751G.00/7–3054: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon ( Heath ) to the Department of State
[Received 5:45 a.m.]
404. Repeated information Paris 145, Hanoi unnumbered. Re Paris telegram 366, sent Department, repeated Saigon 31.1 La Chambre’s statement that it was his expert view of armistice that US military assistance to Vietnamese forces could continue as long as channeled through French is surprising and one would be inclined to say disingenuous. There is nothing in armistice to prevent US or any other country giving budgetary assistance for Vietnamese defense effort. There is certainly nothing that even implies that only France could extend such aid. What armistice does prevent is sending fresh troops and military matériel, except for replacements. French have of course gained influence and dollar exchange through our channeling through them 385 million for Associated States defense budgets in 1954 (great bulk going to Vietnam).
We are [were?] willing to let French get credit and dollar exchange as long as French Expeditionary Force kept up fight. There was also advantage that French were much better equipped to control Vietnam expenditures than we. It would have been matter of expense, time, and [Page 1892] difficulty for us to set up auditing commission here, particularly in view of fact that English is little spoken in Indochina. Except for this last consideration, there is now no longer any apparent advantage in continuing to pass this aid through French. Only possible valid reason for continuing to do so for a time would be that otherwise French would decide greatly reduce their forces in Vietnam in near future. That of course should not occur until Vietnam forces can be reorganized and strengthened. I do not say that we should begin immediately giving direct budgetary support to Vietnam Defense Ministry. In first place it would take some weeks or even months to negotiate arrangements and organize control staff; secondly, I can see that at this precise moment we would not want to lower French prestige and influence by no longer dealing through them in this matter. But we must shortly do so because chances of building anything solid militarily or politically in Vietnam as long as French retain a dominant position are extremely slight. Long prevalent distrust of French has intensified alarmingly as result of partition of Vietnam consented to, or rather negotiated, by French with Viet Minh. This distrust will be increased if French, as seems likely, send a representative to Viet Minh (Paris telegram 397 sent Department).2 Prime Minister Diem told me 28th that French officials in Hanoi had already made some objection to removal of contents of Hanoi museums to south Vietnam, presumably because of fear of objections by Viet Minh. It is altogether likely that special deal will be made with latter to allow continued operation of French business and cultural enterprises in north and that will tend further to increase southern mistrust of French.