756D.00/12–1654: Telegram
No. 305
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State
929. I saw the President this morning. He was affable, relaxed, and exuded confidence during my half-hour conversation. He showed none of the signs of physical debility which some of my colleagues have told me have appeared since September.
I communicated in formal terms the greetings of President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon, which he appropriately acknowledged.
After amenities Sukarno referred to the Irian question but in mild terms, confining himself to a moderate elaboration of his well-known thesis that by not supporting the Indonesian point of view the US was helping the Communists in Indonesia in their efforts to identify communism with anti-colonialism and support of nationalist aspirations. He also remarked that our policy was losing us the understanding of Asia generally: “What are ten million Dutchmen as compared to one billion Asians not to mention the peoples of the Middle East”. I told the President, smilingly, that he sounded a little as if he were making a speech; that he had perhaps overlooked in the understandable intensity of his feelings over Irian the fact that amongst the Asian peoples Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan were associated with us in a mutual defense pact; that Turkey was our ally in NATO; that Iran and other important states of the Middle East had mutual security agreements with us. I said therefore that I thought it was a slight exaggeration to say that the US and its aims and purposes in standing against communism and aggression and colonialism were not understood by the peoples of the East. The President limited his reply to saying that our agreements were with governments and did not [Page 485] necessarily reflect mass opinion. We did not pursue this subject further.
He asked me what were my first impressions of Indonesia upon my return and I said that (paragraph B 3 Deptel 777)1 I had been struck by the highly charged political atmosphere and especially by the apparently increasing success of the PKI identifying themselves not only with Indonesian nationalist elements and goals but also with the PNI party. He replied that the increased tensions which I had noticed were due to the recent parliamentary debate on the no-confidence motion and might be expected to continue during the next pre-election months. With regard to increase in Communist influence, he said that this was largely due to Communist success, as he had previously mentioned, in selling themselves to the Indonesian people as anti-colonialists. “Every political development in this country,” he said, “has its origin in nationalism and anti-colonialism”. I asked if I might speak frankly and, with his permission, said that while this was to a great extent true, I had been disappointed to hear so few Indonesian voices raised to explain the aims of US policy including our determined stand against communism while so many voices, some those of non-Communists, seemed eager to take almost any opportunity to present the distortions of the Soviet bloc. I said that even some of his own speeches had in English translation been so worded as to be susceptible of distortion on this point. Sukarno then said that the present government was embarrassed by PKI support but (repeating what the Prime Minister has said over and over again) no politician could reject a vote. I referred to Mendès-France’s2 statement at the time he sought investiture that he would not accept office unless he had a majority excluding the Communist vote. He laughed and said Indonesia was not France.
I then went back to his statement that tension might be expected to continue during the pre-election period and said (paragraph A 1 Department telegram 777) that both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon had expressed great interest in the progress so far made towards the holding of Indonesian national elections and I observed that many speculations had come to my attention in Indonesia as well as elsewhere that the elections would not be held in 1955 and would be postponed from time to time on some pretext or other. The President said there are many difficulties, not all of which are technical, in the way of holding the first general elections in this country but that he felt they would be held. Sukarno said that no one would welcome elections more than he himself. [Page 486] That until elections were held he could have no certain knowledge as to which political party was in fact the strongest in the country and he was beset by claims from PNI, Masjumi and even PKI that each had the greater strength and more truly represented the mass of Indonesian people.
I said that, speaking as a friend, I thought it would be useful if some categorical statement could be made by someone in authority to the effect that the elections would be held in 1955; he said that I might tell my President that “the elections must and shall be held”. I thanked him for this assurance and said that I would communicate it to my government but I wondered if it would not help if such a statement were made publicly. He laughed and said, “you are indeed a friend to make the suggestion and I will make such a statement in my speech at the PNI party reception at Bandung this coming Saturday.”3 Sukarno said that if he made such a statement on such an occasion it would be taken as a commitment by PNI as well as by the press; that many people in Indonesia charge him with being a PI [PNI] supporter, but he was above politics. I asked whether he proposed to attend the Masjumi party conference this year as he had done some years ago. He replied that he had not been invited.