Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.00/12–1852

No. 29
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Burma (Sebald)

secret

Rangoon, December 18, 1952.

Subject:

• Burmese Arms Procurement; KMT Problem.

Participants:

• Lieutenant General Ne Win
• Ambassador Sebald

In a private conversation after luncheon at the Embassy Residence today, General Ne Win said that he had several matters which he wished to discuss with me.

(1) Arms Procurement General Ne Win said that when he was in Washington, he had promised General Olmsted¹ a letter, setting forth Burma’s arms requirements, within two weeks after his arrival in Rangoon, but that various circumstances, including the absence of the Prime Minister from Rangoon and his own subsequent travels, had made a decision on this question impractical, and that he had not yet written the promised letter. However, in the meantime, some doubt had arisen in governmental circles, and in his own mind, concerning the advisability of making a request for arms procurement from the United States at this time. These doubts rested upon the fear that the new Administration² in Washington might adopt a different attitude toward Burma, and that any Burmese request, if denied, could give rise to serious repercussions among some members of the Government. He said that he did not wish to make a request to the United States for arms procurement unless he could be assured in advance that the request would be granted.

I said that, while I could not, of course, speak for the new Administration, which had not yet taken office, and that anything which I might say would therefore be based upon my own analysis of the situation, I felt that it was public knowledge that the Republican Party and its leaders had stated that they would give much greater attention to the problems of Asia than had hitherto been the case. In any event, I had reason to believe that the United States Government as at present constituted, would most probably look with favor upon a request by Burma for arms procurement, provided the conditions of the relevant legislation were met. I also doubted very much that the new Administration under President Eisenhower would act differently. However, in order to guard against the possibility of a refusal, it might be well if an informal approach were made by the GUB to the Embassy to ascertain in advance what the reaction of the United States Government would be to a specific request for arms procurement. Such request should include a list of the items which are desired, and a timetable of such requirements. I stressed, however, the necessity that the GUB consult with the British Services Mission in advance, so that we might be assured that the British are aware of what is being done. I felt sure that he understood that our relations with Britain are very close and the we all must of necessity be above-board and work together in transactions of this kind. General Ne Win said that he had already consulted with the British and felt sure that they understood the situation.

I told General Ne Win that I had heard that he was considering renewing the agreement with the BSM³ for another five years. He said that no decision had been reached in this regard, but that some decision must, of course, be made prior to January 31, 1953, when the present agreement expires. He related some difficulties which have recently arisen between officers of his staff and some of the British officers—difficulties which he attributed largely to personality clashes. He said that several British officers were attempting to use the recently reestablished good relations between the British and Burmese for bargaining purposes to “feather their own nests”. He is presently studying these problems in conjunction with Air Commodore Ward.

(2) KMT Problem. General Ne Win briefly traced some of the difficulties which have recently arisen out of the KMT problem, such as the capture of a Chinese Communist officer; the defection of several hundred KMT’s to the Communists, and their advance southward almost as far as Tavoy, where, it appears, an effort is perhaps being made to join up with the Communists in Malaya; and, information to the effect that some twelve KMT officers had been instructed to return to Taipei, thus leaving their subcommands without direction.

I said that I was, of course fully aware of the dangerous potentialities of the KMT problem and hoped that we could be of some help in suggesting a solution. I intimated that we were thinking about ways and means to resolve this problem, but it appeared to us that the crux of the problem lies in an answer to the question whether the KMT’s would carry out orders given to them by Taipei. Should the answer be in the affirmative, I wondered whether the GUB would agree to allow the KMT’s to pass through Burmese territory to be placed on shipboard either at Rangoon or some other port. General Ne Win replied that there would be no question but that such permission would be granted, and further, that the KMT’s arms would be returned to them. I said that we would further consider the problem, and if we could discover any practical way in which we might be of help, I would let him know through the Foreign Office.

General Ne Win spoke at some length concerning the danger that the Chinese Communists might use the presence of the KMT’s in Burma to infiltrate their own operatives and troops into Burma. He spoke of Naw Seng, a Kachin leader, who is presently in China near the Burma border with some three hundred troops. Should Naw Seng and his followers enter Burma, he felt certain that the morale of the Communists in Burma would be raised to a considerable extent, and that this would raise further difficulties. He also said that it is presently necessary to deploy at least six battalions of troops to watch the KMT’s. He is also under considerable pressure to use a greater portion of his Army to drive out the KMT troops.

General Ne Win mentioned Singh (concerning whom The Nation had recently published an account). He said that his intelligence had known of Singh for about two years. He is from Manipur and maintains close connections with the Indian Communist Party as well as with the Chinese Communists.

W.J. Sebald

1. Maj. Gen. George H. Olmsted, Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense.
2. Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated as President on Jan. 20, 1953.
3. Reference is to the Defense Agreement between Burma and the United Kingdom, signed Aug. 29, 1947, or the Freeman-Let Ya Agreement. The text is printed as an annex to the treaty between Burma and the United Kingdom recognizing Burma’s independence, signed Oct. 17, 1947; see 70 UNTS 183.