Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

792.5 MSP/4–2553

No. 391
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

secret

Washington , May 5, 1953.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to a joint State/MAAG telegram from Bangkok No. 2111 of April 25¹ on the subject of Thailand’s military needs in view of the invasion of Laos by the Viet Minh. The Chief of MAAG and the Ambassador strongly urged that the MDAP program of equipment for Thai armed forces be greatly expedited on the grounds that transpiring events in Laos would result in establishing a hostile armed force of communists along Thailand’s northeastern frontier, and that such forces might find support among the three to four million Lao in north and northeastern Thailand, the latter area being further made hazardous by the presence of about fifty thousand Vietnamese, most of whom are supporters of the Viet Minh. The telegram then listed specific items for Army, Navy and Air Forces which were most urgently required.

It is realized that under the present low priority rating for Thailand deliveries will continue to be slow even though some items are in process. It is believed that urgent consideration should be given to raising the level of Thailand’s priority if not to a level with Indochina then at least to a point approaching that level for the following reasons:

1. Thailand is an essential element in the front against the advance of communism in southeast Asia. The principal communist objective after Laos would logically be Thailand, and this fact in itself requires a re-examination of Thailand’s military preparedness.

2. Thailand is threatened by communist elements within its borders which may be expected to become more dangerous with the approach of communist forces on the northeastern border, and accordingly the Thai Government needs to be militarily strong to police them. The largest communist element is Chinese. In 1952 the Thai Government arrested over 900 alleged communists, mostly Chinese. About forty-two of these have been formally charged with conspiracy. The Chinese dominate the economic life of Thailand and are in a position to damage the nation seriously if organized and determined to do so. Another aspect of the Chinese threat occurs in the southern provinces along the Malay border where disturbed conditions are caused by Chinese communist guerrillas which enter Thailand to escape British forces in Malaya.

In northeastern Thailand another troublesome minority consists of Vietnamese whose numbers are estimated at about 50,000, most of whom are refugees from Indochina and who are believed to be sympathetic to the Viet Minh and if given an opportunity would provide support to Viet Minh forces.

The Thai Government must be prepared and able to continue civil administration over these unruly elements.

3. The Thai Government needs psychological encouragement to give it stamina to oppose the corrosive forces of communism which, after establishing themselves in Laos, may be expected to engage in a cold war propaganda campaign to attempt to subvert the Thai populace and unseat the present anti-communist government by coup d’état. Practical steps taken by the United States Government to support the Thai Government in facing its security problems would encourage it to continue to stand boldly against communist aggression. A step-up in priority deliveries of urgently needed matériel would help prepare adequately armed and trained forces to guard Thailand’s frontiers and to maintain internal security.

It would be appreciated if prompt consideration could be given to the problem of deliveries and their priority to Thailand by the Department of Defense and by such committees or boards which might be seized with the problem such as the Munitions Allocations Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

1. Not printed. (792.5 MSP/4–2553)
2. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Najeeb E. Halaby replied on May 29 that the Department of Defense had given the matter serious consideration and had directed the Army, Navy, and Air Force to take administrative action within the current priorities to expedite shipment of programmed material for Thailand. Halaby listed a number of specific items which were to be shipped within the next 90 days. (792.5 MSP/5–2953)