished reaffirm his past agreement with Secretary’s thesis that we must do our maximum to permit Diem Government to succeed. Now he wished add that he was no longer sure that even maximum would help. He said [Page 2401] we must now have alternate formula in mind. Without varying from our stated purpose of supporting Diem Government as long as it exists we must now prepare in our minds for alternative.
Secretary replied that he recognized task in South Vietnam was difficult one. Difficult because it required that government be built of indigenous peoples with little or no experience. Moreover, they had to build in time of great stress following military defeat, temporary partition and while there was great influx of refugees from north. Secretary regarded basic factors as favorable. People were opposed to communism and had great natural resources. They had exportable surplus. They received greater aid from abroad than north. Beginning of joint Franco-U.S. task difficult, but situation was much improved now that there was full cooperation between French and American authorities. Problem must not be approached between French and American authorities. Problem must not be approached in spirit of defeatism. Only serious problem we have not yet solved is that of indigenous leadership. We cannot expect it to be solved ideally because there is no tradition among indigenous people for self-government. We must get along with something less good than best.
Secretary continued to say that he had no personal judgment of personalities involved, but our indications were that Diem was best man available in spite of failings. We visualized cabinet with broad appeal and authority. This vision has not been realized. Diem appears to be man constitutionally incapable of making decisions. US not committed to Diem in any irrevocable sense. We have accepted him because we knew of no one better. Developments have confirmed our fears as to his limitations but no substitute for him has yet been proposed. Those suggested in past varied from month to month. Now it is claimed that only Bao Dai can save situation. If that is case, then we must indeed be desperate. Secretary’s view we should continue back Diem but exert more pressure on him to make changes we consider necessary. Secretary finished by asking whether Ely had, with Collins, already applied maximum pressures to Diem.
Ely replied they had and that both were now virtually convinced that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem. Nevertheless they continued pressures. Secretary asked whether Diem had yet been confronted with ultimatum that unless such and such were done by certain date our support would be withdrawn. Ely said he had not. He characterized Diem as extremely pig-headed man who became more so under pressure. Secretary asked if this meant that ultimatum would make him more stubborn and Ely replied it would.
Mendes then pursued subject with Ely who stated that he felt that to exert too much pressure on Diem was not in keeping with the new independent status of Vietnam and that in any case such pressure [Page 2402] should not be exerted jointly but separately by himself and Collins. Moreover, he described Diem as having tendency play one man against other in typical Asiatic style and that this was to be avoided. He commented on Diem’s own difficulties, especially those he had had in reconciling sects. Principal question was to decide now whether Diem was really man capable of national union. He and Collins must decide that question.
Secretary stated that he was opposed to issuance ultimatum until we know what we would do if it were rejected. At the moment we have nothing else to offer, he commented. Mendes recommended that we approach Bao Dai because of his legal powers and usefulness and fact that presumably would have to appoint any successor to Diem. He had proven in Hinh case that he could be useful and Mendes felt that Bao Dai could again serve purpose. He could be used to put alternate plan into effect if ultimatum to Diem failed. Secretary commented that he realized that we must be prepared to use Bao Dai but felt that we must go to him prepared with our own ideas and not simply to accept his. Mendes agreed but commented that Bao Dai’s personal position had weakened recently. In spite of this fact, he still represented legality and could serve in future if “legality” had to be provided to any step we would wish to take.
Mendes then spoke of a plan French have been considering. First phase was to ask Bao Dai to place on spot in Vietnam a representative who would exercise Bao Dai’s authority. He would be “delegate” or viceroy. He would have full authority to use Bao Dai’s powers. Usefulness would persist even if Diem should succeed for he could act as supreme arbitrator to settle squabbles.
Mendes said that French were now prepared to talk to Bao Dai along these lines and urge him establish viceroy without delay.
French also proposed approach Bao Dai with view reinforcing present govt and preparing legal grounds for new one if it should be found necessary.
Eden intervened to state that in his opinion it would be mistake for Bao Dai to go back now but British recognized advantage of Vietnamese royal tradition and agreed that “royal commission” of some sort should be set up and might prove be best way out.
He inquired about personality and usefulness of Empress and Mendes replied that she was exemplary person who could prove very useful in Vietnam.
Secretary stated that in considering viceroy we were advancing into second problem without having solved first. He did not expect viceroy be able decide on alternate to Diem and to set up machinery to implement our ideas. He stated that our job was to create this machinery. At present time we must concern ourselves with present problem, not with [Page 2403] new intrigues. He asked Mendes what his advisers had suggested as alternative. Mendes replied no one specifically as yet but that he preferred allow Ely speak on this subject.
Ely replied that he was more concerned with current problems of Diem Govt than with question of possible new govt. Only certainty is that no more time can be wasted. Ely mentioned Huu, Tam and Quat as among many personalities who might be used. Mendes asked if there was no preference. Ely said not yet. Secretary asked what was wrong between Quat and sects and Ely replied that it was result of an old feud dating from time Quat was Minister of National Defense and had tried abolish sects private armies. Mendes asked if there was no good provincial govt and Ely replied not sufficiently good take on rational [national] responsibilities.
Secretary went on to say that we must exhaust all our pressures on Diem to get things done before considering alternate solutions. Radford will be in Saigon Dec 22 to report result our conversations to Collins. Secretary agreed we must explore all possibilities but warned that mere fact we were doing so was sufficient to undermine present govt. He asked Mendes not to think we had obstinately closed our minds to possible alternate solution. We had not but our investigation of alternate must be done on careful basis and we must for present support Diem.
