Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/9–2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Saigon, September 27, 1954—4 p.m.
[Received 8:55 a.m.]

1250. Repeated information priority Paris 433. Dr. Fishel came to see me September 26 with information Diem had agreed make effort at rapprochement with Hinh substantially along line I had discussed with him previously (Embtel 1232, repeated Paris 431).² Diem proposed ask Hinh present to him within three or four days plan for national army under direction of Hinh with cooperation civil authorities and all available forces including those of sects to suppress Viet Minh dissidents Free Vietnam. This plan, if approved by President, would become point of departure for reconciliation between Diem and beginning concerted effort against Viet Minh subversion.

Diem proposed Hinh issue at once public statement, approved in advance by President, stating: (1) Hinh had noted with satisfaction other nationalist elements are joining government under leadership Diem to strengthen government in its fight against subversive communism; (2) That Army will also join actively under leadership President so that all will work in harmony against common enemy, the Communist Viet Minh.

When Hinh issued statement and submitted plan President stood ready to issue statement saying:

(1) He is pleased to note new statement by Hinh;

(2) It is time all Vietnamese worked together for salvation Vietnam;

(3) President welcomed cooperation of army in struggle against Communist subversion Free Vietnam; and

(4) In recognition of General Hinh’s cooperation President has cancelled earlier instructions to Hinh (meaning President’s orders to Hinh leave country on study mission) and directs Hinh take action at once against Communist subversive activity.

Diem stood ready, according to Fishel, to call Hinh in at once, and make this proposal to him. President would be grateful, however, if Hinh could be “prepared” for such reconciliation attempt prior to President’s call for him. At my request General O’Daniel, Colonel Lansdale³ and Embassy First Secretary Meloy called on General Hinh afternoon September 26. Hinh received this group politely but coolly. Without delay, O’Daniel presented proposal saying that if Hinh were willing make immediate public statement along lines indicated above President in turn was willing make statement also as indicated. O’Daniel emphasized that President would annul his order to Hinh directing latter to leave country. He further said that after three or four days President would wish receive from Hinh a plan for combined effort all available forces free Vietnam against subversive communism and that Hinh, remaining as Chief of Staff, would direct this effort.

Hinh reacted with a touch of belligerency, assuming role of wounded party, and indicated a certain amount of resentment that he was thus abruptly asked to make statement reversing position he had clearly taken in his telegram to Bao Dai week before. He indicated he believed statement suggested was “public apology” on his part but it was carefully explained to him this was not so. O’Daniel explained at some length advantages and necessity of all anti-Communist elements free Vietnam joining without delay in common effort to save country. Hinh countered by commencing recital his grievances against government.

Embassy officer interjected saying that unfortunate as past difficulties may have been, purpose of call was not to review past but to discuss as friends what could be done in future. He said US as true friend of Vietnam deeply disturbed at lack of harmony among elements of strength in Vietnam in this dangerous hour. This conversation was in no sense official representation by US Government nor was it intended as adding to pressures to which Hinh was already subjected from many quarters. It might be helpful, however, if views of US Government were made unmistakably clear. Embassy officer said this desire by Diem for rapprochement with Hinh was most encouraging in US view. There was nothing humiliating in it to either side and President was in effect offering Hinh opportunity he had long desired to lead effort against Communist subversion according his own plan which President about to request. Embassy officer made clear that while recognizing faults of Diem US believed that at this time there was no other leader available who had better chance lead free Vietnam to strength and security provided he had wholehearted cooperation all patriotic groups and elements. Among these, army was important factor. Without full cooperation army, Diem might well be doomed to failure. US was not tied to Diem nor did Diem have blank check on US support. If, within reasonable period of time, Diem with full cooperation all major elements Vietnam still demonstrated he was unable lead country, US would naturally re-examine its entire position of support. US must in the circumstances, however, remain judge as to what “reasonable time” consisted of and also of whether or not cooperation with Diem were real or only nominal.⁴

Hinh countered, somewhat truculently, by saying US did not know every Vietnamese in Vietnam and he felt we had chosen “wrong candidate”. He himself, however, declined or was unable to present name more desirable alternative to Diem with same qualities honesty and nationalism. Hinh then launched into sophistry that army was presently “cooperating” with government and therefore government had no complaint. Embassy officer replied that purpose of visit was not to discuss definition of word “cooperation”, that he fully understood what Hinh meant by cooperation in this matter and Hinh also understood what Embassy representative meant by cooperation. Hinh was leader of army and army was important factor in preservation Vietnam. It was our hope army could join government and other elements in wholehearted and concerted effort preserve Free Vietnam. It was entirely uncertain as to whether any successor government to Diem might meet criteria for US support. Meanwhile Diem did meet those criteria and we hoped all elements would join with him. Hinh said army would fight communism “with or without support” and if necessary would “walk barefoot and eat dry rice and fish”. Embassy officer replied that it was this very spirit which made army such valuable factor in concerted effort against subversive communism.

Toward end of conversation Hinh appeared much less inclined to belligerency. Colonel Lansdale suggested that all that stood between him and President in unified effort for welfare Vietnam was “piece of paper” and that President was showing willingness brush that aside. Hinh said he would consider matter of reconciliation with President and would naturally have to consult his followers and supporters. When O’Daniel asked when we might expect answer, Hinh replied “in three or four days”. When this statement was countered by comment we hoped he would arrive at decision very much more swiftly than that, Hinh complained that “Diem can take three weeks but three days is too much time to allow me”. Hinh concluded by saying he would call followers together that very evening and commence discussions with them. He did not commit himself as to when his answer would be ready or what it would be.

It is clear that Hinh, counting on message from Bao Dai dismissing Diem, was not in receptive mood and was playing for time. During conversation there was much activity in nearby office in which Colonel Lam and Captain Giai were participating. It was fairly safe to assume they were busily preparing broadcast over army controlled radio. Unconfirmed report received by USIS said army noon broadcast today had stated army “impatient” with inactivity and delay of government and was about to “punish” government for its inactivity.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Dated Sept. 25, p. 2059.
3. For Lansdale’s recollection of his activities in Vietnam during the period June-December 1954, see Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, pp. 126–207. See also excerpts from “Lansdale Team’s Report on Covert Saigon Mission in 1954 and 1955,” in The Pentagon Papers [Gravel Edition], vol. i, pp. 573–583. No copy of that report has been found in Department of State files.
4. In telegram 1239 to Saigon, Sept. 27, the Department of State expressed regret that General Hinh had been informed that the United States was not tied to Diem. Even though that might in fact be the U.S. position, it was unwise to advertise it to Diem’s enemies. (751G.00/9–2754)