Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

OCB files, 105 62 D 430, “Southeast Asia—1”

No. 439
Paper by the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on NSC 5405¹

secret

Washington, December 20, 1954.

Potential Political Difficulties For The United States Inherent In Supplying Arms To The Thai National Police And Army

problem

The OCB has requested the 5405 Working Group to review the potential difficulties for the United States inherent in supplying arms to the National Police and to the Army in Thailand as these two groups are potential rivals for political power, and to develop appropriate recommendations thereon for consideration by the Board.

bkackground

1. U.S. Assistance to the Thai Army

The OCB “Special Report on Thailand” (NSC 5405) of September 29² outlined the pattern and quantity of military assistance being given or planned to enable the Thai Government and people to maintain internal peace and security in the midst of nations disturbed by Communism, Thailand not yet being under attack and her neighbors not yet lost to the forces of Communism. Military projects included the inclusion of the entire Thai Army under MDAP for the purpose of creating a reinforced corps of three Divisions plus an additional one-third Division and support arms.

The present training program is aimed to provide Thailand with a well trained and well officered Army of about 80,000. Any further expansion of the Army would depend upon the success of the training program for commissioned and non-commissioned officers which is the crucial factor. The higher ranking officer staff is not noted for its military quality, consisting largely of men who are more interested in politics and business. It is believed that the average soldier is as good as other soldiers in the world and that the lower ranking officers are professionally competent. The great need is for trained leadership.

2. U.S. Assistance to the Thai National Police

The Thai National Police have an estimated size of 42,000.… The National Police are Thailand’s first line of defense as they are responsible for the patrol of Thailand’s borders and inland waterways. Training … has produced excellent results which are noticeable in the smartness and high morale and efficiency of those elements of the Police located in the strategically important north and northeast border areas. In connection with the National Police, training has been completed of approximately 700 persons for the Volunteer Defense Corps. This is a village force aimed to cope with the small roving bands of Communist guerrillas or propaganda agents. They might also be used conversely as information agents for the Government. Their equipment is of a very light Police nature. The eventual goal for the Volunteer Defense Corps is 120,000. Each of Thailand’s 40,000 villages would have three resident trained members of the VDC. During General Phao’s visit in Washington a sum of $3 million was allocated to expand the present VDC to number about 25,000 trained persons.

3. Army and Police leaders.

The Thai army is commanded by General Srisdi Dhanarajata, who led a twelve-man military mission to Washington on July 1 for discussions with the Department of Defense. The Chief of JUSMAG, General William N. Gillmore, accompanied the mission. General Srisdi’s mission was regarded in Thailand as highly successful as he received certain specific commitments before his departure which in money amounted to about $26 million beyond previously committed amounts of military assistance. General Srisdi was welcomed at the Bangkok Airport as a national hero. His political star appeared to be at its zenith.

The Director General of the Thai National Police is General Phao Siyanon. General Phao arrived in Washington November 3 on a special mission bearing requests contained in a letter from the Prime Minister to the President³ containing requests for economic assistance. On December 4 Mr. Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, informed General Phao⁴ that the United States Government had committed an additional $28.2 million of aid to Thailand for U.S. Fiscal Year 1955. The specific projects should be developed in Bangkok between the Thai Government and United States representatives. Of this sum only $3 million, referred under “2” above, was for direct assistance to General Phao’s VDC. The remainder was for diverse projects recommended by the Country Team, most of which would tend to strengthen the Army rather than the Police.

discussion

Thailand’s political situation is one which does not rest upon party politics. Political leadership and domination is measured in terms of strong personalities who have personal followers with power and influence. The three strong men in the Thai Government are the Thai Prime Minister, Phibun Songgram, General Srisdi and General Phao. A number of lesser individuals such as the Chief Air Marshal, Fuen Ronaprakat, provide additional support to the Prime Minister’s Government.

The three principal political leaders control not only Thailand’s Army, Air and Police Forces but also dominate the economy of the nation by economic controls and by their own business interests. For the first time in Thailand’s modern history the rewards and profits of business are being drained from the alien business community (Chinese, British, Americans and others) into the accounts of the Thai. The Thai are aware of their inability to compete in business on an equal basis with the aliens. Thai officials have tipped the balance in their favor by the use of Executive Orders, legislation, graft, and legitimate business organizations which have the support of Thai officialdom.

Reports emanate constantly from Thailand that Generals Phao and Srisdi are in competition for the position of Prime Minister; that they do not come to blows because they are equally strong; that the Prime Minister is helpless in their hands as they have direct control of Army and Police power; and that at some moment there will be a coup d’état by General Srisdi or General Phao to take over the reins of Government.

