756D.00/12–2254: Telegram
No. 306
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State
970. I had an hour’s conversation with Vice President Hatta this morning, gave him greetings from Vice President Nixon and (all paragraph references are to Deptel 777)1 regarding paragraph A1 expressed President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon’s interest in election progress, saying critics of Indonesia abroad as well as in country were continuing to charge that elections would be indefinitely postponed. Hatta expressed confidence that elections would be held in 1955; that former Minister Home Affairs Hazarain had done everything possible to obstruct progress, believing that PIR would disappear (which Hatta said it probably would) [Page 487] when elections held; that new Home Minister Soenarjo was determined to push forward with elections because his party, Nu, was steadily losing strength due to Moslem criticism of Nu’s participation in government and consequent indirect association with PKI. While PIR’s existence depended upon postponement elections, Nu’s existence and possibility of participation in Masjumi Government depended on early elections before their voting strength had waned. I stressed personal feeling public statement by some one other than Prime Minister that elections would be held was important and said I wondered why President Sukarno had made no reference to this point in his PNI party speech at Bandung despite his assertion to me that he would. Hatta said he agreed with my view as to importance such statement and would try to say something in one of his speeches.
Re paragraph B3. Hatta considers Aidit’s claims substantial expansion PKI membership grossly exaggerated. He thinks there have been slight gains in party membership (he disclaims knowledge actual figures but agreed with my suggestion that they might be in the order of 25,000 to 30,000 card holders) but thought that voting strength was “fairly large” due first to their successful identification of PKI program with PNI and other nationalist programs; second, to increased participation of highly placed dupes in front organizations; and third, government’s support of PKI adoption of hammer and sickle insignia on ballots to include PKI and non-party voters. Hatta considers, and I agree, greatest Communist danger is in continued infiltration of intellectual circles and continued compromises by PNI to retain PKI support—he minimizes danger of Communist coup even if elections go against PNI “and when Masjumi come into power”.
I asked Hatta his view as to importance that should be attached to the new rumors I had heard of increasing dissatisfaction with leftward trends of government policy amongst government officials, younger intellectuals and especially within the Army. He said there was no doubt but that many of these people including some moderate Masjumi party members were beginning to feel situation was so serious as to require some “strong action”. He said that an important contribution to political stability lay in the increasing success of efforts by all army officer factions to reconcile their differences and unite. I asked whether he thought that in this process the impetuousness of younger officer elements such as, for example, October 17 group, would infect more conservative-minded officers. Hatta opined that there were enough calm leaders (implying, in my opinion, himself) to prevent any rash action, and went on to emphasize that settlement of differences within officer corps very [Page 488] greatly enhanced army’s ability to take care of Communists if force were needed.
With reference to paragraph A4 I said that I was personally somewhat embarrassed that after strenuous efforts following conversations with Prime Minister Ali and Defense Minister Iwa I had been able arrange MATS transport for Indonesian officers proceeding US but that advantage had apparently not been taken of this generous arrangement. I went over with him a breakdown prepared by my army attaché, showing that for the Indonesian Army 90 students had been allotted for FY 55; 22 had accepted; 21 had declined; and 47 were pending. At his request I left with him on plain paper a copy of this breakdown and he said he would look into the matter at once to see if he could do anything about the “obvious cause of the delay”. I surmise, of course, that he referred to Iwa and anti-American circles around Iwa.
I mentioned the point in paragraph A2—he made no comment. With regard to A7 he expressed a desire to receive full documentation on all that had officially been released on the subject. I promised to try to compile this for him but, in order to overlook nothing would appreciate anything Department can send me.
With regard to A6 he said that despite anything I might hear to the contrary it was his opinion that there was no possibility whatsoever of the enactment of legislation implementing Ong’s2 investment policy statement until the Masjumi came into power. He said that every effort made by Ong and conservative PNI elements to bring such legislation forward had been blocked by left-wing PNI, and he inferred the Prime Minister himself, because of the wish or necessity of placating the PKI.
Re the general political scene Hatta thought PNI and PKI were showing vigorous leadership and felt that both were very skillful in taking the initiative. He felt that Masjumi Party organization had improved and strengthened and that this had had some effect in creating a certain limited dissatisfaction amongst SOBSI members with their Communist leadership. He added, a little sadly I thought, that the present weakness of Masjumi was its inability to produce a leadership as vigorous as that displayed by PNI and PKI which could properly guide and use the very good Masjumi Party organization in the villages. He added that he hoped that the Masjumi Party Congress tomorrow in Surabaya would produce some progress in this direction.
In conclusion Hatta said that he hoped I would come to see him more often here in Djakarta or at his country rest house. I tentatively suggested that I had not seen more of him because I did not [Page 489] want to subject him to charges of too close association with the American Ambassador. He said that he could take care of that and that I should visit him more often. I will do so.
Throughout conversation Hatta was extremely friendly and frank. He many times used the expression “when Masjumi come into power”. I felt that he is confident of a Masjumi victory but is worried, as stated above, about the weakness of Masjumi leadership in the face of vigorous PNI leadership and the steady PKI encroachment into and upon nationalist circles.
- Document 304.↩
- Ong Eng Die, Minister of Finance.↩