690B.9321/12–852

No. 30
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)1

top secret

Subject:

  • KMT Troops in Burma
[Page 43]

A. Initial Steps to Seek Solution of Problem

The problem and reasons why it is desirable for the United States Government to try to assist in bringing about a solution were discussed in my memorandum of December 18 (tab 1).2 The preliminary outline of proposed steps by which the departure of these troops from Burma might be brought about has been revised to take into account the possibility of evacuation via Thailand as an alternative to the original suggestion that the troops be transported from Kengtung to Rangoon by air. This revised outline is attached as part of tab 1.3 The initial reactions of the CIA and of the Ambassadors at Rangoon and Bangkok and the Chargé at Taipei have been obtained. They concur in the desirability of an effort to help bring about the departure of these troops from Burma and their transportation to Formosa.

B. Discussion

1.

American Interest

The KMT troops in Burma were presumably regarded at one time as of potential value either as the nucleus of a guerrilla force which could move into and operate in China or as a bastion of defense against a southward advance of Communist Chinese into Southeast Asia. As events have turned out, there is no indication that these troops will ever move into China for guerrilla warfare against Communist forces or even return to their homes. When they did attempt to move into China they were driven out. As regards their value as a defensive force they are in conflict with the authorities of the country they occupy and there is reason to believe that now they are of less military value to the free world as a support to regional defense than the regularly organized Burmese Army with which the KMT troops in Burma are bound to be in conflict as long as they remain on Burmese territory. The matter is therefore believed to concern an over-all regional interest as well as the relations of the United States with Burma.

2.

Recent Aggravation of the Problem

[Page 44]

The above ground Communist opposition in Burma has made sedulous use of the KMT situation to heckle the Government. The free press has continued to focus a spotlight on what has become a running sore until public opinion is being brought to a boiling point against the affront to Burma’s sovereignty. Unless it soon appears that some thing is being done public pressure may goad the Burmese military into undertaking a large-scale offensive against the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma. This the Burmese have naturally been reluctant to do because available troops are needed for fighting the local Communist and other insurgents.

A recent increase in KMT activity, bringing with it an intensified interest on the part of the Burmese press, has given rise to a spate of reporting on the situation. It appears certain that the Chinese Nationalists have indeed been more active in the last few months than they had for some time before. In early December the Supreme Commander of Burma’s armed forces expressed concern over a report that 300–500 Chinese Nationalists had switched allegiance to the Communists and were moving into the southerly peninsula of the Tavoy-Mergui area, with the possible aim of seeking contact with Malayan Communist elements. Other reports reached the Burmese War Office of suspected infiltration of KMT ranks by Chinese Communist officers in the Shan States. Reports continued to point up the insolent behavior of the KMT elements in the area of Kengtung. One press story claimed that about 500 Chinese Nationalist troops had moved into the seat of local government in the Shan state of Monghsu (about 90 miles WNW of Kengtung) and had occupied the ruling Sawbwa’s official residence and taken over the tax functions. The Burmese War Office confirmed this report and admitted the local Sawbwa was bringing pressure on the Burmese Government to divert troops to the area to drive the KMT out. Ne Win has recently informed our Army Attaché that additional KMT troops have reached Burma through Thailand.

The danger of an alliance between elements of the KMT and the Karens has by no means subsided according to recent reports. … the KMT activities of the past 60 days may force a radical change in the deployment of Burmese troops in an attempt to avert the possibility of a KMT-Karen alliance.

. . . . . . .

4.

Reactions of the Ambassador at Rangoon and Chargé at Taipei

Ambassador Sebald telegraphed on December 8 (tab 3)4 that the Embassy agreed fully with the plan in substance and that details of [Page 45] a plan that would offer prospects of a practical solution could be worked out after receipt of a definite instruction. Mr. Rankin telegraphed on December 11 (tab 4)5 saying that he was sending comments by mail and suggesting that the matter be discussed with Foreign Minister Yeh, if possible.

Mr. Rankin’s letter of December 18 (tab 5)6 concurred in the desirability of a practical plan but raised several points requiring careful thought and planning. He also enumerated certain difficulties to be overcome. He felt that Chiang Kai-shek would not agree to the plan unless satisfied that it had the backing of the new U.S. Administration and said that a direct request to Chiang to order his troops out of Burma would risk almost certain refusal unless the ground were carefully prepared in advance. Mr. Rankin recommended careful investigation of how the plan would be financed and urged study of whether evacuation of 2,000 or 3,000, which would be only a portion of the total, would be worthwhile. He recommended evacuation via Thailand, if possible, pointing out that transportation southward from Kengtung to Bangkok would be much simpler than southwest from Kengtung to Rangoon over mountain ranges.

Mr. Rankin expressed the belief that some of the Chinese military on Formosa would object on the ground that the KMT troops in Burma had great potential defense value and together with guerrillas in South China were in fact now tying down two Chinese Communist armies in Yunnan. Other Chinese authorities, who have given up cherished projects in the interest of achieving a balanced budget, would oppose expenditures on a repatriation project which was of less concern to them than projects they had given up. We would have to anticipate the possibility that the Chinese Government would claim that it did not have control over KMT troops in Burma and that General Li Mi himself controlled only a portion of them.

Mr. Rankin wrote that he was convinced that in order to induce the Chinese troops in Burma to obey an order to leave Burma it would be necessary to make a lump sum payment to each officer and man.

5.

