Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

611.90/10–2254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

top secret

Washington, October 22, 1954—7:48 p.m.

1679. Joint State-Defense message to US Ambassador Saigon and Chief of US MAAG Saigon. The following message contains the policy of the US Government and your instructions necessary in furtherance of paragraphs 10–a and 10–d, Part IV of “US Policy Toward the Far East” transmitted by State Department instruction A–28 of Sept. 10, 1954.²

Part I

(1) It is US Government policy to support the Government of Free Vietnam under the Premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem and to assist that Government (a) to promote internal security and political stability in Free Vietnam, (b) to establish and maintain control by that Government throughout the territory of Free Vietnam, and (c) effectively to counteract Viet Minh infiltration and paramilitary activities south of the 17th Parallel.

(2) It is realized that the principal stumbling block to effecting the policies outlined above is concerned with the loyalty of the existing Vietnamese armed forces, and particularly the loyalty of the Chief of Staff of those forces, General Hinh. It is further apparent that any long range program of aid for and training of these Vietnamese armed forces can have no appreciable effect on the immediate situation. It is therefore directed that the Ambassador and the Chief of MAAG collaborate in setting in motion a crash program designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty and the effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces. For this purpose the assets of all US Government agencies in Free Vietnam will be concentrated as necessary in the hope that within the immediate future (the next month or so) the present Diem government can be strengthened to such an extent that longer range programs can be decided upon with a reasonable expectation of success. The details of “how” are left in the hands of the Ambassador and General O’Daniel. The closest cooperation between US Ambassador and Chief MAAG will of course be required to ensure that these activities are consistent with the policies of the United States regarding the legal government of Vietnam.

(3) Financial limitations are not prescribed for this crash program, as it is considered here that necessary resources are now available to Ambassador and MAAG Saigon for such actions as may be practical. Speed is essential to achieve success.

(4) If it is considered necessary, you both are authorized at any time to inform French authorities, Vietnamese authorities, and General Hinh personally of US objectives and to further state without equivocation that no long range support to the Vietnamese armed forces will be programmed or extended by the US as long as there is the slightest doubt as to the loyalty of the Chief of Staff or other high officers in those forces.

(5) Should you determine that it is not practical to work with the existing Vietnamese armed forces organization you are authorized, upon receipt of concurrence from Departments State and Defense, to approach the Prime Minister and to state that the United States is willing to commence immediately the organization of a national police or constabulary separated from the present Vietnamese armed forces if the Prime Minister is able to select an individual who is considered by you to be competent to command such an organization.

(6) US Ambassador is requested to undertake the necessary discussions and negotiations with the Government of Free Vietnam and local French authorities to obtain agreements (a) ensuring US MAAG Saigon will have the necessary authority, responsibility and freedom of action to carry out the above program; and (b) assuring the cooperation, coordination and assistance from Vietnamese and French authorities and personnel at all levels in Free Vietnam. US Ambassador will immediately consult with Chief MAAG to formulate the detailed agreements and assurances which MAAG requires.…

(7) It is desired that you jointly inform State and Defense Departments as to the plan of action you decide upon as a result of this directive, and, in addition, furnish progress reports upon which determination of future scope of US programs in support of the Government of Free Vietnam may be based.

(8) For your information, the Department of State will undertake to obtain appropriate understanding and means of augmenting the MAAG strength as required. In the meantime rotation as necessary to accomplish the objectives herein set forth can be provided.

Part II—Instructions for US Ambassador, Paris

Subject to such conversations as the Secretary of State may have with Mendes-France, you are requested to inform French Government of these instructions and to seek its agreement immediately to authorize General Ely to conclude the necessary agreements with the US Ambassador Saigon and Chief of MAAG to implement the above program.

Hoover

1. Drafted by Young of PSA. Also sent niact to Paris as Tedul 15.
2. Airgram A–28 to Saigon, Sept. 10, transmitting excerpts from NSC 5429/2, is not printed. (611.90/9–1054) For the text of NSC 5429/2, Aug. 20, 1954, see volume xii.