Mendes agreed. To summarize he had three main points: First, to support Diem; second, to study alternatives. Collins and Ely should be instructed to explore further possibilities including Bao Dai with greatest discretion. Secretary then returned to viceroy question asking if proposed man would be independent or dependent on Bao Dai. Mendes stated he would be independent but would derive legality from Bao Dai. Question would be studied further and French proposal passed on to Collins and Ely for study.
Mendes’ third point was that Ely and Collins should be requested investigate matter of timing. How much further delay can be tolerated, Mendes asked? We must set deadline. The generals must come to conclusion on two and three and make precise recommendations to us so that we can take necessary decisions.
Secretary agreed but stated that fourth point must be added. It is that if US should decide that there is no good alternative to Diem we will have to consider how much more investment we will be prepared to make in Indochina. Our policy would have to be reappraised. Congressional committees, particularly the two foreign affairs committees, led by Mansfield and Richards, were intensely interested in problem and would have to be consulted. They both had strong feelings. Mansfield believes in Diem. Secretary was not fully cognizant with Richards’ opinions but thought he did too. Secretary believed that even [Page 2404] slight chance of success in Vietnam was worth considerable investment. US had also to think of what happened in adjacent countries—in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Malaya. US situation was different from that of French. French had an investment in lives and property in Vietnam while ours involved effect that fate of Vietnam would have on rest of South East Asia. Secretary closed by stating that he accepted Mendes’ three points with addition of his own fourth.
Mendes replied that he sympathized with US problem but trusted that we would not arrive at negative conclusion. He urged that US and France keep in touch at all times. Even if US should arrive at negative position, France would not renounce hope.
Eden stated he agreed and felt that even additional single year of sustained effort would help everywhere and that we must try and keep up the fight in order to give confidence to others in area. This ended main part of Indochina discussions.
Mendes then said that he wished to raise question of letter sent by Viet Minh to Eden and Molotov as co-chairmen of Geneva Conference.3 It complained about violations of Geneva agreement by French and Vietnamese Govt. He said that some of Viet Minh complaints “were not unfounded”. Whole matter constituted delicate question for ICC would be seized of it and it would prove difficult, particularly in view sensitivity of Indians on ICC. Mendes believed we must exert all our efforts to convince south not to violate Geneva agreements. Vietnamese position had been that they were not signatories. This might prove useful to US later as legal position but for present believed south must be persuaded to abide by Geneva terms.
Eden stated he had rejected letter explaining that attempt to deliver it had been made in Moscow. Mendes corrected Eden’s memory by stating that letter had been reported by British Consul in Hanoi. He described letter as not being important in itself—a propaganda instrument—but that it indicated start of political offensive by Viet Minh.
Related problem was safeguarding of public utility services in Haiphong. Vietnamese Govt had been breaking Geneva agreements on this score as well. Viet Minh had complained and justifiably.
Another difficult problem with regard to Geneva was training of Vietnamese officers. He would be pleased to know US position on introducing new military advisers into Indochina and possible conflict with Geneva agreement.
Secretary stated that although we were rotating MAAG personnel we were not increasing it. Radford confirmed. Ely stated that Collins–Ely agreement on training4 remained within framework Geneva [Page 2405] accords. Mendes stated that question was legal one; rotation permitted under terms Geneva but can training officers be substituted for administrative personnel? Was it violation of accords to substitute officers for noncoms, etc.? Mendes said that French Govt would have to study text of Collins–Ely agreement, carefully from legal point of view to ensure that it fully accorded with armistice and requested US do same. He said this particularly important as VM had already officially protested to ICC re US assumption of training responsibility. Secretary expressed general agreement with principle that Geneva accords should not be broken but stated that our interpretation of them must not be so refined that we refuse to substitute x for y if y is ill or less competent than x. Mendes agreed and said that in last analysis people who must be pleased are ICC. He asked that British maintain their contacts with Indians and Canadians, which Eden agreed to do. General discussion ensued on question Viet Minh protests on violation of Geneva accords and Secretary concluded by saying that it would be unfortunate if we were to find ourselves on defensive in this matter in light of smuggling of military material into North Vietnam from China and persecution of Catholics by Viet Minh.
Mendes then proceeded to question about Cambodia stating that French had 500 officers in Cambodia as training mission and intended to keep them there. He asked Secretary to look into matter and to give French US views on subject. Mendes added that French considered presence of their military mission there as consistent with French defense policy.
Meeting then proceeded to other subjects covered in separate immediately following tels. At end there was a prolonged discussion about communiqué and it was finally decided not to issue any.
Mendes asked at end what should be done about informing Associated States govts of our discussions in keeping with our usual practice. It was decided that the high commissioners in Paris would be informed by three-man group representing three delegations. (See separate telegram.)5
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩
- The meeting occurred on Dec. 18.↩
- Reference is to a letter of Dec. 5 from Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander in Chief of the People’s Army of Vietnam. For the Commission’s interim reply, Jan. 28, 1955, see Cmd. 9461, First and Second Interim Reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, pp. 55–56.↩
- For text, see telegram 2261 from Saigon, Dec. 14, p. 2366.↩
- Secto 24 from Paris, Dec. 19, infra↩