751G.13/9–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
1036. Repeated information Paris 347. Limit distribution. Conflict between Diem and General Hinh has now reached point where clear-cut decision must be obtained. Matter has gone beyond question of whether Diem or Hinh wins out. Whole principle of supremacy civil authority over military is now at stake and will be decided within next few days by default if by no other means.
It is clear and established fact that French are not happy with Diem and would be only too glad to have him removed from picture. While I do not doubt impartiality and integrity General Ely, I believe there is little question some other French officials have been giving quiet encouragement if not unofficial support to Hinh in his defiance and intransigence. It is obvious that if Hinh succeeds in defying President’s order to leave Diem’s days will be numbered. None of French could be expected shed many tears over latter prospect.
If Hinh succeeds in defying President, army will become not latent political danger but open, strong, unpredictable factor contributing to continuing political instability. Having once found that it can make or break presidents, army could scarcely be expected refrain from trying maneuver again should occasion arise.
Even should face-saving compromise be reached with public exchange of expressions mutual esteem, confidence and support, and Hinh thereby succeed in remaining Saigon thus nullifying President’s published order he take leave, Diem will have lost what authority and prestige remain to him. In short, should Hinh succeed in his present defiance of President, Diem can be expected have little authority in Vietnam beyond grounds his own palace.
[Page 2031]With every day Hinh continues stall and appear get away with his defiance, influence and prestige of civil government is diminishing. By design or accident on part of Hinh and by bad handling on part of Diem, appearance of struggle between the two has shifted until it seems to be attack by Diem on National Army and integrity its officer corps, rather than effort remove temporarily from political scene a Chief of Staff who has been plotting treacherously against legal head of government. This impression is gaining credence and army can be expected rally more and more to Hinh if impasse continues. Whether Diem succeeds or fails, remains in office or falls from power, General Hinh must be removed from scene, temporarily at least, if principle of supremacy civil government is to be preserved in Free Vietnam.