751G.00/11–1854: Telegram
The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State
1886. Repeated information Paris 617. Limit distribution. From Collins. Re Paris telegram sent Department 2080, repeated Saigon 298.1 In conversation, November 15, with Ely, he stated since French Union forces here were much weaker than those of Viet Minh, it might be wise to consider a political settlement with Viet Minh, as an alternative to a possible military show-down which might develop in event Viet Minh become convinced they would not win elections. I questioned him sharply as to what he meant by a “political solution”. With a somewhat guilty expression, Ely replied that he was not thinking of what I possibly was afraid of. (I feel sure he was aware of US concern re Sainteny mission). He elaborated he did not mean that Vietnam should be handed over to Viet Minh but rather that when Vietnam had a strong, stable government comparable to that of Viet Minh, it might be possible for two parts divided nation to co-exist independently in peace. He pointed out South Vietnam possessed excess of foodstuffs [Page 2268] while [North] Vietnam cannot feed itself without importing additional food. On other hand South Vietnam could well utilize hard goods, coal and other products of Viet Minh area. Hence, he said, politico-economic solution might be sought to avoid war. For this to succeed, he said, South Vietnam must develop strong government and be backed up by Manila Pact. Moreover, peoples on both sides of 17th parallel must renounce war in favor of such solution. Above adds an amount of confirmation to estimate contained in reference cable. I assume matter will be explored with Mendes-France. Needless to say if Dillon’s estimate is correct, this will have profound effect on outcome of my mission Vietnam.