Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/12–1354: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

top secret
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Saigon, December 13, 1954—7 p.m.

2250. Repeated information Paris 706, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. Limited distribution. From Collins. Re Deptels 2305 repeated Paris 2094 and 2378 repeated Paris unnumbered December 10.² This message in two parts.

• Part I.

  Recent developments current situation follow:

  1. Relations with French:

  (A) Earlier this week Ely was on verge of signing minute of understanding on organization and training of Vietnamese armed forces. Now French have come up with new amendments requiring US respect Ely’s responsibilities “under Geneva accords” and including long new “protocol” with several references to Geneva. Whether these new proposals come from Ely’s legal staff or Paris I do not know, but inclined believe latter since Ely agreed to resolve few remaining minor points directly with me and since he has said several times that Paris political circles would have to be satisfied. I intend refuse accept any reference to Geneva accord or make any further concessions reference O’Daniel’s full responsibility for training under Ely’s broad direction.³

  (B) Interview with Sainteny, to which Ely and his officers continue to refer with chagrin, appears reinforce view that our relations with French in Indochina may remain less clear-cut than Ely wishes and has given me to believe they are.

  2. Latest developments re Quat:

  (A) Since Luyen’s return from Paris, his open opposition to Quat has undermined Diem’s decision to appoint Quat Minister of Defense. On 11 December Diem informed Fishel as follows: six of seven cabinet members consulted by Diem have voiced strong opposition to Quat. Generals Phuong (Cao Dai) and Soai (Hoa Hao) have declared they will withdraw from government and threaten open rebellion if Quat appointed. Because of location Hoa Hao territory, Diem purports to fear General Soai might cut off rice supply of Saigon–Cholon, block road and waterway traffic through coastal areas and to Saigon, make war in Hoa Hao areas against national army which in present condition could not handle situation. Diem fears also comparable action might be taken by Cao Dai forces, including possible moves against government in Saigon and vicinity.

  (B) Diem told Fishel that he had informed Phuong and Soai that Americans wanted Quat as Defense Minister. The Generals replied, “a responsible American should speak for the Americans”. Hence Diem asked Fishel to transmit these “facts” to me, saying if I or “some other person” can convince Phuong and Soai not oppose actively the appointment, Diem will appoint Quat at once. (A neat passing of the buck, we must admit.) If sect leaders persist in their opposition, Diem says he would be inclined raise present Deputy Minh to Defense Minister and give him full authority and responsibility over armed forces.

  (C) I am quite convinced that Diem and brothers Luyen and Nhu are afraid to turn over control of armed forces to Quat or any other strong man. They may also fear Quat as potential successor to Diem and hence are doing everything they can to keep him out of any post in government. With General Hinh fired and General Vy replaced as Chief of Staff by spineless General Ty, Diem has fairly effectively seized control of army. I doubt Diem would delegate real authority to Minh, but would retain meddling hand on details to detriment O’Daniel’s training mission and effective development of armed forces.

  (D) Through Colonel Lansdale’s group and CAS, I am canvassing attitude of sect leaders and genuineness of their alleged threats. Depending on Lansdale’s findings, I will consider (1) proposing to Ely a direct US-French approach to General Soai, who Quat has said will bow to French pressure; (2) having Lansdale suggest to Soai that with Quat in defense all rice for armed forces would be purchased from Hoa Hao (this was hint dropped some time ago by Quat as means of buying off Hoa Hao); (3) sending emissaries to Soai, Phuong and Cao Dai Pope (Pham Cong Tac) making clear that any rebellion would lead to withdrawal all American aid and inevitable victory for Ho Chi Minh who would certainly not tolerate private empires of Hoa Hao or Cao Dai.

  (E) I realize disadvantages of forcing Diem to accept “American choice” of Quat. However acceptance of status quo, with Minh elevated to Defense Ministry and sects reinforced in veto power over government, is simply postponing evil day of reckoning as to when, if ever. Diem will assert type of leadership that can unify this country and give it chance of competing with hard, effective, unified control of Ho Chi Minh. Such a delaying action would appear to be justified only if we are preparing way for alternatives, as indicated in part II.

  3. Resolution of Phan Rang-Phan Thiet affair:

  Compromise solution in matter of rebellious officers has been found and is apparently satisfactory to army command and Prime Minister.

  4. Army Chief of Staff and Inspector General:

  At midnight 12–13 December Generals Vy and Ty took office as Inspector General and Chief of Staff Vietnam armed forces, respectively. Details of Vy’s duties not yet known.

  5. Diem’s declaration of confidence in Army:

  December 13 Diem published declaration expressing confidence in Army and calling on all ranks to join with people in building free, independent Vietnam.

  Postscript.

  6. Re paragraph 1 (A) above: Ely and I this morning signed minute of understanding on development and training of autonomous Vietnam armed forces and agreed to wording of separate explanatory memorandum for record to accompany it. Final text of minute is based on our draft and I consider it wholly satisfactory. Texts follow by separate message.

