Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower paper, Whitman file

No. 392
Memorandum of Discussion at the 143d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 6, 1953¹

top secret eyes only

Washington, May 6, 1953

[Extracts]

Present at the 143rd meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Under Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of the Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

. . . . . . .

2. The Situation in Indochina and Thailand

The Director of Central Intelligence² stated that the latest reports on the situation in Laos were slightly more optimistic, though the situation was far from clear. The rainy season would commence within a week or ten days, and would probably put an end to the fighting until next autumn.

On the political side, continued Mr. Dulles, the recent statements and actions of the King of Cambodia³ were the most significant developments. The King had bluntly stated that the French must give Cambodia virtually complete independence if they expected the Cambodians to assist in resisting the Vietminh invaders.

Mr. Dulles then stated that Thailand had asked for assistance from the United States, .… the Thai ground forces, numbering some 45,000 men, were fairly good fighters. There was an air force of some 10,000 men and 300 aircraft, many of which aircraft were obsolete. The Thai navy was of relatively little account. The major difficulty with the Thai army, said Mr. Dulles, resulted from the involvement of its high-ranking officers in politics. The rank and file were good.

General Bradley⁴ observed that the involvement of Thai Generals in politics did not seem to him to make them unique.

[Here follows discussion of developments in Indochina; for text, see volume XIII, Part 1, page 546.]

Mr. Cutler also read the statement of policy on Thailand with particular reference to military assistance, noting that under this policy it would be appropriate to increase U.S. military aid to Thailand.⁵

Secretary Smith⁶ said that the situation in French Indochina had developed so rapidly that his staff in the State Department has been unable to keep up with them. It was certainly clear, however, that the situation in Thailand differed fundamentally from that in Indochina. Secretary Smith confirmed that the Government of Thailand had formally requested increased military assistance, and noted that the Government had already begun to move certain disaffected and pro-Communist elements from the border areas adjacent to Laos. Secretary Dulles had written to Secretary Wilson⁷ urging the provision of additional military assistance, particularly ammunition. This was all very desirable, said Secretary Smith, but what the United States really ought to do to meet the situation in Thailand was to send out a high-ranking general officer to head a small military mission along the lines of General Van Fleet’s mission to Greece.⁸ At present we have only a Colonel in Bangkok, and while he was competent it was clear that the Thais wanted a general officer who would direct and coordinate the training of their armed forces. Much could be done if we would accede to this request.

In answer to a question from the President, as to the availability of arms and ammunition at short notice, General Bradley replied that a certain amount could shortly be got to Thailand quickly, but that the Thais wanted a good deal more than we had planned to send up to now. General Bradley then read some of the details of these requests for matériel.

Pointing out the very great possibilities of the loss of French Indochina, Secretary Smith observed that we might still be able to hold Thailand and the Kra Isthmus. We ought therefore to do our utmost to meet the Thai requests.

Mr. Cutler inquired whether there would be any possibility of getting General Van Fleet⁹ to head the military mission which Secretary Smith had outlined.

Secretary Smith said that the selection of General Van Fleet would have a very powerful psychological effect, but the President expressed doubt as to the likelihood that General Van Fleet could be persuaded to go.

The President also inquired into the nature of the MSA program for Thailand and whether it contemplated amounts of matériel sufficient to meet the demands of the situation, and if not, whether there was sufficient flexibility in the MSA program to permit transferring to Thailand arms and munitions earmarked for other areas. The President thought it inadvisable to seek new Congressional appropriations, in view of the urgency of the matter and in view of General Bradley’s statement that aid programmed for Thailand would not cover all that they were now asking for. The President also suggested that General Bradley consider possible candidates to head the military mission to Thailand which was obviously the view of the Council and himself that we should send. The President also directed General Bradley to call General Van Fleet to see if there was any possibility of his being willing to go.

The Vice President raised the question as to whether publicity should not be given to the assistance we propose to render Thailand.

The President said he agreed with General Smith that it was unwise to give any publicity to what we were proposing to do for Thailand until the assistance had actually materialized, on the ground that nothing would be worse than to make a lot of noise about what we were proposing to do, and then failing to do it.

Mr. Jackson inquired whether it would not be sensible to look into what could be done by way of psychological warfare with Thailand as a base.

The President directed Mr. Jackson to consider this matter and report on it to the Council at its next meeting.

The National Security Council:⁹

a. Noted an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation in Laos and Thailand.

b. Agreed that it was essential that the French make clear that they intend to give the people of the Associated States maximum freedom to choose their own form of government, as soon as internal security can be established in Indochina.

c. Agreed to recommend to the President:

(1) The provision, as a matter of urgency, of a military mission to Thailand, headed by a high-ranking U.S. officer, to give training and operational advice to the Thai armed forces along the lines of the Van Fleet mission to Greece.

(2) Acceleration of military assistance to Thailand to furnish all feasible matériel aid to the Thai armed forces.

d. Agreed that Mr. C. D. Jackson should report at the next Council meeting on the possibilities for psychological operations based on Thailand.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation. The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on May 7.
2. Allen W. Dulles.
3. Norodom Sihanouk.
4. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5. Reference is presumably to the section on Thailand in NSC 124/2, June 25, 1952; for text, see Part 1, p. 125.
6. Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith.
7. Supra.
8. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, USA (ret.), served as Director of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece, 1948–1950.
9. General Van Fleet had recently retired after serving as Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, April 1951–February 1953.
9. Paragraphs a-d and Note below constitute NSC Action No. 780.