751G.00/10–954: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
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1387. Repeated information priority Paris 467. Reference Embassy telegram 1382, repeated Paris 466.1 I saw Diem again yesterday evening and found him still adamant on proposition that General Hinh must leave his position as Chief Staff and Vietnam. I said to Diem that, while his government has support of both France and US, this obviously did not mean that either country could put force at his disposal to protect his regime against organized internal opposition. I remarked he evidently did not believe Hinh would actually endeavor to overthrow his regime by force and also believed that if he did, coup would be unsuccessful. On contrary on basis of my information, I believed Hinh was quite capable of both undertaking and promptly succeeding in coup de force and would act if Diem failed to meet “request” of Bao Dai to take Xuan and Binh Xuyen into government. I told him to disregard Bao Dai’s telegram saying army should participate in government because Bao Dai had very specifically assured me that was drafting error and he did not contemplate army as such would hold office in civil ministries. I inquired whether he had been negotiating with Xuan and Binh Xuyen. He replied he had not; he was waiting settlement of Hinh issue. I earnestly advised him to call in Xuan and Binh Xuyen and offer them posts he had already indicated they might have. If he delayed further, they would take line he had disobeyed Bao Dai and either agitate for removal of Diem government or more probably proceed to coup d’état. If they raised question of Hinh’s demands, they could be told Bao Dai had made it very clear he did not support army’s participation in civil government. I told Diem, as I had told him earlier in day, that by leaving Hinh as Chief Staff he would have time either to bring Hinh back to loyalty to civil government or if he continued this course to convince Vietnamese Officer Corps that Hinh was following course fatal to future of National Army. Hinh could be gotten rid of later but by pressing issue now when President had no force behind him Hinh would almost certainly be victor. All this seemed make little impression on Diem. He remained mutely obstinate that Hinh must go now.
[Page 2127]Dr. Fishel came to see me this morning and said Diem would not press for Hinh’s dismissal now, although he remained firm in his conviction that Hinh must go—eventually. Fishel said also President was getting in touch immediately with Xuan and Bay Vien of Binh Xuyen. I urged Fishel to persuade Diem to lose no time in concluding his negotiations with Xuan and Bay Vien.
I saw Ely at noon today who urged me to see both Diem and Hinh without delay. Ely said, according to his information, plot between Binh Xuyen and Hinh to surround palace and take Diem prisoner was already far advanced. He said Xuan, Hinh, and Bay Vien had sent telegrams to Bao Dai urging him to dismiss Diem on grounds Diem had failed to obey Bao Dai’s instructions to take Xuan and Binh Xuyen into government. Ely said he felt desperately pessimistic about situation.
His own position vis-à-vis Expeditionary Corps and French community Vietnam was extremely bad. He was accused of having “sold out to Americans” at Washington meetings by widely repeated story of American correspondent that he, Ely, preferred having “nationalist and anti-French Government in Vietnam” to a “pro-French Government” was being used against him in Saigon and in Paris. He had found it necessary to call in officers of French Expeditionary Corps and insist there had been no sacrifice of French interests in Vietnam and he had issued press statement to that effect this morning.