Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361

Summary Minute of a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State. October 8, 1954, 10:30 a.m.1

top secret

Subject:

  • Report on Franco-American Talks on Indochina

Participants:

  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Bowie
  • Mr. Nolting
  • Mr. Barbour
  • Mr. Kidder
  • Mr. Galloway
  • Mr. Young
  • Mr. Dale Fisher
  • Mr. Hoey
  • [Mr. Selby]

Support to Diem Government

Mr. Young opened the meeting with a brief review of the bilateral talks stating that the delegations had reached accord on the principle of supporting Diem (the Minute of Understanding) and on the tactics to be followed in the immediate future (the agreed instructions to Saigon). The implementation was now up to the Saigon missions. No information had been received from Saigon in the last forty-eight hours, but it was understood that Diem was stalling “the generals, pending the return of Ely and Heath. The latter have stated their belief that strong talk by Ely can resolve the situation by returning the generals to their tasks. A crucial aspect of the problem would be assuring implementation of the agreement by middle level French officials in Paris and Saigon. The length of time during which joint support was to be extended to Diem had not been specified.

Bao Dai Status

During the talks the French had particularly pressed us for agreement to get rid of Bao Dai. Mr. Young remarked that we had recognized [Page 2123] this problem but reserved our position as to any immediate action.

The Secretary referred to his meeting the previous day with British High Commissioner Sir Malcolm MacDonald during which the latter had expressed high regard for Bao Dai, an esteem which only MacDonald holds as far as the Secretary knew. Mr. Robertson noted that ex-Ambassador Bullitt held a similar view.

Coordination of Aid Programs

Mr. Young stated that a major unresolved problem is the nature of joint U.S.-French arrangements with respect to aid programs. La Chambre had envisaged bilateral preparation of aid programs which would then be “presented” to the Associated States Governments. Mr. Robertson said that there was considerable doubt that the French had really accepted our position on informal tripartite coordination. Mr. MacArthur noted that the French had, in pushing the joint idea, stressed aid projects with an immediate political impact.

Elections in 1956

The Secretary asked what our policy on the 1956 elections was. He noted that there was no possibility of fair elections in the North and that, when the time came, we would have ample grounds for postponing or declining to hold them in the South. The problem is not one of getting ready for a political election but combating subversion and infiltration in the immediate future. He felt that we should not use the election as target dates for our aid programs.

Mr. Kidder noted that the election date could serve as a lever for compelling action by the French and the Vietnamese. Mr. MacArthur stated the question of holding elections highlighted the desirability of documenting truce violations. Mr. Young added that to date we have received a great deal of unevaluated material on violations from local governments and the Canadians as well as from our own missions. He pointed out that during the talks with the French both sides had expressed doubt that the elections would or should be held in Vietnam.

Size of Economic Aid Program

Mr. Young stated that the OCB had asked the Working Group to prepare recommendations and instructions on the size of the proposed economic and military aid programs, the machinery and methods for their implementation. The FOA had in mind about a $100 million program, 35 for refugees and 65 for economic assistance. Provisional planning was under way but political guidance was needed.

Mr. Young indicated that the main problem to date is that the Defense Department has been “unenamored” with Vietnam. It stresses the need for political stability as a condition precedent to adding a training mission to MAAG Saigon, and is giving the program a low [Page 2124] priority on its military support agenda. Mr. Murphy said his talks with Defense officials gave him the same impression. We have pointed out the connection between political stability and minimum military security for the Vietnam National Government. It was noted that at present the top ranks of the Vietnamese National Army are overwhelmingly French.

Mr. Robertson stated that one objection posed by Defense is the lack of sufficient military personnel for completing the program envisaged prior to the target date (mid ’56). Defense envisages the need for 1500 officers compared to the present Saigon complement, additions to which are probably precluded by the Geneva Agreement.

Mr. Young noted that the National Army would utilize the FEC stocks of military gear but, over and above this, the JCS estimate an annual cost of about $550 million for the armed forces of Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Secretary expressed doubt that this was the most effective way to spend a half billion dollars. Mr. Nolting noted that this was a total non-equipment cost figure and that the French and the Vietnamese would doubtless contribute a portion.

The Secretary posed the question of the mission of the National Army. Mr. Young stated that our original request had given the JCS the opportunity for a two-fold answer (1) an army to defend against a Vietminh attack not supported by Chinese forces and (2) sufficient forces for maintaining internal security. The Secretary stated his view that there was no point in preparing the Vietnamese army as the means for defense against a fullfledged attack since this situation would bring the Manila Pact into play.

Mr. MacArthur stated that conversations with Colonel Rossen suggested that the force goal was the replacement of the French forces now in Vietnam. Mr. Galloway added that military strength necessary to hold a beachhead had also been mentioned. The Secretary indicated his rejection of the idea of the Vietnamese National Army as an important force in a general SEA war. Its mission should be psychological in order to give the people the assurance of internal security and the government a sense of stability. A 250,000 man army seemed far too expensive, for it was not an all or nothing proposition and a force of fifty thousand might accomplish the same purpose.

Mr. MacArthur added that, with respect to creating confidence, there were now 180,000 Vietnamese in uniforms and to reduce significantly their number might set in motion an unfavorable political reaction. The Secretary noted the need to educate people to the fact that individual military power within a collective group need not be so large as the requirements of a nation acting alone. We could not [Page 2125] press the Defense Department to contribute sums in the measure of a half billion dollars to a project such as this enjoying but one chance in three of success and where the sum did not bring an appreciable improvement of the odds above a smaller contribution.

Answering the Secretary’s query, Mr. Young stated that the half billion dollar figure had apparently originated with MAAG Saigon, which envisaged a ten-division army trained for an offensive mission; this in contrast to the defensive strategy of the French. The Secretary stated that he had thought in terms of a police force rather than an army.

Answering Mr. Robertson’s question as to how the Manila Pact would actually be applied in case of overt aggression, the Secretary stated that, in case of an all-out Vietminh attack, he foresaw American bombing of Tonkin and probably general war with China. Our concept envisages a fight with nuclear weapons rather than the commitment of ground forces.

The Secretary stated that the military plan under discussion was one having no significance in case of a general war but must be judged on the basis of its political and psychological value. We could not recommend overriding JCS recommendations on military grounds but where the primary purpose of the Force was to defend against political subversion it would be a matter for State Department guidance.

Mr. Young suggested that what was required was our specifically outlining our goals to Defense. Mr. Nolting stated that a prior experiment in covertly training Indonesian officials in FBI techniques had been successful. Mr. Young suggested that the problem of training and force goals should be handled by separate letters to Defense and asked the Secretary how he wished the Department to proceed. The Secretary instructed that his views be incorporated in a single letter. He stated his present view that we should not ask for the creation of a ten-division army, adding that his views might be somewhat changed after lunch today with Senator Mansfield.

Pathet Lao Forces

Mr. Young noted that a further problem was the continued presence of “Free Lao” forces in the mountain country of East Laos.

MAAG in Cambodia

Mr. Young stated that the French had indicated during the talks that the establishment of a US MAAG in Phnom Penh was not inconsistent with their plans but they preferred a joint undertaking.

The Secretary noted the possibility that the British had promised Chou en-Lai that they would oppose this move as a violation of the [Page 2126] spirit of Geneva. Mr. MacArthur expressed doubt we really had the agreement of the French.

  1. Drafted by Selby of S/S–RO. Circulated as document ELaC Memo 20.