751G.13/10–2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State

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1553. Sent priority Paris 510. Paris for the Secretary. My telegram 505 to Paris.1 I plan to communicate to La Chambre and General Ely tonight substance of Department’s telegram 1663 of October 212 and say to them that these are my instructions to see Diem get full chance to succeed. I will say that “full chance” does not mean mental reservation that Diem cannot succeed and we are just utilizing waiting space to find a better candidate. I will say further that “full chance” means Hinh leaves Vietnam at least for space or effects reconciliation with Diem, which latter will be difficult, if not impossible, not so much on account of Hinh alone but because of unreliable character of certain of his camarilla and because of grudgeful, bitter intransigence of Diem re Hinh. I mean to say that I think the Diem solution as agreed upon at Washington does not mean we should fail emphatically to impress on Diem and army the necessity of real plan to eradicate Communist infiltration and win villages. Neither would support of Diem mean that he should not reorganize his present government to get more efficient and honest ministers. If he had support of army he would be less dependent upon support of two sects and Binh Xuyen. If Department approves line I plan to take with Ely and La Chambre, then it will be necessary for Paris Embassy to send someone, perhaps Achilles or Gibson, immediately to see Bao Dai at Cannes and say to him we are still backing Diem government and Hinh must either effect reconciliation with Diem or leave Vietnam for time with assurances of maintenance, or perhaps even improvement of his rank.

I realize I may not convince Ely and La Chambre of this line, in which case I will have to have strong backing from Department to Paris. I realize also there is certain danger Hinh and his camarilla may refuse this solution and even, although I rather doubt it attempt coup d’état. I think that is risk that is to be run. I am not certain that army would really succeed, or if it did achieve some success, that, faced with dropping of our aid, elements in army would not get rid of Hinh and return to obedience to Diem government. Hinh is not really popular in army except as Diem government’s inept handling of him has given him temporary currency and authority, and there is beginning trend of military opinion against his actions and attitude.

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There is also decided possibility (see my telegram sent Paris 505, Department 1536, October 22) that even with whole-hearted complete backing Diem cannot succeed in forming viable government. That is risk, however, I am inclined to take.

If Department approves I think now is time to deliver the President’s letter to Diem (Department’s telegram 1336, October l).3 Do this Embassy and Paris inform Ely and French Government in advance of our intentions to deliver this letter?

Please instruct.

Heath
  1. For telegram 1536 from Saigon, also sent to Paris as telegram 505, Oct. 22, see p. 2151.
  2. For Tedul 11 to Paris, Oct. 21, also sent to Saigon as telegram 1663, see p. 2149.
  3. For President Eisenhower’s letter to President Diem, see p. 2166. Regarding telegram 1336, see footnote 1, ibid.