Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.13/10–2554: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Paris, October 25, 1954—11 p.m.

1737. Repeated information Saigon 224. Reference A—Tedul 14, rptd Saigon 1678.² Reference B—Deptel 1177, rptd Saigon 1298.³ Reference C—Deptel 1195, rptd Saigon 1327.⁴ I went to see La Chambre this afternoon at 4:30. When I arrived I found Parodi with him. The conversation lasted two and a half hours, 90 percent of which was taken up by La Chambre. He was obviously upset when conversation began.

Overall French position which I will develop in detail later on appears as follows:

They consider that statement in first para of Reference A that “French have not been actively working to consolidate Diem govt” is untrue and is direct personal reflection on both La Chambre and Ely, and on honor of French govt. This sentence was quoted verbatim in the telegram from La Chambre in Saigon to Mendes that caused him to telephone me on Sunday.⁵ French further believe that U.S. seems to be relying on this inaccurate statement to break the agreement reached in Washington last Sept. Specifically they consider (2) (b) of Ref A to be diametrically opposed to the agreements reached in Wash. While French fully agree that channel for U.S. aid shld be direct to Associated States they consider that firm decision was reached in Wash that tripartite comites shld be set up in each of the three Associated States which shld decide what form French and American aid shld take and how it shld be divided. French rely for this understanding on General Smith’s statements. La Chambre states there was some division of opinion in American delegation when this subject was discussed and that Robertson seemed opposed to the creation of such tripartite boards but that General Smith had made final decision that they shld be created. (Emb comment: In this connection last paragraph of page 4 of top secret memorandum of conversation (ELaCMC–2) covering Smith La Chambre meeting Sept 29 seems relevant.)⁶ As an example of the decision regarding the establishment of tripartite comites, La Chambre said that Bedell Smith had even discussed the chairmanship of these comites and had said that of course a Frenchman shld be chairman of the comites in Vietnam and in Laos, but that he wld expect an American to be chairman of the comite in Cambodia.

La Chambre also pointed out that unilateral direct military aid by U.S. wld create grave difficulties for French under the Armistice Agreement signed at Geneva. France, he pointed out, is a guarantor of this agreement and must be fully and currently informed both of any imports of matériel and of any changes of personnel. La Chambre understood that personnel changes wld be required in MAAG Saigon to enable it to undertake a training mission. These wld have to be handled with great care in order that France cld avoid a charge of breaking the terms of the armistice.

La Chambre indicated repeatedly that he felt he had arrived at complete understanding with General Smith and he stated he felt present situation wld never have arisen if General Smith had still been present in Dept. By end of conversation La Chambre and Parodi seemed more relaxed and it was agreed that [when] we broke up that (1) I wld forward to Wash on behalf of Mendes-France the formal and emphatic protest of the French govt against allegation that French had not actively worked to consolidate Diem govt; and (2) query Wash as to whether understanding which La Chambre reached with General Smith that tripartite or “combined” groups wld be set up to coordinate and oversee distribution of aid still held good.

In connection with French protest Parodi also stated that French govt considers that it is surprising and disturbing that U.S. govt shld take such a grave decision at a time when the Secretary of State was absent in Paris discussing other vitally important matters concerning Europe with the French Prime Min.

La Chambre asked if we cld furnish him with a copy of all memos of conversation regarding his talks in Wash, as French had no such record. I told him I wld request permission from Wash and I recommend that I be authorized to give him a set as soon as possible. If Dept approves, please send extra set soonest.

Detailed account follows:

Meeting commenced by my showing La Chambre bulk of Deptel 1499⁷ indicating that U.S. had no intention of departing from Sept agreements. I did not show him final paragraphs of this telegram. La Chambre then showed me and went over with me in detail the telegram which he and Ely had jointly sent to Mendes-France and which provoked Mendes-France’s telephone call to me. In this telegram La Chambre and Ely protested vigorously against wording in Ref A, “French have not been actively working to consolidate Diem govt.”

