751G.5/8–1254
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your letter of August 12, 1954, setting forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on requests from the Governments of the Associated States of Indochina for United States assistance in training the indigenous forces of those states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established four preconditions for United States participation in such a training program and you add the further consideration that an international interpretation of the cease-fire agreement may in any event impose limitations on the extent of military training, as well as end item assistance, that could be undertaken by the United States in Indochina.
The first precondition of the Joint Chiefs is that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control of the Indochinese states requesting United States assistance. This condition applies to the Government of Cambodia which is strong, stable and enjoys the wholehearted loyalty of the population. A similar situation likewise exists in Laos but there, because of the restrictive terms of the cease-fire agreement and likewise because the Laotian Government has never made a request for U.S. training assistance, the problem does not arise. In the case of Free Viet Nam, the civil government, which has been under the presidency of Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem for only slightly more than a month, is far from strong or stable. However, we are currently [Page 1955] perfecting measures which may assist that Government rapidly to increase the effectiveness of its administration. I should like to point out that one of the most efficient means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong is to assist it in reorganizing the National Army and in training that army. This is, of course, the familiar hen-and-egg argument as to which comes first but I would respectfully submit that the U.S. could profitably undertake two courses of action in Free Viet Nam: one, to strengthen the government by means of a political and economic nature and the other, to bolster that government by strengthening the army which supports it.
The second precondition established by the Joint Chiefs is that the Governments of the Associated States should formally request that the U.S. assume responsibility for training their forces and providing military equipment. As indicated above the Government of Laos has made no such request and does not contemplate one. However, the Government of Viet Nam, in a letter from Prime Minister Prince Buu Loc to the American Chargé d’Affaires dated June 18, 1954,2 did request that MAAG Saigon participate in troop training and requested U.S. assistance in providing adequate armament and in financing a proposed expanded troop base. In the case of Cambodia, the Cambodian Minister of National Defense, General Nhiek Tioulong, in a letter dated May 20, 1954,3 addressed to General John W. O’Daniel, Chief of MAAG Saigon, stated that the Royal Khmer Government was anxious to complete plans to set up in the minimum of time three divisions according to the methods of accelerated instruction used in Korea, on condition that the U.S. Government assured the Cambodian Government of indispensable financial and matériel support.
The third precondition of the Joint Chiefs calls for arrangements with the French guaranteeing full independence to the Associated States and providing for the phased withdrawal of French forces, French officials, and French advisers from Indochina in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of National armed forces.
The case of Laos may be set aside since Laos has not requested U.S. assistance and under the terms of its military agreement with France is required to look to France for aid in training and other purposes. Furthermore, under the terms of the cease-fire agreement Laos is estopped from introducing foreign military personnel other than “a [Page 1956] specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army.”
In the case of Cambodia, de facto full independence already exists. Likewise during 1953 and early 1954 command of the Royal Khmer Army was handed over to the King of Cambodia and French forces have been entirely withdrawn from Cambodian soil. There is a minimum of French advisers still attached to the Royal Khmer Army.
In the case of Viet Nam, practically the entire French Expeditionary Corps still remains in that country. It would be militarily disastrous to demand the withdrawal of French forces from Free Viet Nam before the creation of a new National Army. However, as seen from this Department, there would seem to be no insuperable objection to the U.S. undertaking a training program for the Vietnamese National Army while at the same time the French forces commence a gradual phasing out from that theater.
As for the point you raised regarding the limitations of the Geneva settlement, in the view of this Department there is a limitation on the degree to which the Vietnamese armed forces can be increased. However, in my opinion, there is no provision of the cease-fire agreement regarding Viet Nam which would prevent the existing MAAG Saigon from undertaking a training mission or which would impede MAAG Saigon from rotating existing personnel to bring in number for number new personnel especially versed in military training.
In the case of Cambodia there is no obstacle whatever to the setting up of a U.S. training mission. The cease-fire agreement affecting Cambodia provides in Chapter III Article 7 that the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war matériel, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of effective defense of the territory. This latter clause makes it entirely possible for the Cambodian Government to request a foreign training mission and for the U.S., if it so desires, to provide such a mission. In the opinion of this Department, it would be most helpful to the futherance of our national policy in Indochina, if the U.S. should reply affirmatively to the letter of the Defense Minister cited above, and it is recommended that the Joint Chiefs give their consent to the establishment of a MAAG/Phnom Penh which would provide both training and logistical assistance to the Royal Khmer Army. The Department of State likewise feels that sympathetic consideration should be given to the establishment of a training mission in MAAG Saigon to assist in the development of an effective Vietnamese National Army.
Sincerely yours,