Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 421
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)1
General Ely paid a call on me this morning and to my surprise had no request to make for any support in any new line of action. It turned out to be no more than a courtesy call and although he answered questions frankly, the net result of the information which I obtained was to the effect that General Ely was working with General Collins in support of the Diem Government and had no recommendations to make at this time for any change of policy. In answer to a question, he stated unequivocally that the over-all situation in South Viet Nam was such, that a good strong government could win the elections in 1956 if such a government was established not later than next month.
In answer to questions as to whether in his opinion Diem could establish such a government, Ely said that Diem should be able to succeed because two strong nations were backing him. Ely had no recommendations for a change since he was supporting his government’s policies and was not free to even consider any one but Diem. He did say that many French criticised him for this stand but that he was maintaining it. In answer to a question, Ely did admit that it was his opinion that the French Expeditionary Forces should not be reduced below approximately 75,000, which number he felt should be reached by July 1955 and held until the situation clarified. (I gathered that he actually meant that this number should be maintained until the elections were held.) This figure was also subject to revision depending upon the success obtained in the rebuilding of the Viet Namese Army. At the same time, Ely felt that it was necessary to keep the majority of the French Expeditionary Forces in the Saigon–Cap St. Jacques Area as a stabilizing influence to show the people of South Viet Nam that they were not being abandoned.
In regard to the necessity for the establishment of a strong South Viet Namese Government at an early date, I asked General Ely if Prime Minister Diem had been given any indication to this effect. In other words, had Diem been told that he had to produce or else. General Ely laughed and said that he had shaken up Diem so often that he could hardly talk to him now, and was leaving this matter largely up to General Collins, who, he felt, had clearly indicated to Diem that he must produce a strong government in the near future. I asked Ely if the Viet Namese Army had really deteriorated a great deal in the last few months. He stated that he did not feel that it had deteriorated as [Page 2400] much as was being said. It had suffered, of course, from the political actions of General Hinh, but I gathered that Ely was not too concerned in this respect. I asked him about Generals Ty and Vy, and what he thought of them. He said he thought that General Ty was the master-sergeant type and that General Vy was smarter. Ely said that General Collins thought perhaps they might be a good combination since General Ty, not being very bright, would be easy for our MAAG to work with.
- This conversation with General Ely occurred at the Hotel Talleyrand at 10: 30 a.m. on Dec. 18. A marginal notation on the source text indicates that this memorandum was seen by the Secretary of State.↩