Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/11–2454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

secret

Washington, November 24, 1954—8:01 p.m.

2112. Following is summary political and economic points raised during Mendes-France talks re Vietnam:

1. Support of Diem Government

A. Secretary stated government formed around Diem is as good as is possible, perhaps better. While realizing Diem’s weaknesses he has strong spirit of nationalism, is anti-Communist, dedicated, sincere and honest and actually head of government. US prepared put strong support behind Diem if French are also prepared. No use our two governments working opposite directions. If French support someone else, no chance of success in Free Vietnam and better not support anyone.

B. Mendes stated French had agreed September talks support Diem although they not optimistic about his abilities. French had pressed Bao Dai to call back Hinh. This evidence French doing their best. French believe within few months they and US will be forced consider replacement Diem. They had no one to propose at this time but wished point out some Vietnamese who worked with French in past had much better records than Diem. Some present governors quite efficient. Although Tam too close to French had done well. Believe time had come for France and US to give Diem some specific advice, particularly regarding agrarian reform, to establish efficient administration and give attention to rural areas. Mendes understood Diem had lots US money for propaganda, but does not use it efficiently. Propaganda must be made by Vietnamese not US or French. Diem should be given only a certain amount of time work out such a program since time short. US and France might consult in one or two months to see what form concrete action Diem has taken. Mendes asked if US were prepared go ahead on above basis of joint instructions from France and US to Diem, and if messages should be sent Collins and Ely work out precise measures. Important that they make survey of needs and keep in contact to judge results of execution.

C. Secretary replied that although no objection believed experts should get together and define specific proposals to be made and question timing and manner presentation. Also should study arrangement for speaking together regarding how proposed programs were developing. US wished first check with its field representatives about specific programs. While US agreeable working together on this matter, Secretary did not wish adopt general principle of always making joint rather than unilateral approaches in every case. While efforts and timing should be concerted, US did not wish to be committed never to consult alone with Diem government.

D. Department’s comment—General Collins and country team comments requested soon as possible submit recommendations as to possible proposals to Diem on (1) improving administration, (2) various reforms and other measures, and (3) timing of execution and subsequent joint judging of results.

2. Bao Dai

A. Mendes said difficult for French come to decision and wished US views. Bao Dai wishes return Vietnam and French successful in preventing up to now but he is insisting. Even if Bao Dai not very interesting person he does provide legitimacy. Although now supporting Diem his future policy unknown. French afraid Bao Dai will make public statement France keeping him from returning.

B. Secretary replied while not in position advise, US opposed Bao Dai’s returning.

3. Relations with Viet Minh

A. Secretary referred to problem of recognition which US wished avoid. Mendes described Sainteny’s situation as “ambiguous”. Read proposed letter to Viet Minh giving Sainteny’s terms of reference charging him with defense French interests and naming him French delegate “auprès de vous”. Secretary suggested substitute for this last phrase might be found which would not imply recognition. Mendes-France admitted he was not happy with this letter, would try to find better wording, but pointed out at Geneva letter was addressed by French to “Democratic Republic of Vietnam”. Mendes-France feared Viet Minh would ask for reciprocal treatment Paris which would be difficult refuse. Sainteny mission important for France even though few French remaining north. Will be real problem when Haiphong evacuated. He inquired re possible US discrimination against French citizens in north. Secretary said still under study.

Secretary said appeared be belief in some quarters compromise between north and south Vietnam inevitable. US willing listen arguments along this line but not disposed agree such approach which we feel inevitably result in loss of area to Communists. If Viet Minh get majority national government, minority would not long survive. Object is therefore build strong anti-Communist government South Vietnam not one seeking accommodation with Viet Minh.

B. Mendes-France views—Mendes said felt same way as Secretary that cooperation between North and South Vietnam would be very bad. Communists at Geneva proposed tricks re bipartite relationship but French had fought against such. Only thing to do is develop political strength South Vietnam as counter to north. Even if south is not as strong as north if there is real political life something could be hoped for. As long as disorder exists in south there will be infiltration and no counter to north.²

4. Economic and Financial

Mendes-France asked that financial questions not be included in political discussions. It was agreed refer them to experts meeting in Washington near future. Economic aid programs also not raised. Secretary said frankly US faces problem of what is worthwhile spend in money and effort in view of possible outcome Vietnam. Similar amount money spent elsewhere might accomplish better results.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Hoey of PSA. Repeated for information to Paris as 1937; pouched to Phnom Penh and Vientiane.

2. Telegram 2113 to Saigon (1938 to Paris), Nov. 24, concerning a closely related question, read as follows: “During Mendes visit Secretary raised matter privately of elections in Viet-Nam.

   “Mendes said too early speak with finality this time and much would depend on conditions at time. Present view was that elections should be held by small local units rather than on single national ticket. In this way some anti-Communist local leaders would be elected rather than clear Communist victory through national selection.” (751G.00/11–2454)