There are a number of considerations, however, which provide a different interpretation. For one thing, General Phao and General Srisdi are joint stockholders in many of their business ventures, both licit and illicit. For another thing, they have both been raised to their high positions by Prime Minister Phibun Songgram who took them under his wing when they were Captains and Majors and made them Generals and Admirals. It is significant that during General Phao’s mission to Washington in November, he secured a commitment for $28.2 million in aid to the Thai Government and that most of the amount with the exception of $3 million for VDC would tend to strengthen the Army of General Srisdi. If the two were engaged in mutually destructive competition it is difficult to believe that General Phao would have worked so hard to strengthen the Armed Forces of General Srisdi.

The position of helplessness attributed to the Prime Minister is not novel. It is interesting to note that in 1940 the American Minister, Hugh Grant, in recounting his conversations with Prime Minister Phibun Songgram, stated frequently that he was a fine man who was helpless in the hands of the military; that he was forced to do and say the things that he did and said. Mr. Grant described him as a puppet in the hands of a military junta. Fourteen years have passed and the same things are being said of the same Prime Minister Phibun Songgram. It is worth noting that in 22 years of Constitutional Government since 1932, Phibun Songgram has had things his own way as Prime Minister for twelve years and appears to be in excellent health and on good terms with the current two strong men in his Government, General Phao and General Srisdi.

Before Ambassador William J. Donovan left Bangkok he reported a conversation with the Prime Minister, General Srisdi and General Phao,⁵ to the effect that in case of a national emergency the Prime Minister, Phibun Songgram would take charge of the Armed Forces, General Srisdi would become Prime Minister and General Phao would maintain control of his Police and engage in clandestine operations and be the power behind the scenes.

It is believed that the evidence indicates that far from being political enemies preparing for each other’s destruction, Generals Phao and Srisdi form the backfield for Prime Minister Phibun Songgram’s power team, that they maintain an excellent balance of power within the country and that in event of national crisis they would work together for their own salvation as well as for that of the nation. These are men who have risen to high position by graft, by ruthless brutality and by cooperative support of one another. According to Thai custom they are blood brothers, made so by special ritual.

At the present time General Srisdi controls more guns in strategic locations than General Phao. The generally superior training and effectiveness of the Police and the capacity for rapid action might well outweigh the greater numerical strength of the Army in a coup situation. The additional military assistance promised to General Srisdi during his recent mission to Washington will probably provide the Army with as much assistance as it can absorb and certainly as much formal defense as the Thai nation requires. Any additional assistance should be aimed principally to improve the quality of the national Police and to coordinate the training and the relations of the Thai National Police with similar forces across the border in Laos, Cambodia and Burma. Such a development would enhance the security factors of these nations and would tend to pull them together in their stand against Communist aggression. It is not believed that such a development would be inimical to relations between General Phao and General Srisdi but would, in fact, be an additional factor in consolidating the position of the Thai Government in its anti-Communist stand and in its acceptance by the Thai people.

conclusions

1. Thailand’s political strength depends upon strong personalities who control power and not upon party politics.

2. The present Thai Government depends principally on the personal power and influence of three men: Prime Minister Phibun Songgram, General Srisdi and General Phao.

3. The leading politicians in the Thai Government control not only the Armed Forces and the Police Force but also have stronger control over and derive more benefit from alien business interests than any previous governments.

4. There is no political opposition, individual or group, which presently offers any threat to the present Thai Government unless supported by substantial foreign power and money.

5. The Prime Minister is not a helpless puppet in the hands of his military supporters as has been alleged continually since 1940, but is in real control and with his followers form a political team.

6. Generals Phao and Srisdi are not implacable enemies waiting for an opportunity to destroy each other to become Prime Minister, but are joint stockholders in most of their ventures, both licit and illicit.

7. There is recognizable competition between Generals Phao and Srisdi but such business and political vying is natural in their relations and is not self-destructive nor inimical to the stability of the Thai Government or its policies toward international Communism.

recommendation

That the OCB accept the foregoing conclusions which indicate that there are no potential political difficulties which might inhibit the United States from supplying arms to the Thai National Police and Army.

1. A memorandum attached to the source text from Elmer B. Staats, OCB Executive Officer, to the Board Assistants, Dec. 20, notes that this paper resulted from an OCB request of Oct. 29 and comments: “While the paper was not completed until after the discussions and decisions on aid to Thailand, the exercise was beneficial in that the essential position of the paper … had been made known to all interested agencies.”
2. Reference is to Document 432 and its tabs.
3. See Document 436.
4. The only record of this conversation found in Department of State files is a draft memorandum of conversation by Allan Loren of the Foreign Operations Administration. (792.5/12–454)
5. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.