611.5111/7–1054
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Vietnam Laos-Cambodia Affairs (Hoey)
Subject:
- Cambodian Ambassador’s Request for Clarification of U.S. Position at Geneva
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Mr. Nong Kimny, Cambodian Ambassador, Washington
- Mr. R. E. Hoey, PSA
The Ambassador stated that he was returning to Geneva on Monday, July 12 to rejoin his Governments delegation. Prior to his return he wished to discuss with the Secretary the position of the U.S. in order that the Cambodian delegation could be fully informed.
The Ambassador stated that the Government and people of Cambodia were completely united in their determination to oppose any Communist effort toward neutralization or demilitarization of Cambodia. This policy had been made quite clear in the past by the Cambodian delegation at Geneva. As the Geneva Conference was approaching a critical stage Cambodia anticipated that there would be further demands made by the Communists with respect to neutralization and demilitarization. The Ambassador said his Government would strongly oppose any such demands and in this respect it would be most useful if the U.S. could furnish a written response to the letter from the Cambodian Foreign Minister to Ambassador Heath dated June 23, 1954 (Secto 513).1
The Secretary replied that an oral response had already been made to the letter. It was extremely difficult at this time to add to the oral statement. For example, the U.S. is now engaged in bilateral talks with the UK.2 Depending on the outcome of those talks we would know to what extent our desire for a collective security arrangement could be accomplished. We hoped that a strong Southeast Asia security pact could be developed and that Cambodia would be a member [Page 1806] to any such collective arrangement. In view of the imminence of the Ambassador’s departure, it would not be possible to give a written response by Monday. However we would try, depending upon the progress accomplished in our talks with the British, to furnish a written reply while the Ambassador was in Geneva. Such a response would of course be transmitted through the U.S. delegation at Geneva. The Secretary referred to the independence of Cambodia which he described as being superior to that of the other two States. This fact in itself supported the Cambodian position that it should oppose Communist demands for neutralization and demilitarization. Cambodia’s independent status is compatible with Cambodia’s desire to call for outside military and economic assistance as it desires.
The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for his answer and assured him that it would be of great assistance to his delegation at Geneva in maintaining a firm position against Communist demands. The Ambassador hoped that a written reply during the course of the conference would further strengthen that position.
The Ambassador raised the question of UN action, should the Geneva Conference fail. He wished to know the position of the U.S. with respect to Cambodia entering a complaint into the UN, should developments at Geneva take an unfavorable trend and the conference fail.
The Secretary replied that this was of course a hypothetical question. The U.S. would approve in principle the introduction of a Cambodian motion into the UN should the Geneva Conference fail. However under the conditions of a failure of the Conference, careful study must be made of just how a UN appeal would be most effective in light of the circumstances then existing. We would be prepared to consult with the Ambassador after his return from Geneva, should this contingency arise.
The Ambassador asked for U.S. views with respect to a control organization. The Secretary replied that this is a most difficult matter. It would be hard to see how membership of a Communist power on a control organization could do anything but help the Communist cause. There is no guarantee against Communist aggression except by developing military strength to stand against such aggression. Military strength is a factor which they understand and is in itself the best guarantee. Cambodia should be in a position to safeguard itself against internal subversion since it would be expected that the Communists would make efforts to work from within and create internal dissension. The U.S. would wish to assist the Government of Cambodia in the development of such internal security and would hope that the Cambodian Government would stand firm against any efforts by the Communists [Page 1807] to neutralize or demilitarize the country or prevent Cambodia from being able to call for assistance from without.
The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for his helpful clarification of the U.S. position and assured the Secretary that his government’s delegation would stand firm against unreasonable Communist demands. The Secretary suggested that the Cambodian delegation at Geneva keep in close touch with the U.S. delegation.
- For text of telegram Secto 513 from Geneva, June 23, containing the text of the Cambodian letter, see vol. xvi, p. 1231.↩
- For an extract from the report of the Joint U.S.-U.K. Study Group on Southeast Asia, July 17, see p. 1847.↩