751G.00/12–1354: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State

secret

2244. Repeated Paris 704, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. From Collins. Below summary of two recent conversations concerning Quat appointment, Diem and Bao Dai: [Page 2361]

1.

(A) On 10 December Quat informed me that Diem had told him that he would take him in the government if Quat could persuade Cao Dai and Hoa Hao to agree. Quat told Diem he did not think problem serious, would do whatever he could to allay sects fear of him but would not engage in any electioneering before hand. Quat suggested that it might be helpful if junior American official informed Phuong, Cao Dai Pope (Pham Cong Tac) and Soai that Quat appointment would be in national interest and they should not fear appointment of Quat as Defense Minister. Quat also said that Soai is responsive to French pressure so I intend to bring this subject up with Ely. Quat further stated that he had seen Prime Minister 15 times with respect entering cabinet but did not intend to see him again in this connection. He remains available to serve country but felt continued consultation this subject would only be harmful to both men. Quat is convinced Diem does not want him in cabinet and is using pretexts to avoid naming him.

(B) Quat felt future policy of Vietnam next few years would be divided into two stages. In immediate future national policy must be based on the fact that a large expeditionary corps is based Vietnam, colonial administration remains in place and Geneva accords are in process of implementation. The second phase would follow this period and policy would be similar to that followed by Philippines and Republic of Korea. He feels that Diem wants to vault over the first phase and enter at once into the second. Quat, on the other hand, says that he would favor a flexible policy during first phase adaptable to circumstances.

(C) Quat then asked me if American aid would only be given to Diem Government. I replied that if the Government of Vietnam is legally changed there is no reason to deduce from that fact that American aid would be suspended. I further told him that I had been sent to Vietnam to support the legal Government of the country and that Vietnam occupies so strategic a position in Southeast Asia that we could not contemplate its loss without greatest misgivings.

(D) Quat then stated he felt Bao Dai was necessary instrument and should be used either in France or Vietnam. If he remains in France he must be kept completely informed; if he returns here he should give the Prime Minister a free hand. Quat feels Bao Dai is gradually orienting himself toward the US and American influence over Bao Dai is increasing.

2.

(A) On 11 December Le Huu Tu, former Bishop Phat Diem in Tonkin called. He said when Diem took over office there was wave of hope throughout country but that this had been dissipated by at least 50 percent and that there is increasing widespread dissatisfaction with Diem. Tu said Diem is honest patriot but indecisive and surrounded [Page 2362] by bad advisers, most of whom are members of his family. Tu felt, however, there was no one to take his place at present and that he must be encouraged to take action and improve administration. Tu further stated that Diem is authoritarian in spirit and when threatened by rise of capable individual he seeks others to play off against potential rival.

(B) Bishop said Quat would make good Defense Minister but feels he lacks popular support to become Prime Minister.

(C) Tu stated that Bao Dai must be kept as a figurehead and symbol of national unity but that he should remain in France. Bishop believes that brother Nhu is eager to dispose of Bao Dai and advises Diem accordingly.

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