396.1 LO/10–2354: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
1717. Repeated information Saigon 217. Saigon for Heath. After signing ceremonies1 today the Secretary discussed Indochina with Mendes France and Eden;2 he made specific reference to instructions contained Dept’s Tedul 143 and agreed to furnish Mendes with a paraphrased copy of instructions in numbered paras 1, 2 and 3 of reftel.
The Secretary admitted that Diem had not displayed the qualities we would have liked but stated that we still thought he was the best man to receive our support and in any case we thought that in order to have a chance Diem must receive 100 percent support from both French and ourselves before we began acting on any alternative solution. The Secretary emphasized that in criticizing the lack of support given by the French to Diem in accordance with Washington understanding, he was not referring to the top authorities but rather to underlings, particularly in Saigon. He reminded Mendes of Senator Mansfield’s report and the importance it would have on congressional opinion and decisions regarding further aid to Indochina. He stressed strongly the necessity of forming an effective government of national union which would devote itself to urgent internal problems rather than to petty bickering among its members. He stated that we now believe we must do something to break the deadlock and were prepared to do so in full recognition of the risks involved. Our proposal to have MAAG undertake the training of indigenous forces was made in an effort to accomplish this objective.
Mendes stated that the French believed the Diem Government was weak and were not sure it would accomplish what was necessary. But, Mendes said, they did not have an alternate solution at the moment and were prepared to carry out their part of the Washington agreement to the full until the Diem Government became hopeless. Mendes did not find it surprising that only three months after the armistice the situation was as bad as it was. He believed that we were now in the trough of a wave and could accordingly hope for improvement in the future. In spite of its willingness to support Diem the French Govt believed that we must have some alternate plan in mind to substitute for the Diem formula when and if it failed.
Mendes then announced that the French were accordingly now studying a plan wherein a man would be sent to Indochina to act [Page 2166] as the delegate of Bao Dai, “a sort of viceroy.” This man would have no powers to interfere in government but would serve the purpose of retaining the prestige of legitimacy which came from Bao Dai and at the same time avoiding the undesirable effect of Bao Dai himself returning to the Vietnam. He described the man’s role as similar to that of President Coty or Queen Elizabeth. When we asked who he had in mind he did not reply stating that two or three people were under consideration and that he would have a specific plan to propose to us in the very near future. I asked whether this man would support Diem or not. Mendes replied that he would do neither but would simply preside over a presidium which would take its own decisions. Eden agreed with the possible merit of this suggestion and specifically with the thought that the thread of legitimacy from Bao Dai be retained. The Secretary said that he did not object to sending a man as long as he did not interfere in politics.
Although Mendes did not mention any names we have no doubt that he was thinking in terms of Buu Hoi or Buu Loc, both of whom appear to fill Mendes’ description. I referred to a message we had received today through an intermediary that Bao Dai would like to see us. I asked whether French had any objections our seeing Bao Dai. Mendes replied in the negative stating that it would be best to hear what Bao Dai had to say. Eden expressed willingness his government to do whatever possible could be done to help. Mendes reiterated that Ely and La Chambre were being given specific instructions to carry out loyally the understanding reached at Washington.
Full memorandum of conversation follows by pouch.
- Reference is to the signing of the various agreements on the restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany; for documentation, see volume v.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation, drafted by William M. Gibson, First Secretary of the Embassy in France, is filed in Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238.↩
- Dated Oct. 22, p. 2159.↩