Office of the Historian

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361

Summary Minute of a Meeting at the Department of State, September 27, 1954, 10 a.m.1

secret
Washington, September 27, 1954, 10 a.m.

Participants

  • State
  • General Smith
  • Mr. Hoover
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Barbour
  • Mr. Nolting
  • Mr. Young
  • Mr. Hoey
  • [Mr. Selby]
  • Defense
  • Admiral Carney
  • Admiral Smedberg
  • Lt. Col. Dwan
  • Mr. Sullivan
  • FOA
  • Governor Stassen
  • Mr. FitzGerald
  • Mr. Timmons

The meeting opened with a consideration of the points on the attached agenda.2 The Acting Secretary then summarized his informal talks with La Chambre on the preceding Saturday morning following the briefing session with the Secretary.3 General Smith had emphasized the need for a joint political program as a prerequisite for useful military and economic assistance. La Chambre then had indicated French willingness to go along with the Diem government. The French felt that Bao Dai should be removed from the scene in a legal fashion after he had served his purpose. In spite of known pressures on Mendes to drop the Vietnamese government and to deal directly with Ho, the French were ostensibly in accord with our policy toward Vietnam. It [Page 2079] was agreed that a joint session with the Associated States representatives would be held at the conclusion of the bilateral talks.

The Acting Secretary foresaw that the most difficult aspect of the talks was likely to be accord on the mechanism for military aid to the Associated States, the complications being a possible Mendes–Eden–Chou-en-Lai understanding dating from Geneva. The British have indicated their view, opposed to our own, that direct aid to Cambodia is contrary to Geneva. The Acting Secretary reported that he had just seen the UK Ambassador and informed him, inter alia, of the U.S. intention to set up a MAAG in Cambodia.

As to the mechanics of aid, General Smith pointed out that the French want a joint training program in Vietnam chaired by Ely, a point which we would probably have to concede, which would run the risk of a continual veto of the introduction of our techniques. In Cambodia we would administer the aid directly, although a similar joint commission under our chairmanship could be created, with French training officers remaining. The status of Laos under the Geneva agreement is unclear but might be handled by a Laotian-chaired joint group; the Laotians voting our way in any case. The Acting Secretary added that the International Control Commission might become a real problem in this regard if not adroitly handled.

Mr. MacArthur cautioned that the critical item in the discussions would be the Vietnamese political problem, and that we must concentrate on getting agreement there and not let the talks stray into areas beyond the competence of Ely and La Chambre. Our intention to extend military aid directly to the Cambodians should be made clear.

Economic Talks

Gov. Stassen proposed that in discussing economic topics we should adhere to a “study and stall” technique consistent with the overall aim of reversing the current dollar flow to France.

General Smith noted the Secretary’s agreement to this aim but added that it was our desire that some elements of the French Expeditionary Corps remain in Indochina since an FE phase-out would have to be spread over time to facilitate the Associated States military build up.

Gov. Stassen stated that the [he?] was opposed to writing off Indochina should the French elect to deal with Ho Chi Minh. Gen. Smith indicated concurrence though our military felt that they were already taking a large risk with our material even with French support.

Gov. Stassen assured Mr. Nolting that should cut-off result in the French ceasing troop payments to the Vietnamese National Army, the USOM in Saigon would be in a position to take up the slack with counterpart funds.

[Page 2080]

Political Approach

Agreement was reached on the approach to the French on political topics as outlined by General Smith moving from the more palatable topics (D–1/3—Policies toward Viet Minh, Bao Dai, and Strengthening of Vietnam) toward those on which we were prepared to take a stern attitude (D–1/1—Diem Government, D–1/2—U.S. Relations with Associated States).4

Mr. MacArthur received approval for the constituting of an interagency working group to prepare a draft minute of understanding. (This group met immediately after the briefing session adjourned.)

Military Topics

Mr. Young noted that our general approach was to sound out the French and reserve our position, Admiral Carney concurring. On the possibility of the French proposal to withdraw as raised by Mr. Robertson, Admiral Carney noted that pulling out would be no easy matter, that we should play for time, and if necessary, call their bluff. Gen. Smith expressed doubt that they would more than hint in this regard.

Mr. Robertson emphasized the drastic impact that the loss of Vietnam would have on the rest of Asia. Admiral Carney expressed doubt that the Congress would support an adequate (one-half billion dollars) program without a stable government; Mr. Robertson noting the dependency of political stability on military security, and General Smith stressing the immediate strengthening of Diem which would result from the prompt negotiation of even a small direct training program.

  1. Drafted by Selby of S/S–RO. Circulated as document ELaC Memo 17, Oct. 6.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. For the summary minute of the briefing session of Saturday morning, Sept. 25, see p. 2066; regarding Smith’s talk with La Chambre, see telegram 1217 to Saigon, Sept. 25, p. 2070.↩
  4. These position papers are not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361)↩