Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

611.51/11–2054: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

secret
priority

Washington, November 26, 1954—11:45 a.m.

2126. Following is summary military points regarding Viet-Nam raised during Mendes-France talks:

1. Collins Proposed Agreement on Training.²

Regarding press reports on General Collins’ press statements, Mendes apprehensive might bring protest by Communists. In private and plenary talks he repeatedly emphasized important no pretext be given them to charge breach armistice. Appeared from Collins’ project, French responsibilities to be decreased and finally disappear with U.S. taking over. He had to explain to French people why they should still support heavy burden in Indochina if they get impression no utility in such may be strong reaction. Hoped full consultations future. Regarding item one of Collins’ proposed memorandum, this should be studied by experts. Item two; French had no objections but doubted could be carried out by July. Mendes objected particularly paragraph three and to remaining items. U.S. responsibility for all military assistance likely to raise very important objections. If main body instructors French, hard to see why political responsibility in U.S. hands. Also doubted if this consistent with Geneva agreement which prohibits additional foreign but not French troops. Would also have serious effect on morale FEC.

Secretary replied unaware Collins statement until mentioned by Mendes. Agreed should be prior consultations if possible. U.S. realized Communist sensitivity regarding U.S. actions compared with lesser concern over similar acts taken by French. But one should not necessarily refrain from taking action which Communists might possibly claim be inconsistent with Armistice since virtually any act could be so claimed due ability take extreme interpretation. However, Secretary emphasized U.S. does not desire do anything provocative. Without current French presence Indochina there would be vacuum which enemy would quickly fill. Secretary said regarding proposed memorandum that U.S. did not wish to press for any formula if French found it seriously objectionable. Basic question is, who is to be responsible for training. U.S. willing take on training job if that is to be U.S. responsibility, but does not want responsibilities it cannot discharge. Must be decision on whether use American or French methods and basic theories. This does not mean French personnel eliminated. U.S. hoped questions of national prestige not be allowed compromise issue. Secretary proposed matter be referred to Collins and Ely.

Mendes undecided and specifically endorsed referral training question back to Ely and Collins, although had serious reservations about memorandum. He said Ely’s cable has not agreed paragraphs three and four. He hoped Collins would not make any further public statements on this matter before agreement reached.

2. French Expeditionary Corps.

Mendes said U.S. informed French would reduce FEC to one hundred thousand by end 1955. Necessary have that strength in Indochina. Not prepared discuss U.S. financial aid for FEC now but would leave for experts Embassy Washington to work out. M. Faure understood in September talks U.S. would announce decision by December 1. Hoped support could be continued in future as in past even though previously in support combat which now ended. Political need maintain security still existed.

Secretary said must take into account likely cost of supporting FEC, national army and economic and technical aid in Indochina. If total is large sum, might not be worthwhile doing. Any commitment would be subject total review of U.S. programs in Far East.

3. Viet-Nam National Army.

A. Mendes-France summarized cable from Ely to effect Collins proposal for training would result in eviction French influence, and Collins project for sending hundreds of Vietnamese officers to U.S. would weaken French cultural influence, while eventual replacement of French cadres by U.S. endangered morale of FEC as well as give Viet Minh provocation. Secretary replied primary purpose was to build strong national force in Free Viet-Nam, and not to establish U.S. influence in the new area or to bolster French influence in an old area. Unless priority given to Viet-Nam build-up there would be no U.S. or French influence there a year from now. He especially urged Mendes-France everything possible be done not allow considerations national prestige compromise achievement objective. Mendes-France said he was in full agreement and therefore wished people on spot make decisions.

B. On size Vietnamese forces, Secretary expressed U.S. theory was to have adequate local forces to maintain order against subversion and serve as small blocking force against attack from outside with reliance for principal deterrent on obligations under Manila Pact. Together with centralized mobile reserve, this concept seemed only practical one to U.S. and was basic strategy in Collins’ recommendations. If there were open attack from outside, the area was subject to protection from outside under Manila Pact. Secretary thought U.S. prepared throw some forces into such situation. This fact would serve deter attack of that kind. U.S. does not feel it possible to build up local forces strong enough to throw back invasion. Burden of support would be prohibitive. U.S. proposes reduction in force of national army to eighty-three thousand men within six months. Cost about two hundred million a year.

C. Mendes said he understood general principles which appeared sensible, and should be studied by military experts on spot and left up to Ely and Collins. Mendes during discussions did show misunderstanding of U.S. intentions regarding national army. Thought U.S. wished build up separately force for internal security. Apparently had two things confused. He said he understood U.S. wanted set up separate army supporting government. This was delicate matter which could weaken regular army. Secretary and Hensel stated there were not to be two forces, but only one as outlined in Collins’ recommendations. If FEC only 100,000 and national army reduced to only 90,000, Mendes did not see what latter could accomplish except perhaps internal order while Viet Minh forces being increased.

4. Violations of Armistice.

See Department telegram 2071 to Saigon.³

5. Helicopters.

Mendes took this up both in private talk with Secretary and in plenary. He stated requirement for six additional helicopters for use of ICC particularly in Laos whose importance he emphasized. France had already turned over all they could spare to ICC. He also stated need spares for grounded planes and hoped for satisfactory reply soon.

U.S. representatives replied no appropriated funds for purpose of aiding ICC. However a memorandum was requested of the French to include what was provided and what capabilities French already have to provide needed planes themselves. As for spare parts, U.S. had no information planes grounded that account. U.S. would have to take into account balance between use of planes and availability of spares.

Saltzman

1. Drafted by Young of PSA. Repeated for information priority to Paris as 1942; pouched to Phnom Penh and Vientiane.
2. See telegram 1854 from Saigon, Nov. 16, p. 2259.
3. Telegram 2071 to Saigon (281 to New York), Nov. 22, summarizing the Dulles–Mendès-France talks as they related to the refugee problem and particularly to Viet Minh restrictions upon those in the north who might wish to emigrate, is not printed. (251G.51G22/11–2254)