Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/7–3054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret

Washington, August 18, 1954—5:29 p.m.

610. Limit distribution. Personal from Secretary. Department 366 to Paris, Paris 409 and 438, Saigon 394.² I am convinced that if free world is to make most of fighting chance remaining to it in Indochina we must move ahead rapidly developing and maintaining nationalist resolve in non-Communist areas. I believe Mendes-France is as aware this as we are, but backward-looking elements may take advantage his preoccupation other urgent matters to return to the Franco-Vietnamese relationship and to a kind of government in Viet-Nam which has always failed in past. Paris 438 not reassuring in these respects especially when considered together with reports reaching us of intrigues of some southern leaders and in view time which may be required for LaChambre–Cheysson study.

We do not wish make it appear Ngo Dinh Diem our protégé or that we are irrevocably committed to him. On other hand we do believe kind of thing he stands for is necessary ingredient of success and we do not now see it elsewhere.

To make sure Mendes aware our concern Dillon should hand him following as personal message from me:³

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In the days that have passed since the settlement at Geneva, I have been giving earnest thought to the future policy of the United States toward Indochina.

I believe you and I are in complete agreement that in South VietNam a strong Nationalist Government must be developed and supported if the world is not to witness an early Communist take-over and a still greater menace to South and Southeast Asia, with repercussions in Africa.

Your own recent declarations of French intentions to accord full independence to the Associated States will certainly contribute to this end if they are vigorously executed. In anticipation of that they have already had an excellent effect in this country, for they are recognized as coming from a man who has long stood for independence and who has shown a resolve to make good on his promises.

We here have been thinking about what we might appropriately do to help get an effective Vietnamese government. In our opinion, M. Ngo Dinh Diem, initially at least, has a better chance of rallying and holding nationalist sentiment than most of the Vietnamese who seem now to be on the scene, or in the wings. We recognize that his government needs more realism, experience and a broader geographical representation, but it does seem to provide a nucleus for future efforts.

We have, however, been concerned at a growing feeling among our Vietnamese friends that the United States and the free world have abandoned them.

In order to eliminate that impression and at the same time to lay a firmer basis for a strenuous effort to preserve freedom in Viet-Nam, we plan the following steps:

1. In a message addressed to the President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, President Eisenhower will express on behalf of the American people his and their appreciation of the efforts of the Vietnamese Government and people in the struggle for freedom and the readiness of the American people to continue to aid in this struggle.

2. In addition to military material assistance and economic aid, we are prepared to give direct assistance to the Associated States including budgetary support, in addition to the support furnished by the French Union. Subject to a practical solution of the transfer problem and the establishment of adequate controls, we believe presently some and eventually all of this aid should be given directly rather than through the French Government, as has been done previously, particularly in connection with the execution of the ‘Navarre Plan.’ This approach seems to us in keeping with the independent status of these states and necessary to help them to develop their self-confidence and self-reliance. It is also necessary from the U.S. domestic standpoint. Much of the aid so far provided was justified to the Congress for support of the French Union forces in the war against the Viet Minh. Now that war has ceased and the Foreign Aid Bill passed by the Senate on July 29 calls for ‘the furnishing, as far as possible, of direct assistance to the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.’⁴ Accordingly, to adjust our policy to the changed conditions now existing in Indochina and to meet the requirements of the U.S. Congress we plan in future to deal directly with the governments of the Associated States in questions concerning economic or military aid to these states.

3. Although our final decision will depend upon the establishment of the complete independence which you have publicly affirmed it is the intention of the French Government to grant, and will be conditioned likewise by the extent to which the recipient governments give evidence of their stability and capacity to carry out needed reforms, we are also prepared to consider the requests of the Associated States such as have been made by Viet-Nam and Cambodia to undertake direct military training of their armed forces. In the future and to the extent possible under the restrictions of the Geneva settlements we are prepared to consider the establishment of training missions in their territories. We would also wish to exercise our existing right to request redistribution of certain material from stocks now on hand in Indochina directly to the Associated States. In view of the changed circumstances and in order to accelerate the development of reliable native armies we believe it will be necessary to revise or rescind the Pentapartite agreement of December 1950 between France, Laos, Cambodia, Viet-Nam and the U.S. In any case we believe that the Associated States can and should be brought into more direct and mutually beneficial contact with military planning, training and logistical activities. We would, of course, consult closely with the French Authorities in all these matters and expect to continue the harmonious cooperation which has hitherto existed between us. I understand that General Ely and General O’Daniel have already discussed at least the possibility of a training function for our present Military Aid Advisory Group.

There are undoubtedly many other possibilities for effective action in Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. For example, we are considering in what ways we can modify our economic aid and development programs for best results in the changed situation. We are considering special help in the refugee and resettlement program and increased aid in the field of technical assistance. I believe that the measures I have listed above are the most urgent and should produce an effect upon Vietnamese public opinion which you and I both would desire.

I have not set forth any time schedule for these measures but I should think that at least the message from President Eisenhower should be delivered soon. There are clearly a number of technical matters which should be worked out between our governments by the experts.

The main thing, I believe, is to move strongly together to dissipate the present discouragement in Viet-Nam. The stakes are so high that I feel confident that we shall succeed. I take this opportunity to express my high regard and best wishes. John Foster Dulles.”

Embassy London should give copy above message Foreign Office on confidential basis.⁵

Dulles

1. Drafted by McClintock of FE. Also sent to London as telegram 973. Repeated for information to Saigon as 636, to Phnom Penh as 26, to Hanoi as 213, and to Vientiane as 15. This message was developed within the State Department under the primary direction of FE, running through several versions between Aug. 2 and 16. Documentation on the drafting process is in files 751G.00 and 611.51G. The message was approved in draft by the Operations Coordinating Board on Aug. 11. (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “Minutes”) For comments on the subject by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Aug. 12, p. 1938.

   On Aug. 18, Secretary Dulles submitted a draft of this telegram to President Eisenhower. That draft, identical in substance to the message as actually transmitted to Paris, was accompanied by a memorandum by the Secretary for the President titled “Message to French Prime Minister Tracing New U.S Policy of Direct Aid to Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam.” The memorandum read as follows: “The enclosed telegram embodies a policy message from me to Mendes-France along the lines which I discussed with you yesterday. It indicates that it will be future United States policy to give direct assistance to the states of Indochina in maintaining their political and territorial integrity against further Communist aggression. The essence of the new policy is that we desire the states of Indochina to be completely independent, that they establish strong and stable governments and that, to assure the latter end, the United States will henceforth channel the bulk of its aid, both economic and military, directly to the three states of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, Dulles–Herter series)

2. For telegram 366 to Paris, July 28, see p. 1888. Regarding telegram 409 from Paris, July 29, see footnote 3, p. 1889. For telegram 438 from Paris, July 30, see p. 1896. Telegram 394 from Saigon, July 30, in which Ambassador Heath expressed agreement with the content of telegram 366 to Paris, is not printed. (751G.00/7–3054)
3. In telegram 706 from Paris, Aug. 19, the Embassy reported that the Secretary’s message had been delivered to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the absence of Prime Minister Mendès-France at Brussels. (751G.00/8–1954) The Embassy further reported in telegram 710 of Aug. 20 that the Foreign Ministry had forwarded the message to Mendès-France. (751G.00/8–2054)
4. For documentation on the Mutual Security legislation of 1954, see volume i.
5. In telegram 874 from London, Aug. 19, the Embassy reported that a copy of the message had been delivered to an official of the Foreign Office. (751G.00/8–1954)