Reaction of Ambassador at Bangkok

No copy of the outline of a proposed plan for removing the KMT troops from Burma via Rangoon has been sent to the Ambassador at Bangkok but after … expressed the opinion that evacuation via Thailand was not out of the question the Department telegraphed the Ambassador at Bangkok (tab 6)7 for his reaction. On [Page 46] December 9, Mr. Stanton telegraphed (tab 7)8 that he had not discussed the matter with the Prime Minister for a long time but thought the Prime Minister and Cabinet could be persuaded to agree to transportation of the troops via Thailand provided the KMT troops were willing to surrender their arms at the border. Mr. Stanton has reported in the same sense as Mr. Rankin (tab 8)9 that he is certain that a cash sum payment or subsidy would be paid to each soldier in order to induce the men to leave Burma.

C. Conclusions

The previously prepared outline of proposed steps has been modified to provide for the possibility of moving the troops out of Burma to Thailand and from Bangkok to Formosa by Chinese Nationalist vessel. It is not believed necessary to work out in detail a plan of action for evacuation via Thailand at this time. The original proposals have been amended (tab 1) to provide that if Chiang Kai-shek agrees to the plan and Li Mi’s cooperation is assured, the Burmese Government will be informed that the U.S. Government is prepared to associate itself with the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa in asking the Government of Thailand whether it would be prepared to allow evacuation via Thailand and, if so, under what conditions. The Burmese Government might be asked if it would be willing to associate itself with this move by making inquiry on the subject through its Embassy in Bangkok. If the Thai Government should agree to evacuation via Thailand the troops could move southward by foot to Chiengmai and by rail from Chiengmai to Bangkok. No airlift would be necessary and the extent of assistance required from the Department of Defense would be less than if evacuation were to be via Rangoon. Evacuation via Thailand would have the further advantage of permitting direct contact between the Chinese Nationalist troops and Chinese Nationalist representatives in Thailand and direct communication regarding the progress of evacuation between the Thai Government and the Government on Formosa.…

With regard to Mr. Rankin’s query as to whether evacuation of 2,000 to 3,000 would be worthwhile it is believed that if the United States can help arrange the departure of even a smaller number of the KMT troops in Burma the action will redound to the benefit of the United States. In preparatory steps to secure President Chiang’s agreement to order the KMT troops out of Burma it is recognized that one obstacle is that mentioned by Mr. Rankin in his letter of December 18, namely, that some of President Chiang’s [Page 47] military advisers will maintain that the KMT troops in Burma are of greater potential usefulness where they are than they would have to be in Formosa.

Both Mr. Rankin and Mr. Stanton have expressed the opinion that some form of lump-sum payment would have to be made to the soldiers in order to induce them to obey orders to leave Burma. While it is not absolutely certain that it would be necessary to make such payments the possibility of this being necessary requires consideration of whether there are political or other objections to making such payments and, if not, how the necessary funds are to be obtained and disbursed. It may be assumed that no such payment to any individual soldier would be made until after he had laid down his arms and agreed to submit to the authorities directing the departure of soldiers from Burma. It may be assumed also that in order to provide the inducement, if payments are necessary, the KMT troops would have to be given some promise of payment so that they would know that they may expect to receive a payment if they lay down their arms.

If evacuation is to be via Rangoon, aircraft must be obtained for an airlift from Kengtung to Rangoon. Travel on foot from Kengtung to Rangoon is probably not practicable. The question of availability of such aircraft is a matter which should be discussed with the Department of Defense with a view to determining whether U.S. military aircraft could be used and, if so, under what conditions and in what quantity. Even if evacuation is to be via Thailand full concurrence of the Department of Defense is desirable in view of various military considerations involved in these proposals.

D. Recommendations

It is recommended that the proposal that a plan be worked out for removal of the KMT troops from Burma be taken up with the JCS with a view to securing their approval and that if they concur the Department proceed to hold discussions with such officials of the Department of Defense as may be designated for the purpose by the JCS.

. . . . . . .

If there is full agreement between the Department of State … and the Department of Defense, it is recommended that appropriate instructions be sent to the Embassies at Taipei, Rangoon and Bangkok and that the Chargé d’Affaires in Taipei be instructed to make the initial approach to Chiang Kai-shek that will be necessary to carry out the first step in the proposed plan of action.

  1. The memorandum was routed via Deputy Under Secretary Matthews. It was apparently not forwarded to Bruce, but was returned to Allison with an attached memorandum of Jan. 22, from Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary, which reads as follows:

    “Mr. Matthews agrees with the conclusions and recommendations of the attached paper. He feels, however, that probably the best and quickest way to get Defense Department concurrence is via General Magruder who, I believe, is familiar with the problem and who may decide that it is not necessary to take the matter up with the JCS. If I can be of help in taking the matter up with General Magruder, please let me know.

    “… General Smith has been informed that such a plan exists, but he has not concurred in the plan itself.

    “We agree that the plan to evacuate the KTM troops through Thailand is the more feasible of the two possibilities, and assume that we will press first for this solution.”

    Walter Bedell Smith was the Director of Central Intelligence.

  2. Reference is to Document 28.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Telegram 952 from Rangoon, Dec. 8, 1952, not printed.
  5. Telegram 610 from Taipei, Dec. 11, 1952, not printed.
  6. Letter to Assistant Secretary Allison, Dec. 18, 1952, not printed.
  7. Telegram 1084 to Bangkok, Dec. 8, 1952, not printed.
  8. Telegram 1044 from Bangkok, Dec. 9, 1952, not printed.
  9. Telegram 980 from Bangkok, Nov. 29, 1952, not printed.