La Chambre said that this had very much upset both him and Ely. This had been somewhat rectified regarding Ely by Secretary’s statements to Mendes, but omission of La Chambre in this connection had made him all the more upset. According to La Chambre, Ely was personally and solely responsible for preventing Hinh from taking armed action against Diem. La Chambre said that he personally also had worked as hard as he could to solve crisis in Vietnam and to strengthen Diem govt. He said that he himself had persuaded Bai Vien to agree to see Diem and to enter Diem govt. He also said he personally had persuaded General Hinh to agree to compromise with Diem provided Diem accepted Xuan as Min of Defense to protect the interests of the army. La Chambre said all this was done in closest cooperation with Heath and that Heath then carried out a comparable task with Diem. In this connection Heath had been successful in persuading Diem to accept Xuan.⁸

Only reason for continuation of crisis in La Chambre’s eyes has been stubbornness of Diem in not agreeing to accept Xuan as Min of Defense. La Chambre said Diem’s reason for refusing Xuan was not that he disliked him but that he wanted to force Hinh out. What Diem wishes, according to La Chambre, is to have French remove Hinh from his command and order him out of Vietnam. This, according to La Chambre, the French could never do. La Chambre said that Ely feels that such an action would be likely to cause a civil war, which would be the final end for Vietnam. La Chambre said that if such a situation arose we should understand clearly that in no event would the French Expeditionary Corps intervene and take action against Vietnamese forces. The French were willing to fight Communists but no one else.

La Chambre said that he had seen Diem several times and had had three or four meals with him. He said that he and Ely feel very strongly that they have both done their best and he said that Heath, when delivering the message in Ref A to both of them, agreed fully with their feeling that they had each done everything possible to cooperate with the U.S. in supporting Diem.

Regarding Secretary’s statement to Méndes that Ref A referred to some lower level French, La Chambre requested that US back up this assertion by citing names and facts. He stated that if we could prove that any French official had disobeyed his and Ely’s orders to carry out agreements reached at Washington to support Diem govt, French would instantly discharge such official. La Chambre closed this part of the discussion by saying “I gave General Smith my word and—I don’t break my word”.

Telegram from La Chambre and Ely to Mendes then went on to say “the decision to unilaterally notify Diem of the unconditional grant of aid seems to us to be contrary to the accords of Washington”. La Chambre emphasized that the key word in this paragraph was the word “unconditional”. The telegram then quoted at length from Ref B which La Chambre relied on almost entirely as expression of agreement reached in Washington as he had no minutes of proceedings. From Ref B French gathered understanding as follows:

1. Support should be given to Diem to facilitate the construction of a strong govt by him and not merely for the purpose of prolonging the crisis.

2. With respect to General Hinh a reconciliation should be sought between Hinh and Diem but this did not mean that Diem should be authorized to force the resignation of Hinh. Paragraph 5, and in particular last sentence, is interpreted as indicating that Hinh should stay on as Chief of Staff although he should cease to meddle in politics.

3. Sentence in paragraph 5 reading “it should be emphasized that France and US are firmly supporting President Diem and that once his position consolidated and only then, extensive program designed to develop national army under General Hinh could be undertaken” is interpreted by French to mean that aid for national army can not be given until political crisis is settled. They consider that item in Ref A regarding initiation of immediate training program by MAAG Saigon is flat contradiction of this agreement.

La Chambre then stated that his discussions with General Smith covered the possibility of an alternative solution if despite all help given him Diem should fail. La Chambre said that alternative solution he discussed with General Smith along lines of that proposed by Mendes-France in his talk with Secretary. La Chambre stated categorically that General Smith agreed that such an alternative position should be prepared but that it should be kept in reserve so that full support could be given to Diem in the first instance. Reference C apparently refers to this conversation. La Chambre stated that in view of this fact he felt that paragraph (3) of Ref A and in particular the last sentence thereof was not in accord with the understanding he had reached on this subject with General Smith.

La Chambre then said that he felt that the unilateral action taken by the U.S. runs the risk of breaking the close Franco-American teamwork which had been established between Heath and Ely and would probably only serve to prolong the crisis.

