Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/7–1054: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Saigon, July 10, 1954—6 p.m.

124. Repeated information priority Paris 53, Geneva 28, Hanoi unnumbered. Reference: Deptel 84, sent Paris July 8 repeated Saigon 84.¹ I am glad Department has taken stand it will not make public statement that US will respect agreement on Indochina unless Associated States, and particularly Vietnam, agree to terms settlement. As noted mytel 115 of July 9,² minimum terms which Vietnamese Government will now accept for cease-fire are retention of Hanoi-Haiphong parallelogram and the two Catholic bishoprics. Majority of intelligent Vietnamese, except anti-northern Cochin Chinese, who it must be admitted are fairly numerous, are opposed to partition. They are particularly opposed to surrender of Hanoi. Belief of these elements, and I may add that of this Embassy, and also present Vietnamese Government, is that without retention of Hanoi and a foothold in north it would be impossible to create a durable state in remaining Vietnam. Announcement of partition along lines French have been secretly negotiating with Viet Minh will evoke permanent bitterness against France. French are accused of being interested only in protecting cement plant, and other important investments, and coal mines in Haiphong enclave and great French investments in Cochin China.

Even if fruitless, I believe we should use all our influence to persuade Mendes-France to include Hanoi in northern enclave. If Viet Minh object, they can be told that after an unspecified period of calm, elections within Hanoi-Haiphong enclave will determine to which side this region would fall. If Mendes-France repeats view expressed Geneva’s 13 to Saigon of July 7³ that Hanoi cannot be held by present force longer than end of September, we can answer that General Ely believes he can hold at least that long and that our offer of American participation under certain conditions (Secretary’s Los Angeles speech) still holds good.

At beginning of Geneva conference, American delegation took a firm stand against partition of Vietnam and conclusion of any armistice except under effective, impartial, international control. We have now retreated from this stand.

I suggest that, if Mendes-France refuses to alter conditions which he has been discussing re partition of Vietnam and to maintain original French position on authoritative, impartial, and international control, US withdraw from Geneva conference, or at least reduce its delegation to observer status. I do not believe that it is in national interest for us to associate ourselves with agreement consecrating Communist victory in Indochina or that we should join in guaranteeing frontiers of new or remaining Vietnam which coincide with major French investments.

Heath

1. For text of telegram 84 to Paris, July 8, see footnote 5, p. 1792.
2. Telegram 115 from Saigon, July 9, is not printed. (601.51G11/7–954)
3. Telegram Secto 568 from Geneva, July 7, repeated for information to Paris as telegram 16, to London as telegram 10, and to Saigon as telegram 13, contained a summary of a conversation between Bonsal of the U.S. Delegation and Offroy of the French Delegation. For text, see vol. xvi, p. 1294.