  7. Re paragraph 2 above: Ely and I agreed this morning to take further steps to secure Quat’s appointment. Ely discounts possibility sects will revolt if such appointment made. Ely said he would at once see Generals Phuong and Soai and inform them both French and Americans support Quat’s appointment. Ely said he has little influence over Cao Dai Pope and recommended I see him. Ely will also intervene with Deputy Defense Minister Minh and ask him to remain three to six months as Quat’s deputy.

• Part II.

  Possible alternatives to Diem Government:

  1. As I see it, we have 3 possible courses of action in Vietnam:

  (a) Continue support of Diem Government.

  (b) Support establishment of another government which may be able to save situation.

  (c) Gradually withdraw support from Vietnam.

  2. (A) Difficulties and risk of support Diem have been covered in Embtel 2108⁴ and part I this message and other cables. Recent accomplishments have been minor considering magnitude of task ahead. Favorable developments include:

  (1) Diem made first anti-Communist appeal to people 16 November.

  (2) Diem–Hinh feud has been resolved, for present at least.

  (3) Diem made trip to South Cochin China to observe work by Army in its rehabilitation program.

  (4) Phan Rang–Phan Thiet affair has been compromised.

  (5) Vy and Ty have taken their new offices.

  (6) 13 December Diem issued proclamation expressing confidence in the Army and calling on it to unite with people in the fight against Communism.

  (B) Realize abandonment of Diem would embarrass US in view our public support present government. However, if it proves necessary, believe such embarrassment would prove insignificant compared to blow to anti-Communism in Asia and throughout world if US-supported free Vietnam were lost to Communism. I believe it would be better to take slight loss of prestige in near future while time to attempt other solution remains, rather than continue support Diem should failure appear relatively certain. We have not reached this point, though I have grave misgivings re Diem’s chances of success.

  3. In view of possibility that Diem will fail to rally unified support of army in fight against Communism, believe we should consider other solutions. Two alternatives (neither of which is too promising, but each of which should be considered in event of Diem’s failure) are suggested:

  (A) Have Bao Dai name Quat to replace Diem as President of Council. Quat is able, forceful and resourceful and though obstacles to his success exist, if given chance he might succeed where Diem failed. Whether the various selfish groups in the country would give him that chance is question. He is northerner, has only slight political following and, as indicated in part I, faces considerable opposition. With complete confidence and support of Bao Dai, however, he might succeed; without it he would surely fail.

  (B) (1) Second alternative is to have Bao Dai return to Vietnam under “state of emergency” conditions, assume Presidency of Council and rally entire nation to unified action. What is needed here more than anything else is leader who can fire imagination and patriotism of people and instill in them determination to fight for freedom of Vietnam. Bao Dai may be the last possible candidate for this task.

  (2) I have been impressed with influence Bao Dai still exercises over leaders Vietnam. All leaders continue to refer to him as “His Majesty” and most regard him as the real source of authority Vietnam.

  (3) To overcome obstacles, dramatize return and establish self as leader of Vietnam, Bao Dai could take steps such as:

  (a) Turning over some of his holdings to government for distribution to peasants as step toward agrarian reform;

  (b) Form an “emergency” Cabinet including best available Vietnamese—Quat, Diem, others;

  (c) Announcing withdrawal French military forces by some specific date;

  (d) Issuing temporary democratic charter to guide government during emergency;

  (g[e]) Convening a representative assembly;

  (h[f]) Calling for a constituent assembly.

  6. Though course 1–c (gradual withdrawal from Vietnam) is least desirable, in all honesty and in view of what I have observed here to date it is possible this may be only sound solution. Should this be necessary, it may be wise to concentrate effort on saving Laos–Cambodia–Thailand–Burma–India line—if possible with latter’s active support. Realize Department has probably given consideration to some such alternative. I will not presume to advise steps to be taken at this time, other than suggest that we attempt persuade India recognize Governments Laos and Cambodia soonest.

  7. Summation: (a) At present I am highly dubious of Diem’s ability to succeed but prefer to reserve final judgment till early part of January; (b) alternatives to support of Diem should be thoroughly explored within US Government.

  8. Recommendations: (a) US continue to support Diem at Paris; (b) not consider alternatives paragraph 1–B with French until after I have communicated my final judgment to Department.

Kidder

1. This telegram was transmitted in three parts.
2. In telegrams 2305 and 2378 to Saigon, Dec. 7 and Dec. 10, respectively, the Department of State requested the current views of General Collins on the situation in Vietnam. This information was required by Secretary Dulles who was leaving for Paris on Dec. 14 for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. It was anticipated that while in Paris, the Secretary would discuss the question of Indochina with Premier Mendès-France and Foreign Secretary Eden. (751G.00/12–754; 751G.00/12–854)
3. For text of the agreement signed by Collins and Ely on Dec. 13, see telegram 2261 from Saigon, Dec. 14, infra.
4. Dated Dec. 6, p. 2341.