La Chambre reported a conversation he had had with Phuong, the head of the Cao Dai. This conversation took place in Saigon on Saturday a half hour before Heath informed Ely of the contents of Ref A. Phuong in this conversation said that much as he personally disliked Hinh he thought that the crisis had now lasted long enough, that its prolongation was due solely to Diem’s stubbornness and that if Diem did not promptly come to terms with Hinh the time had come for Diem to go. When La Chambre asked Phuong whom he thought of as a successor, he said that no previous prime minister would do, that a new man was required, and that the time had now come for Diem to compromise with Hinh or to resign.

Finally La Chambre said that the situation throughout Vietnam is very bad and that outside of the major population centers the entire country is slipping into the hands of the Viet Minh. The Diem govt is in complete disrepute everywhere and is no longer supported even by the Catholics. The Bishop of Hue and the Bishop of Saigon have both told La Chambre that they now are opposed to Diem, as they feel that what is needed above all is an efficient govt which he has shown that he cannot provide. La Chambre said that most popular person in Vietnam as the moment was Buu Hoi because he was not well known. La Chambre said that he personally was worried by Buu Hoi’s leftist tendencies which are not far distant from Communism. If Buu Hoi was to preside over a govt he would need strong men under him to run matters, such as Tam or Bai Vien. La Chambre said that although Bai Vien was a gangster, he was a strong man and apparently was showing signs of wanting to reform. La Chambre said that he personally believes that by far the best bet for restoring order in Vietnam is Tam as Minister of Interior. He described him as a strong career policeman which he said was what was needed. He said that Tam would willingly work for Diem. However, much as they feel he is needed, French would not dare suggest him because of his pro-French reputation.

La Chambre then made solemn statement of following French governmental position which was confirmed by Parodi. “We prefer to lose in Vietnam with the U.S. rather than to win without them. We would rather support Diem knowing he is going to lose and thus keep France-U.S. solidarity than to pick someone who could retain Vietnam for the free world if this meant breaking Franco-US solidarity”.

La Chambre also expressed some concern at Secretary’s description to Mendes of U.S. policy regarding size of army in Vietnam. La Chambre said that he agreed personally Secretary’s ideas that a constabulary or a small force would be far more useful than a ten division army. However, La Chambre pointed out that this was primarily Ely’s responsibility and as far as he knew, no one on the U.S. side had informed Ely as yet of this new American policy. He hoped that this would be done as soon as possible.

In closing, La Chambre praised the teamwork that had evolved between Ely and Heath in Saigon and expressed the hope that the present differences could be promptly settled so that they could get on again with the job.

I made very little comment during this long exposé by La Chambre except to say at the end that I was certain that U.S. still desired to coordinate their aid programs closely with the French and the Associated State concerned. La Chambre said that if this was indeed the case the French would be satisfied but that then it would be necessary to implement this decision by proceeding very promptly to set up the tripartite committees which were agreed upon in Washington.

If the Dept does not consider that agreement was reached to set up such committees, I am afraid that this constitutes a basic misunderstanding such as I referred to in my telegram reporting my conversation with Mendes-France. In that event I would recommend that Dept promptly send someone who took part in the September talks to Paris to clear up the misunderstanding.

Dillon

1. This telegram was transmitted in three parts.
2. Dated Oct. 22, p. 2159.
3. Also sent as Tosec 9, Sept. 30, p. 2101.
4. Dated Oct. 1, p. 2110.
5. Regarding the telephone call from Mendès-France to Dillon on Sunday, Oct. 24, see Paris telegram 1718 of that date, p. 2168.
6. Regarding the meeting under reference, see telegram Tosec 7 to London, Sept. 30, p. 2098.
7. Dated Oct. 24, p. 2171.
8. Telegram 1744 from Paris, Oct. 26, read as follows: “Reference Embassy telegram 1737. Last sentence of second paragraph in detailed account should read ‘Heath had been successful in persuading Diem to accept Bay Vien but had not been successful in case of Xuan.’” (751G.13/10–2654)