Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

INR–NIE files

No. 438
National Intelligence Estimate¹

secret
NIE–62–54

Washington, 7 December 1954.

Probable Developments In Thailand²

the problem

To analyze the political, military and economic strengths and weaknesses of Thailand and to estimate probable developments in Thailand over the next few years, with particular reference to the stability and effectiveness of the government, the internal Communist threat, and the will and ability of the Thai to withstand external Communist pressure or aggression.

conclusions

1. Thailand is relatively stable politically, with power closely held by top military and police leaders. Although inefficiency and corruption limit governmental effectiveness the Communist movement is weak and no undercurrents of serious unrest or dissatisfaction are apparent in the population. Thailand’s future stability and orientation will be largely determined by external developments, in particular by US and Communist courses of action in Southeast Asia. (Paras. 7–10, 20, 45)

2. Thailand’s security forces are adequate for maintaining internal security under present conditions. Even with a large increase in foreign financial and technical assistance, Thailand will not be able to develop security forces adequate to discourage a major Communist invasion or to delay more than briefly such an invasion if launched. Nevertheless with adequate assistance, and particularly if advisory personnel were to work with the Thai at the small unit level, the security forces could probably develop a capability to police Thailand’s borders with reasonable effectiveness, to cope with guerrilla or other subversive activities within the country, and to repel small-scale Communist armed incursions. (Paras. 34, 37)

3. We believe that during the next few years the Communists are unlikely openly to invade Thailand with Chinese Communist or other identifiable Communist forces. They will, however, attempt to enhance Communist capabilities and influence in Thailand by: (a) developing internal subversive organizations and by using their capabilities in neighboring countries for progressive infiltration of Communist guerrillas and agents, and (b) bringing to bear diplomatic and propaganda pressures against the Thai Government in an effort to weaken its alignment with the US. (Para. 46)

4. We believe that at least during the next year or so, the present ruling group will respond to the initial stages of Communist pressures by pulling closer together and will continue its firm anti-Communist stand. Moreover, effective action by the Manila Pact powers in response to an appeal for assistance from Laos, Cambodia, or South Vietnam would greatly increase Thai confidence in continuing to stand with the West. (Paras. 40, 45)

5. On the other hand the extension of Communist control to all of Vietnam might stimulate doubts in Thailand over the wisdom of continuing a Western orientation. Communist control of Laos or Cambodia, by whatever means it were achieved, would significantly increase Communist subversive capabilities in Thailand and would almost certainly weaken Thai confidence in their Western alignment. (Para. 47)

6. In the latter situation, the Thai Government would probably remain aligned with the West only if it remains convinced that the US had both the willingness and the ability to defend Thailand against Communist aggression. If an invasion in force should occur, Thai resistance would probably be short-lived, unless US forces were speedily brought to bear. Furthermore, the Thai might come to believe that their close alignment with the US would not deter a Communist invasion of their country and might even give further incentive to the Communists to invade Thailand. They might feel that even if the US were clearly willing to defend Thailand, it would not be able to do so without protracted and large-scale warfare on Thai soil. If the Thai leaders estimated the situation in this way, they would probably be disposed to reject US assistance and to seek some sort of accommodation with the Communists. (Para. 48)

[Here follows the “Discussion” portion of the paper, comprising paragraphs 7–48.]

1. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE’s) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIE’s were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIE’s.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 7 December 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.”