751G.00/7–3054: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
secret
Saigon, July 30, 1954—3
p.m.
[Received 6:49 a.m.]
[Received 6:49 a.m.]
405. Repeated information Paris 146, Hanoi unnumbered. In further comment (mytel 380 [404]1) on La Chambre’s statements reported Paris telegram 366 to Department,2 I would say:
- 1.
- I thoroughly agree that in our own security interest we should increase substantially our economic assistance to remaining Vietnam, [Page 1893] with view to building up strong government there but not necessarily with idea of winning nation wide elections, which in our view probably will not take place. There should be of course free elections in South Vietnam and I am fairly confident that present government or good successor one could win them, given time and opportunity to prepare proper conditions, and would be willing to have them staged under UN supervision. It is certain that Viet Minh will never allow truly free elections in North Vietnam; in fact armistice provides that they should be supervised by international supervisory commission, one of whose three members is a Communist state, another India, which on record to date has shown no desire to offend Communist China, of which Viet Minh are satellite. Truly free elections in North Vietnam would require not only neutral international supervision of actual voting but absolute freedom of non-Communist parties to campaign for months preceding elections without restraint or surveillance by Communist authorities. Last will never happen.
- 2.
- It is difficult for me to accept as entirely candid La Chambre’s statement that French Government entertained some fears that going through with signature and ratification of treaties initialled last spring would give impression of creating permanent division of country. Not to sign treaties would appear to Vietnam Government, and rightly, as due to French fear of offending Viet Minh and preventing some possible arrangement with latter. Failure to sign would likewise confirm Vietnamese fears that French have never intended other than to “hold them on a leash”.
- 3.
- I am disturbed in La Chambre’s intimations that he does not think Diem suitable to continue as Prime Minister, since latter’s support was mainly in north and he did not “get along” with three sects in south. I think that statement reflects hopes and possibly plans of former colonial administrators in Ministry of Associated States who would like to set up a government that would be not only friendly to France but would accept French influence. It is possible that using French influence on “sects” in South Vietnam, on Vietnam national army as long as it is under command of General Hinh, and promoting political schemes of Tam, Huu, and other former Prime Ministers, would result in forcing Diem Government out of office and replacing it with a pliant successor regime. But that such a regime could be made solid in relatively little time at its disposal is extremely unlikely. It would not enjoy confidence of masses and although latter might be able to do nothing about it they would be more than ever susceptible to Viet Minh subversion.
Heath