751G.13/9–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
1052. Repeated information Paris 354. Diem had hour and half talk with Ely beginning at 11 o’clock today, after which he sent for me. To my question as to how matters stood between him and Hinh, he replied there was only one solution, summary dismissal (destitute) of Hinh. I inquired what would happen then. He said there would undoubtedly be bloodshed but that Hinh did not have real support of many officers or of many battalions and he thought chances were seven out of ten that Hinh would be defeated. He deplored possibility of bloodshed but in case of direct disobedience to constituted authority, actually rebellion, there was no other “clear” way of settling matter. I replied that, if he was certain, or even reasonably certain, of winning out in such struggle, that was of course one solution. I did not know exactly how many battalions he was sure of nor did I know whether he had available men successfully to command such enterprise. I inclined to doubt that he had such force or officers available. Diem replied that at least he had fifty/fifty chance, to which I rejoined that, even if he won, bloodshed would leave bitterness unless he were quickly and clearly victor. I said it seemed to me there were three things that could happen:
(1) He could win outright; (2) he could lose; or (3) French forces could intervene sufficiently in order to preserve order in streets and protect French lives and property, which would either prevent actual joining of battle with Hinh’s forces or make it inconclusive leaving Hinh and problem still in Vietnam.
[Page 2032]I said that if he lost an armed conflict with Hinh or the struggle remained inconclusive, then Diem and his government would also be lost. Not only government would be lost but Vietnamese military would conclude it could ride roughshod over civil authority. This would be most dangerous development—dangerous for army and dangerous for future of Vietnam.
On other hand, I said I understood a compromise solution had been arranged with Hinh (mytel 1043)1 whereby General Xuan would be made Minister Defense, would select Hinh’s interim successor, whereupon Hinh would leave in three or four days for France to stay probably two or three months. I understood solution also contemplated that Chan would offer his resignation. I recalled to Diem he had told me yesterday he was very favorably considering appointing Xuan as Defense Minister and he had also mentioned that Chan might resign to clear air. I said, while we would regret to see Chan leave under these circumstances, since he had been intelligent and energetic Secretary of Defense, he had certainly badly handled all negotiations with Hinh which to date had failed and he had, I believed, exceeded Diem’s instructions. Chan’s effort to take over radio station by force not only failed but might have provoked bloodshed. I recalled that [omission] me he was willing to assure Hinh that in going abroad he would not suffer diminution of rank or title. I said that if Hinh did leave under these conditions it would save latter’s “face” but result would correctly be interpreted here as victory for Diem and his government. It would gain him time to establish himself with army and make necessary changes in its command. Diem then objected that Xuan insisted on being made vice president as well and that Xuan had ambitions to become president. I remarked that his claim to be made vice president was not unreasonable since he had formerly been president of Council and, if Xuan showed political ambitions which interfered with conduct of government, he could be dismissed. Diem admitted grudgingly that Xuan had incurred less enmity and unpopularity than other former Prime Ministers in Vietnam.
I strongly urged Diem to accept this settlement and remarked that if Hinh tried to change terms or back out of it pressure could then be brought to bear on Hinh. Above all I exhorted Diem to remain calm but decide quickly. He said he would decide this afternoon.
[Page 2033]This afternoon I went to see Ely at latter’s request. He said he labored hour and half to persuade Diem to adopt some face-saving compromise with Hinh of kind I had discussed with Diem, but had found Diem very stubborn. Ely said he was uninformed of details of compromise which Do had arranged with Hinh. He was sending Daridan to call on Diem this afternoon and hoped he would persuade Diem to pacific settlement with Hinh. Ely remarked he more than doubted that in trial of military strength Diem would come out victor. He said if Hinh tried to withdraw from tentative arrangement he had made with Do he was pretty confident he could “persuade” Hinh to stand by agreement. In case Diem refused this agreement he hoped I would use my influence to induce him to accept it.
- In telegram 1043 from Saigon, Sept. 16, Ambassador Heath presented a detailed report of his conversation that morning with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do regarding the political crisis. The Foreign Minister had visited General Hinh on behalf of President Diem during the evening of Sept. 15 in an effort to achieve a satisfactory compromise. (751G.13/9–1654)↩