751G.00/10–2054: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
1501. Repeated information Paris 496. I talked at length with Diem yesterday. Sunday1 he had seen Xuan and had offered him vice presidency. Yesterday Diem, presumably encouraged by widely circulated Mansfield declaration that US should suspend aid if his government fell, went back on this offer and said he would not have Xuan in Cabinet at any price. He based his reversal on “unalterable opposition” of Hoa Haos and Cao Dais to Xuan’s presence in government. (Comment: This is contrary to our information from Colonel Thai that Hoa Haos and Cao Dais could be persuaded, reluctantly, to accept Xuan as vice president.) I reminded Diem I had advised him on Saturday he could not reach [refuse?] vice presidency to Xuan without being in conflict with Bao Dai’s recommendation that Xuan be given this post.2 I remarked in view of his new decision to offer nothing to Xuan governmental deadlock would continue to disadvantage of government and Vietnam, and inquired what solution he had. His only solution was to telegraph Bao Dai asking latter to issue instructions to Bay Vien to come into his government.
I expressed doubt that Bao Dai, for reasons of face and also because in his present weak position he would not wish to offend any faction, would order Bay Vien to participate in government. Diem then said it would be necessary for France and US to bring pressure on Bao Dai. I expressed doubt that pressure could be effectively brought to bear on Bao Dai at this precise moment. I said I would report our conversation to Department.
Diem then said if he were to govern at all he had to have minimum of power in his hands, which he would not have if Xuan took over vice presidency and Defense Ministry. Diem said it was more than ever clear that Hinh must go. Leading French officers assigned to Vietnamese Army were, Diem asserted, convinced Hinh was obstacle to [Page 2146] reorganization of army. Xuan would be no better. Increasing number of officers were coming or sending word to Diem that they disapproved of Hinh’s policy and rebellious attitude toward government. They were for Diem, latter asserted, because he represented an ideal. This increasing opposition in army to Hinh, however, had not yet progressed to point, Diem said that he could issue order sending Hinh away on mission or dismissing him. Moment that such action would be practical, however, might not be long delayed, Diem hoped.