Office of the Historian

751G.00/12–1754

Memorandum by Ambassador Donald R. Heath to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

top secret
[Washington,] December 17, 1954.

Subject:

  • Comments on Saigon Telegram 23031
1.
The situation in Viet-Nam at the time of General Collins’ arrival on November 7 might be described as follows:
a.
The French had lost a disastrous battle at Dien Bien Phu and that Communist military victory had been compounded by a humiliating diplomatic defeat for the Free World at Geneva. The Communists had achieved a level of international recognition and position through these developments far exceeding any previous status.
b.
Ngo Dinh Diem took office on July 7. He was the first “Nationalist” to assume the Prime Ministership. He was and is, anti-French, anti-Communist and personally honest. He is politically inept, stubborn and suspicious. In his four months of responsibility he had been faced with massive opposition, including a rebellious Army Chief who allegedly was an unwitting tool of the Communists, active French opposition and many other discouraging factors.
c.
There is every evidence that the French did not want Diem to succeed. Reluctant acceptance by La Chambre (September) and Mendes-France (November) of the U.S. thesis of support of Diem, principally because of the lack of a better qualified candidate, may have eased French pressures against him but did not result in full French support.
2.
Since General Collins’ arrival, the latter has attempted to achieve a rapid solution, at least partially based on the concept that Collins’ mission is temporary and a settlement appeared called for by the time of his originally scheduled departure in mid-January. (Since extended). General Collins’ recommendations are now based on the circumstances of a satisfactory settlement prior to January 1. If no solution is found, he recommends:
a.
Continued support of Diem for a short period but without committing specific U.S. aid programs.
b.
Recalling Bao Dai, if acceptable to U.S.
c.
Revaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast Asia.
d.
If the situation continues without substantial progressive action to withhold support to the Viet-Nam Army and to increase support of the French Expeditionary Corps while evacuating our MDAP matériel.
3.

In our view, General Collins’ recommendations ignore the basic factor that we would assist a Communist takeover by a withholding of our aid, even if it must necessarily be given to a government which is less than perfect.

[Page 2392]

The Secretary has analyzed the situation as one in which we are conducting a time buying operation. If we withhold our support to Viet-Nam, it will be taken over sooner than if we extend smaller aid, at a figure of about a third of last year. In the meantime, we will proceed to do what we can to strengthen Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. This is my understanding of the Secretary’s policy.

4.
I recommend we inform the Secretary and General Collins that we recognize the dangers posed by the above policy, but that in the lack of more useful alternatives that we will continue to support Diem, because there is no one to take his place who would serve U.S. objectives any better. This includes the Bao Dai solution which is opposed by the facts of Bao Dai’s lack of support in Viet-Nam and his past demonstrations of inability to govern. The fear that a fiscal commitment of over $300 million plus our national prestige would be lost in a gamble on the retention of Free Viet-Nam is a legitimate one, but the withholding of our support at this juncture would almost inevitably have a far worse effect.

Recommendation:

That the attached telegram be approved and sent.2

  1. Dated Dec. 16, p. 2379.↩
  2. The attachment does not accompany the source text. However, the source text bears the following handwritten notation: “See (1) Deptel 2273 Paris (2486 Saigon) Dec. 17/54. (751G.00/12–1754) secret (2) Deptel 2274 Paris (2487 Saigon) Dec. 17/54. 751G.00/12–1754 TS.” For the telegrams under reference, see pp. 2393 and 2394.↩