Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/11–1854

Memorandum by the Assistant secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] November 18, 1954.

Subject:

• The Basic Challenge in Viet-Nam and Indochina

Discussion

There seem to be two basic questions: (1) can Viet-Nam be saved from Communist domination during the next few years, and (2) if not, how much time can we buy and at what expense by the US aid programs. There is so much at flux that I do not believe the United States Government can take any final positions with Mendes-France, nor can we recommend to the President and to you a well determined course of action.

The French position is fluid, as we have recognized for some time and as Paris telegram 2080² ably analyzes. If the French are veering towards unification of Viet-Nam under the Communists, then our programs in cooperation with them will be nullified. We have not yet received the fundamental recommendations from General Collins as to his views on whether the US program with French support can hold Free Viet-Nam with a reasonable chance of success. A National Intelligence Estimate is due next week on probable developments in Indochina.³ The preliminary edition is decidedly pessimistic.

Thus, we will soon have in our hands three of the basic elements on which to formulate courses of action with regard to the fundamental questions: French plans as Mendes-France gives us; General Collins’ over-all recommendations; and the National Intelligence Estimate.

$400 to $500 million for the three Associated States is a large sum in the face of the risks and hazards. I support your view that we need to buy time to make preparations elsewhere. If we do not succeed in building a permanent dyke in Viet-Nam, we can at the same time be shoring up Cambodia, Thailand, Burma and Malaya. I also believe we have not exhausted the possibilities regarding elections in 1956. The alternative may not be hostilities. There may be ways either of holding elections or of postponing them which will continue to gain time in Viet-Nam and perhaps forestall indefinitely a Communist take over, if a program in Free Viet-Nam can build strength.

Recommendation

The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest that in finalizing the talks with Mendes-France you indicate that we are not in a position to give final answers since General Collins has just arrived and we do not have his final recommendations.

1. Drafted by Young of PSA. A handwritten notation on the source text read as follows: “Not known whether handed to Secretary to read.”
2. Dated Nov. 15. p. 2246.
3. See NIB 63–7–54, Nov. 23, p. 2286.