Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.5/9–2854

The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, 28 September 1954.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to discussions between representatives of our respective Departments regarding the establishment of training missions, and the retention and development of forces in the Associated States. In response to a request from this office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered these matters and have submitted their recommendations to me in memorandums dated 22 September 1954. Copies of these memorandums are attached for your information.

Based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations, members of my staff are preparing talking papers for use in discussions with the French at the forthcoming discussions to begin on 27 September 1954.

Sincerely yours,

C. E. Wilson

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 22 September 1954.

Subject:

• U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina.

1. This memorandum is in response to the memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated 31 August 1954, which requested the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the State Department views on establishing a MAAG in Cambodia and a training mission in MAAG, Saigon. It also responds to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 15 September 1954, which transmitted additional State Department views on Cambodia to be considered in connection with the memorandum of 31 August 1954, and to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), subject: “Training for the National Police Force of Vietnam,” dated 21 September 1954.¹

2. In their memorandum for you dated 4 August 1954,² subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain conditions which they considered should be met before the United States assumes responsibility for training of the Armed Forces of the Associated States. In their memorandum for you, dated 12 August 1954, subject: “Message to the French Prime Minister”³ the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated two of these preconditions in their recommendations concerning the proposed message to the Prime Minister of France. From a military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all of the previously expressed preconditions are still valid and desire to point out that conditions in South Vietnam fall short of meeting these preconditions. In the light of Presidential approval of the message to the Prime Minister of France and in light of Presidential approval of Sections II, III, and IV of NSC 5429/2,⁴ the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer no further objection in the establishment of a MAAG in Cambodia. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern the unstable political situation presently existing within the state of South Vietnam, and accordingly consider that this is not a propitious time to further indicate United States intentions with respect to the support and training of either the Vietnamese regular or police forces. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend against the assignment of a training mission to MAAG, Saigon.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that special provisions of the bilateral agreement between the United States and Cambodia provide that all French advisors ultimately be withdrawn in order that the United States may deal directly with the Government of Cambodia, completely independent of French participation or control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that no commitment be made at this time as to the size or composition of armed forces to be trained and supported, nor to the size and composition of the proposed MAAG in Cambodia, until further study can be given to these matters.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 22 September 1954.

Subject:

• Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina.

1. In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 10 September 1954,⁵ subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following views and recommendations.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the provisions of the Geneva Armistice Agreement and the latest National Security Council policies for the Southeast Asia area.

3. The restrictions imposed by the Geneva Armistice Agreement on Cambodia are minor and can be overcome to a degree sufficient to carry out generally the U.S. national policies in that area. The restrictions on Laos are major and permit training assistance and supervision by French instructors only. In Viet Nam the cease fire agreement constitutes a major obstacle to the introduction of adequate U.S. MAAG personnel and of additional arms and equipment.

4. Although the French have not submitted for U.S. study any plans they may have for withdrawal of French forces from Indochina, some informal and general information has been obtained as to their present intentions. Based upon this information and taking into account the estimated capabilities of the three nations of the Associated States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that those forces listed in the Appendix hereto⁶ should be retained or developed in Viet Nam and Cambodia. The estimated costs thereof, listed in the Appendix hereto must be re-examined in view of the lack of facts related to condition and quantities of equipment and clothing, quantities of POL, ammunition and arms to be released by the French.

5. Under the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement the training of Laotian armed forces may be conducted by French personnel only. However military equipment can be furnished in specified quantities for the defense of Laos through the French.

6. The development of the proposed forces for Viet Nam and Cambodia will require extensive and detailed training which will extend over a period of 3 to 5 years. The French should relinquish over-all command of the Armed Forces of Viet Nam as rapidly as possible with complete removal of forces when the Vietnamese are capable of exercising command of an effective force. The Vietnamese capability along these lines should be developed by intensive training and by progressive promotion of Vietnamese officers to posts in command of larger units and to positions of increased responsibility.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that prior to the assumption of support of the forces of the state of South Viet Nam, a definite agreement should be obtained from the French Government with respect to the timing of their programmed phased withdrawal. The phasing out by the French should be correlated with the ability of the Vietnamese to take over this responsibility from the French, and at the same time assume command.

8. Although introduction of military equipment into Viet Nam above the levels existing at the time of signing the Geneva Armistice Agreement is prohibited, it is estimated that sufficient matériel is available in Viet Nam from that which was previously delivered to Indochina for the French Union Forces. The primary problem pertaining to matériel would be to insure that the French, while executing their phased withdrawal from Indochina, leave in Indochina the matériel and equipment required, insofar as available, for the use of the Viet Nam Armed Forces. It should also be emphasized that this matériel and equipment should be left in good operating condition.

9. The supply of items such as pay, food, uniforms, and POL, should be furnished by the Associated States to the maximum extent of their capabilities. However, it is fully recognized that, due to economic conditions in the Associated States, they would require extensive support concerning these items. Such support as may be supplied by the United States should be furnished out of Mutual Security funds administered by Foreign Operations Administration.

10. Indochina is an important part of Southeast Asia and merits limited U.S. support in implementation of national policy in that area. The United States is supporting military programs in this area, which possess a capability of producing effective military forces. In view of the uncertain capabilities of the French and Vietnamese to retrieve, retain, and reorganize the dispersed forces of Vietnam, it may be several years before an effective military force will exist. Therefore, U.S. military support to that area, including the training and equipping of forces, should be accomplished at low priority and not at the expense of other U.S. military programs and should not be permitted to impair the development through MDA programs of effective and reliable allied forces elsewhere.

11. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern the unstable political situation presently existing within the state of South Viet Nam, and, accordingly, consider that this is not a propitious time to further indicate United States intentions with respect to the support and training of Vietnamese forces.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The Defense Department communications cited in this paragraph have not been found in Department of State files.
2. The Aug. 4 memorandum is quoted in the letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Aug. 12, p. 1938.
3. Ante, p. 1943.
4. For NSC 5429/2, “Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East,” Aug. 20, 1954, see volume XII.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. Not printed.