751G.5/10–2054
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Davis) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: This letter is in partial response to your letter dated 11 October 1954 in which you asked, among other things, for the views of the Department of Defense on the assumption by the United States of training responsibilities for Vietnamese forces.
The question of training Vietnamese forces has been reconsidered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose views are reflected below.1
The Department of Defense desires to point out that in addition to current unstable political situation in Vietnam the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement have been interpreted by the Department of State to limit the strength of MAAG, Indochina, to 342 military personnel. Even if all these military personnel were replaced by United States civilians to perform the normal functions of the MAAG and the military personnel were thereby released for training duties only, the number of US military personnel would permit only limited participation in the over-all training program. Under these conditions, US participation in the training not only would probably have but limited beneficial effect, but also would assume responsibility for any failure of the program.
In light of the foregoing and from a military point of view, the Department of Defense considers that the United States should not participate in the training of Vietnamese forces in Indochina. However, if it is considered that political considerations are overriding, the Department of Defense would agree to the assignment of a training mission to MAAG, Saigon, with safeguards against French interference with the US training effort. If it is decided that political considerations are overriding, the US should undertake such training responsibilities [Page 2147] only if the number of US MAAG personnel authorized to enter Vietnam is sufficient to undertake an effective training program.
Sincerely yours,
- For a memorandum of Oct. 19 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on “Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina,” see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 771–774.↩