Office of the Historian

751G.00/10–2554

Memorandum of Conversation, by Paul J. Sturm of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs

confidential
[Washington,] October 25, 1954.

Subject:

  • Call of Mr. Pierre Millet on Mr. Young

Participants:

  • Mr. Pierre Millet, Counselor. French Embassy
  • Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., PSA
  • Mr. P. J. Sturm, PSA

Mr. Pierre Millet called on Mr. Young October 25 at the latter’s request to receive a copy, and brief oral exposition, of the President’s letter to Prime Minister Diem.

During the course of the conversation Millet referred to Premier Mendes-France’s visit to Washington scheduled for November 18 and expressed the hope that it would be possible by then to have answers to outstanding questions, such as U.S. support for the FEC, concerning which Governor Stassen had told Mr. La Chambre he would have to consult Congress. Mr. Young replied that these questions are now under study. Our military will be interested in French plans to reduce the FEC. We are concerned with support and training to be given the armed forces of Viet-Nam and Cambodia. In this connection, MAAG Saigon has been authorized to begin a limited training program for the Vietnamese National Army. Our objective is to induce General [Page 2182] Hinh to get out of politics and give his attention to organizing the Army to resist Viet Minh infiltration and subversion. The Secretary advised Premier Mendes-France in Paris of this decision.

Mr. Young said that we still think Diem is the best symbol available to head a government in Viet-Nam. All efforts must be bent to surrounding him with an efficient team.

Mr. Millet said the French Embassy was annoyed by press stories (he mentioned Newsweek) that the French had been encouraging Hinh to carry out a military coup. Mr. Young replied that we were satisfied with General Ely’s performance but wondered if his directives had been faithfully executed at lower levels.

Millet asked whether we thought the Mansfield report went “too far”. Mr. Young replied that the report would carry weight in Congress, and that if it could be shown Prime Minister Diem, owing to military intrigues against him, never had a chance to build up an effective government, reactions in our Congress would be adverse. We have noted that La Chambre seems preoccupied with seeking a successor for Diem.

Millet remarked that for his part he was concerned with finding an efficient head of government and that he attached less importance to the qualities of honesty and incorruptibility attributed to Diem. He did say that a Vietnamese Prime Minister to be successful must be a nationalist patriot; it is asking too much to require him to be honest also.

Millet said that there is no use pretending or hoping that elections will not take place in Viet-Nam in 1956. The Viet Minh would recommence the war if a serious attempt were made to prevent elections.

Mr. Young ended the conversation by saying that we are earnestly trying to carry out the terms of the September 29 Minute of Understanding.